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Preface 
Critical Infrastructures Preparedness and Resilience is a major societal security issue in modern 
society. Critical Infrastructures (CIs) provide vital services to modern societies. Some CIs’ 
disruptions may endanger the security of the citizen, the safety of the strategic assets and even 
the governance continuity. 
The importance of CI’s has been recognized by the European Commission by issuing directive 
2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of European CIs and the assessment of the 
need to improve their protection. The European Programme for European Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (EPCIP) has been developed and running since 2006. The programme involves pilot 
projects analysing EU's gas and electricity systems and other CIs. The European Commission 
Joint Research Centre actively participates in EPCIP by providing technical support, 
dissemination and training activities. 
The critical role that CIs play in the security of modern societies is a direct effect of the ever-
increasing spread out of the information technology (IT) in every smallest task in man’s daily-
life. The continuous progress in the IT fields pushes modern systems and infrastructures to be 
increasingly intelligent, distributed and proactive. That increases the productivity, the prosperity 
and the living standards of the modern societies. But, it increases the complexity of the systems 
and the infrastructures, as well. The more complex a system is, the more vulnerable it will be 
and the more numerous the threats that can impact on its operability. The loss of operability of 
critical infrastructures may result in major crises in modern societies. To counterbalance the 
increasing vulnerability of the systems, engineers, designers and operators should enhance the 
system preparedness and resilience facing different threats. Much interest is currently paid to the 
Modelling, Simulation & Analysis (SM&A) of the CI in order to enhance the CIs’ preparedness 
& resilience. 
ESReDA as one of the most active EU networks in the field has initiated a project group (CI‐
PR/MS&A‐Data) on the “Critical Infrastructure/Modelling, Simulation and Analysis – Data”. 
The main focus of the project group is to report on the state of progress in MS&A of the CIs 
preparedness & resilience with a specific focus on the corresponding data availability and 
relevance. In order to report on the most recent developments in the field of the CIs 
preparedness & resilience MS&A and the availability of the relevant data, ESReDA held its 52nd 
Seminar on the following thematic: “Critical Infrastructures: Enhancing Preparedness & 
Resilience for the security of citizens and services supply continuity”. 
The 52nd ESReDA Seminar was a very successful event, which attracted about 50 participants 
from industry, authorities, operators, research centres, academia and consultancy companies. 
The seminar programme consisted of 18 technical papers, three plenary speeches and a specific 
round table on Cyber Security. 
The editorial work for this volume was supported by the Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission in the frame of JRC support to ESReDA activities. Thank is due to A. Liessens of 
JRC for the editorial work. 
Dr. Inga Žutautaitė   Dr. Vytis Kopustinskas, Dr. Kaisa Simola 
Lithuanian Energy Institute EC Joint Research Centre 
Dr. Mohamed Eid 
Commissariat for Atomic Energy & Alternative Energies 
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Safety and Security of Critical Infrastructures with regard 
to nuclear facilities 
Berg Heinz-Peter 
Bültenweg 85 
38106 Braunschweig, Germany 
Abstract 
Safety and security should have a high priority for operators of critical 
infrastructures keeping in mind that safety and security have a common purpose: the 
protection of people, society and the environment depending of the type of critical 
infrastructure. Cybersecurity has become an essential element of the overall security 
framework of all kinds of critical infrastructures. As the threat landscape changes 
and as new actors – from criminal organizations to nation states – get involved, the 
threat to critical infrastructures from cyber- attacks is increasingly perceived as a 
growing, real problem. As examples the current experiences and future activities in 
case of nuclear facilities in Germany under the IT Act recently set in force are 
discussed and results of international activities in this area are reported. 
Keywords: Safety, (cyber)security, IT security, regulations, international projects. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructure plays a key role in the functioning of the state and the lives of 
its citizens. As a result of events caused by the forces of nature or as a consequence of 
human activities, critical infrastructure can be destroyed, damaged, and its 
performance may be disrupted, affecting the economic development of the state. 
Therefore, the protection of critical infrastructure is one of the priorities of the 
government. Through the protection of critical infrastructure should be understood as 
all activities aimed at ensuring the functionality, continuity and integrity of critical 
infrastructures in order to prevent threats, risks or weaknesses and limitations and 
neutralize their effects, including rapid restoration of infrastructure in the event of 
failure, (cyber)attacks and other incidents affecting the proper functioning. 
As the threats changes and new actors – from criminal organizations to nation states – 
get involved, the threat to critical infrastructures from cyber- attacks is increasingly 
perceived as a growing, real problem. 
A violation or sabotage to critical infrastructures can be driven by a physical attack 
(e.g. disconnection of a cable) or by an indirect attack from the cyberspace and in this 
paper we focus on the latter. According to the terminology in International 
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Electrotechnical Commission (2015), cybersecurity is defined as “actions required to 
preclude unauthorized use of, denial of service to, modifications to, disclosure of, loss 
of revenue from, or destruction of critical systems or informational assets”. 
Nuclear power plants benefit from a sophisticated and comprehensive safety regime 
that has been established over the years. However, the security regime for nuclear 
power plants is far less developed than the safety regime. In general, nuclear safety 
and nuclear security have a common purpose: the protection of people, society and 
the environment from unintended releases of radiation material. Many of the 
principles to ensure protection are common, although their implementation may 
differ. For nuclear safety or security reasons protection shall be ensured by good 
design and appropriate operational practices of the respective facilities including 
nuclear waste disposal. 
Recent complex attacks have been designed to target to instrumentation and control 
(I&C) systems with all the potential consequences for safety and security such attacks 
may carry (Institute for Security and Safety 2015). In that context, cybersecurity is 
understood as all processes and mechanisms by which any digital equipment, 
information or service is protected from unintended access, change or destruction. 
Cybersecurity has become an essential element of the overall security framework of 
nuclear facilities and it is establishing itself as a priority for operators and regulators. 
2. GERMAN IT SECURITY ACT
The German IT Security Act (IT-Sicherheitsgesetz) has been in force since July 2015. 
Regulations which specify the areas of critical infrastructure covered by the act are 
needed for its implementation. An initial regulation relating to this entered into force 
in May 2016. It covers the critical infrastructure sectors of energy, information 
technology and telecommunications, as well as water and food.  
The next regulation is expected in spring 2017 and will cover finance, transport and 
traffic, as well as health sectors. In each case, the sectors affected must full their 
obligations under the law six months after the regulations have entered into force.  
Initial effects are already being seen as a result of the enactment of the IT Security 
Act. For example, individual companies in the areas covered are already meeting their 
statutory obligations for reporting IT security incidents and for protecting IT systems 
in accordance with state-of-the-art technology ahead of the deadline. Sector-specific 
working groups have been formed under co-operation of critical infrastructures.  
The IT Security Act places the highest demands on the operators of critical 
infrastructures. In addition to the establishment of adequate safety measures 
corresponding to the state of the art, they must undergo an evaluation of these 
measures every 4 years. As a national cybersecurity authority, the goal of the Federal 
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Office for Information Security (BSI) is to promote IT security in Germany. BSI is 
first and foremost the central IT security service provider for the federal government. 
Thus, in addition to the legal requirements for the establishment of appropriate 
technical and organizational measures for the protection of IT systems, the core 
element of the IT Security Act is the various reporting requirements on IT security 
incidents to BSI, which will function as a central reporting and supervisory authority. 
BSI provides the insights gained from these notifications, but also from various other 
information, to all operators of critical infrastructures so that they can adequately 
protect their IT. The obligation to report significant IT security concerns initially 
affects, as explained above, the energy sector and, thus, also the operators of nuclear 
power plants. 
A first example with respect to critical infrastructures in 2013 which has been 
reported by BSI (2014) was the malfunction in the energy sector but not in the 
nuclear area. Anomalies were detected in the data streams in several Austrian control 
networks for the management of energy grids. These caused malfunctions for grid 
and power station operators as well as a number of data transmission disruptions. It is 
suspected that the malfunction was triggered by a command during commissioning a 
gas grid operator in southern Germany which also extended to the Austrian energy 
grid. This was then passed on to various different operators. Due to the unspecified 
processing of this message in individual network components the command was sent 
as an infinite loop, thereby triggering serious disruption of the grid management 
control. During the incident the grid’s stability could only be maintained at great 
expense. During the disruption considerable volumes of data were created, leading to 
log data overflows. Accordingly it has not yet been possible to finally determine the 
cause of the incident. 
The recent BSI report (2016) provides a reliable and in-depth description of current 
developments in IT security. It outlines the current exposure in Germany, assesses 
vulnerabilities in IT systems and illustrates both means and methods of attack and 
finally provides information about the structures and framework conditions of IT 
security in Germany. The reporting period was characterised by a continued increase 
in the professionalisation of attackers and their methods of attack. The number of 
known malicious program versions increased further in 2016 and, in August 2016, the 
recorded figure was over 560 million. At the same time, current conventional defence 
measures are continuing to lose their effectiveness. This affects all users – private, 
corporate, state and administrative. The threat from ransomware has increased in 
Germany significantly since the end of 2015. Ransomware is defined as malicious 
programs which restrict or prevent access to data and systems and only release these 
resources upon payment of ransom money. 
Malicious programs are generally installed with the involvement of the user, meaning 
that technical protective measures are circumvented and attackers are able to 
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penetrate protected networks. IT security must be considered and implemented as an 
overarching concept which also comprises user involvement. 
3. SAFETY AND SECURITY ASPECTS FOR NUCLEAR
FACILITIES 
Many elements or actions serve to enhance both safety and security simultaneously. 
For example, the containment structure at a nuclear power plant serves to prevent a 
significant release of radioactive material to the environment in the event of an 
accident, while simultaneously providing a robust structure that protects the reactor 
from a terrorist assault. However, all these actions are, of course, ineffective in the 
case of cyber- attacks as described in the event of malicious software later on in this 
section. Therefore, the Federal Government has issued the Directive for the 
Protection of IT Systems in Nuclear Installations (BMU 2013). 
The following definitions are provided by International Atomic Energy Agency 
(2009): 
 nuclear safety as “the achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention
of accidents and mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection
of workers, the public and the environment from undue radiation hazards”,
 nuclear security, on the other hand, as, “the prevention and detection of and
response to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or other
malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances, or
their associated facilities”.
Although safety and security are considered complementary, typical differences exist 
and are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Typical differences between safety and security. 
SAFETY SECURITY 
The nature of an incident 
is an inherent risk 
The nature of an incident is caused by a human 
act 
Non intentional Intentional 
No human aggressor Human aggressor 
Quantitative probabilities 
and frequencies of safety-related risks are 
available 
Only qualitative (expert-opinion based) 
likelihood of security-related risks may be 
available 
Risks are of a rational nature Threats may be of a 
symbolic nature 
Information is generally open Information must be kept confidential 
There are certainly similarities in the approaches to protection under safety and under 
security: both rely on in-depth-defences; both place priority on prevention, early 
detection, and prompt action; and both require extensive emergency planning. 
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However, the different starting points of safety and security at times have 
implications for how measures are implemented and who implements them. 
Moreover, nuclear safety and security management must be considered throughout 
the lifetime of the facility, which begins with the facility design and continues 
through commissioning, operation, decommissioning and dismantling. An interaction 
between safety and security is necessary before making changes to plant 
configurations, facility conditions or security to ensure that potential adverse effects 
have been adequately considered and managed (Berg and Seidel, 2014). One 
possibility of a unified approach is shown in Figure 2. 
Observations from the near past show the evidence that cyber threats have been also 
directed on software-based instrumentation and control (SB I&C) systems of 
industrial processing plants. For instance, the Stuxnet attack targeted the 
instrumentation and control of a nuclear facility. As a consequence, there is an urgent 
need to analyse and protect SB I&C performing functions important to safety 
according to cybersecurity.  
Cybersecurity as a component of nuclear security is the range of measures enacted to 
prevent, detect, or respond to the theft of nuclear material or the sabotage of a nuclear 
facility that could result in catastrophic consequences through cyber-attacks. 
Security Analysis
Environment, Risks, Threats, Countermeasures
Security Design
Secure components, Interaction, Procedures
Realization, Validation, Commissioning jointly
Operation
Security Monitoring, Updates
Risk/Hazard Analysis
System Boundary, Probabilities, Effects, 
Mitigation
Safety Design
Safe components, Interaction, Procedures
Operation
Safety Requirements, Reassessment?
Secure Decommissioning/Disposal Safe Decommissioning/Disposal
Security Safety
Figure 2: One possible unified approach according to Schoitsch and Bleier (2013). 
In order to implement and maintain cybersecurity a plant specific cybersecurity plan 
is to be developed which involves e.g. prescriptions to following aspects: 
 The high level documents such as on DBT and the plant security policy the
cybersecurity plan is to be embedded,
 Roles and responsibilities for cyber security,
 Reporting and documentation requirements,
 Interfaces of the cybersecurity plan to other documents on plant specification,
 SB I&C asset management,
 Graded approach to SB I&C security and risk assessment,
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 Implementation of cybersecurity controls (these are protective measures of
technical or administrative nature),
 Lifecycle qualification procedure.
It is obvious that the implementation of a cybersecurity feature (a SB I&C system 
internal property to support cyber security) or control some of the above mentioned 
security requirements needs a strategy to meet the above mentioned requirements and 
recommendations in accordance with the safety objectives. Therefore the mutual 
impact on safety and security has to be analyse and if necessary resolved. Some 
examples where a potential conflict has to be resolved are given by the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (2016): 
 The implementation of a cybersecurity feature or control shall not adversely
impact the performance, effectiveness, reliability or operation of safety
functions supported by SB I&C systems,
 The implementation of a cybersecurity feature directly in a pre-developed SB
I&C system should be justified and otherwise avoided because of adding
complexity and introducing new potential failure modes,
 Implementation of cybersecurity within or between safety systems shall be
justified from both perspectives, the safety and security side,
 If cybersecurity features are implemented in safety system displays and
controls, they shall not adversely impact the operator’s ability to maintain the
safety of the plant,
 Cybersecurity features and controls included in safety systems should be
developed and qualified to the same level of qualification as the systems,
 Cybersecurity features should not significantly increase diagnostic and
reparation time of safety functions.
A distinct cybersecurity issue is to develop and maintain a common SB I&C 
procurement strategy for the system vender and the component suppliers. This 
strategy should cover software and hardware development taking into account 
software or logic patterns embedded in pre-developed components such as complex 
programmed logic devices, field programmed gate arrays, or application specific 
integrated circuits. Suppliers should meet the same security requirements as the 
vendor responsible for final product. 
On national level, according to the new added § 44b in the Atomic Energy Act (2016) 
licensees shall report impairments of their information technology systems, 
components or processes which may lead to or already have led to a threat or 
disturbance of the nuclear safety of the relevant installation or practice, without delay 
to BSI. 
The report must contain information about the disturbance and about the general 
technical conditions, especially of the supposed or actual cause, and about the 
information technology affected. BSI shall transfer these reports to the Federal 
licensing and supervisory authorities that are responsible for nuclear safety and 
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security without delay which requires the support by the Incident Registration Centre 
of the Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management.  
One event of malicious software occur in a German nuclear power plant (see BSI 
2016): over the course of preparations for inspection work, malicious programs were 
discovered on a computer used for presenting and highlighting operating steps on the 
fuel rod loading machine (visualisation computer). The malicious programs that were 
detected are widely distributed and have been easily identified by virus scanners for a 
long time.  
The visualisation computer itself was no longer running with the current version of 
the operating system and did not have a virus scanner. This is not unusual in the 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system environment due to the 
authorisation procedures and compatibility requirements in this area. This 
combination enabled an attack by the Concker. In addition to this, the malicious 
program Ramnit was found on the visualisation computer. Besides computer 
networks, both Concker and Ramnit use USB storage devices in order to infect other 
systems. The infection could therefore have been originally transferred onto one of 
these USB storage devices using a PC connected to the Internet which had been 
infected with the malicious software online. The USB storage device was then used at 
a later point in time on the visualisation computer and was thus able to infect the 
unprotected computer even though it was not connected to any network. 
No damage occurred to the nuclear power plant itself, the associated infrastructure or 
the information technology. However, the operator incurred costs in terms of the 
working time involved in reconstructing the course of events, the ongoing analysis 
and the subsequent cleaning of the computers and data storage devices affected. 
As a conclusion from this event, BSI recommended that both Concker and Ramnit 
should be regarded as common and now even obsolete malicious programs which by 
today's standards do not use any special mechanisms. The distribution method via 
USB data storage is also not unusual. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OUTLOOK
There has been remarkable consistency in the identification of the key governance 
improvements that are needed. The regime needs to be more cohesive and its current 
components universalized and maximally utilized. There needs to be greater cross-
border communication of non-sensitive information for the purpose of building 
international confidence in the system.  
The system requires the institution of a peer review process similar to that employed 
in the nuclear safety regime. Moreover, best practices need to be disseminated, but 
allowed to be implemented in a flexible and culturally sensitive manner. 
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Although safety and security programs have different requirements, they overlap in 
key areas and could support and enhance one another. However, the cybersecurity 
reaches very high importance as the BSI identified a new quality to the nature of this 
threat for every type of critical infrastructure.  
The main gateways for cyber-attacks are unchanged and remain critical: 
 Vulnerabilities exist in software, in some cases also hardware products, which
are used most often and which enable attackers to remove information or gain
control over systems,
 Attackers have botnets available which have been developed and are executed
in an organised manner for distributing malicious software or spam emails on
a mass scale. These botnets can also be used successfully for attacks on the
availability of services,
 Users also often either fail to apply conventional and straightforward security
measures, or do so inadequately,
 Opportunities are arising for cyber criminals in the marketing of attack tools,
but also for extortion due to anonymous payment methods such as Bitcoin.
According to GAO (2015) the number of major cyber events continues to increase 
sharply every year, taking advantage of weaknesses in processes and people as well 
as technologies. There has been widespread recognition that some of these 
cybersecurity (cyber) events cannot be stopped and solely focusing on preventing 
cyber events from occurring is a flawed approach. Organizations should improve their 
prevention capabilities with modern technology and tools while augmenting their 
cyber event detection and response capabilities. 
Organizations used to focus their information security efforts on cyber event 
protection, but adversaries have modified their attack techniques to make protection 
much more difficult, including taking advantage of weaknesses in processes and 
people as well as technologies. The number of cyber events continues to increase 
sharply every year leading to a widespread recognition that some cyber events cannot 
be stopped (GAO 2015). 
 
As a result of this risk recognition, organizations have 
started to improve their prevention capabilities with modern technology and tools 
while augmenting their cyber event detection and response capabilities. 
However, although recovery is an important part of the enterprise risk management 
process lifecycle (see Figure 2); for example, NIST (2014) defines five functions: 
identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. These functions are all critical for a 
complete defense. The recovery area is described in more detail in Bartock et al 
(2016). 
Cybersecurity has become an essential element of the overall security framework of 
nuclear facilities and it is establishing itself as a priority for facility operators and 
national regulators. 
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Figure 2: Risk management process lifecycle according to Bartock et al (2016. 
In that context, a research project by the Institute for Security and Safety (2015) has 
been performed on cybersecurity at nuclear facilities. This study focuses on 
characterizing what several countries are doing at the national level and introduces a 
potential model for developing a national approach to cybersecurity at nuclear 
facilities.  
Thematically, this study focuses on the underlying frameworks comparing laws, 
regulations, regulatory frameworks, licensing and other associated regulatory 
activities and analysing differences and similarities across the countries surveyed. 
The range of activities considered in the study provides a model of a national legal 
and regulatory framework necessary to ensure cybersecurity at nuclear facilities.  
After several years in which cybersecurity at nuclear facilities has evolved from ad 
hoc measures and pilot projects to a fairly established and important element of 
overall nuclear security, it is important and timely to try and capture a comparative 
snapshot of where its implementation stands in several countries. 
The threat from cyber-attacks is increasingly perceived as a problem of national and 
international security as cyber-attacks grow in number and sophistication and as 
actors behind them are no longer only private hackers or organized criminals but also 
nation states. Likewise, attacks once confined to networks and computer systems 
have now been extended to instrumentation and control systems with all the 
implications and potential consequences such attacks may carry.  
Nuclear facilities – in operation or being built – have progressively become heavily 
reliant on digital I&C systems or computer based information systems. This is a 
consequence of the disappearance from the market of analog products as the 
digitalization of operational functions and working processes increases in quality and 
efficiency. This development gives rise to new threats confirmed by the publications 
of security vulnerabilities in the area of process control and automation systems. 
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Further efforts need also to be made in ensuring that cybersecurity is acknowledged 
and fully referenced in the other domains protecting the operation of nuclear facilities 
(safety, physical security, nuclear material accountancy and control). In particular in 
some fields like instrumentation & control, the interaction between the cyber and 
physical sides is so strong and inextricable that they are coming into fields of studies 
and analysis of their own, see Institute for Security and Safety (2015). It is therefore 
crucial that these interdependences are rapidly recognized and documented at the 
appropriate level in guidance instruments. Where relevant, most safety and security 
functions may have to be reassessed with a clear understanding of possible 
interactions with cyber threats in mind. 
The impetus for the focus on cyber security is that it is one of the most significant 
new key elements that have entered the nuclear security arena in the last decades, 
quickly gaining prominence and significance due to growing reliance on digital 
equipment and to game-changing events like the Stuxnet attack. After several years in 
which cyber security at nuclear facilities has evolved from ad hoc measures and pilot 
projects to a fairly established and important element of overall nuclear security, it is 
important and timely to try and capture a comparative snapshot of where its 
implementation stands in several countries. 
In general, cybersecurity concerns should extend to cover the full lifecycle of nuclear 
facilities and their components. Therefore, cyber security should become a fully 
incorporated factor in such activities associated with the operation of nuclear facilities 
like the management of the nuclear supply chain, instrumentation certification 
procedures, personnel security issues, core training curricula or threat assessment. 
An important aspect is to provide an appropriate security testing methodology 
because an asset is safe and secure if it free from unwanted damage. Traditional 
software testing doesn’t distinguish. The difference between software safety and 
software security is the presence of an intelligent adversary bent on breaking the 
system which makes security testing more difficult.  
Therefore, a security methodology is not a simple thing. It is the back-end of a 
process or solution which defines what or who is tested as well as when and where. It 
must take a complex process and reduce it into elemental processes and sufficiently 
explain the components of those processes. Then the methodology must explain the 
tests for verifying what those elemental processes are doing while they are doing, 
moving, and changing. Finally, the methodology must contain metrics both to assure 
the methodology has been carried out correctly and to comprehend or grade the result 
of applying the methodology. One approach for security testing is described in 
Institute for Security and Open Methodologies (2010) differentiating six different 
types of tests:  
 Blind: tester knows nothing about assets and defenses; target knows test
details,
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 Double Blind: tester knows nothing about assets and defenses; target is
unaware of test,
 Gray Box: tester has incomplete knowledge of assets and defenses, target
knows test details,
 Double Gray Box: tester has incomplete knowledge of assets and defenses;
target expects test, but doesn’t know details,
 Tandem: both tester and target know details of the assets, defense and test,
 Reversal: tester knows details of assets and defenses, but target is unaware of
test.
Crafting a strategy that protects facilities from dynamic, evolving cyber threats 
requires a fresh, unconstrained examination of the overarching framework that guides 
cybersecurity. The report of van Dine et al. (2016) identified four overarching 
priorities, as well as specific actions, that if implemented would dramatically reduce 
the risk of damaging cyber-attacks on nuclear facilities: institutionalize cybersecurity, 
mount an active defense, reduce complexity and pursue transformation. 
A recent report of the Energy Expert Cyber Security Platform (2017) proposed a 
strategic framework for the energy sector including nuclear with the target to address 
the challenges found in the energy sector including nuclear energy. 
This strategic framework consists of four strategic priorities which address key areas 
of threat and risk management: the cyber response in case of a cyber-attack, the 
continuously improvement of cyber resilience, the build-up of required capacities and 
competences for the energy sector. In order to meet current and future cyber security 
needs, the strategic priorities target organisational preparedness and maturity of 
organisations rather than demanding specific cyber security functionalities. This 
should help to address the dynamics in the energy sector and to anticipate and adapt 
to existing and emerging threats by the analysis and implementation of capabilities 
and appropriate in-time mitigation measures. 
Current questions about cybersecurity arising from the increasing use of digital 
control systems in nuclear power plants are being addressed by the research project 
SMARTEST where a test method for the detection of weak points of software-based 
control systems should be developed. The project will be completed in June 2018. 
Some information on modeling of techniques attacks are shown in Fischer et al. 
(2016). 
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Abstract 
This paper introduces a holistic concept for the protection of heterogeneous critical 
infrastructure networks that is applicable on a strategic level. The basis of the 
proposed model is the concept that security incidents may be propagated between 
assets of interconnected networks. The proposed methodology emphasizes the 
strategic level protection both from the perspective of the network operator and the 
emergency responder, linking all phases of the disaster cycle into a unique concept of 
operations. As a case study for ship to port interface a LNG terminal is presented. 
Keywords. Risk assessment, Interconnection analysis, Holistic impact analysis, 
European critical infrastructures, Climate Change. 
Introduction1.
Critical infrastructures (CI) provide the essential services that underpin society and 
serve as the backbone of every nation's economy, security, and health. Historically, 
the design and operation of CI accounts for natural and accidental failures, but place 
little or no emphasis on protection against security incidents. Networks of assets are 
increasingly physically integrated with each other, with other installations, and with 
other economic activities and support the uninterrupted progress of mass events, 
forming synergistic “network of networks”. An attack on a specific asset is likely to 
impact the entire “network of networks” within which it resides, since it can have 
swelling-effects and cascading failures. 
Despite the fact that security issues are very similar across all counties, there is a 
remarkable gap in the derivation of a commonly agreed protection framework and a 
common concept of operations. Following the EC Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Program (Directive 114/2008/EC), a proposed strategic protection framework  mainly 
could be considered a small yet decisive step towards the development of a common 
and harmonized security risk assessment process for critical infrastructures. 
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The unification of the crisis phases, Figure 1, will ensure effective and faster 
response: Early awareness from multiple fused data sources, increased readiness, 
education and training, reduced risk to emergency responders by providing accurate 
and timely coherent information relating to hazards and risks. The proposed work 
however is focused on the development of a consolidated risk assessment and risk 
management plan for interconnected CI systems linked to coherent contingency 
planning. 
Figure 1. Phases of the Crisis Cycle (Leventakis et. all, 2014) 
Risk Analysis is a continuously adaptive process where threats are evolving and more 
sophisticated technological solutions are used to exploit system vulnerabilities. In 
recent years, many researchers have tried to accommodate the complex 
interconnections of modern critical infrastructures and cascading events into a holistic 
risk analysis process. 
(Earl et al., 2007) and (Rosato et al., 2008) applied complex network theories, 
whereas the introduction of not only abstract interdependencies but also selected 
properties of infrastructure types such as buffering of resources were proposed. 
(Sandmann, 2009) proposed stochastic models of networks covering a broad field of 
models and tools that might be applicable to (inter-) dependency modelling. (Eusgeld 
et al., 2009) emphasized the importance of potential failure propagation among 
infrastructures leading to cascades affecting all supply networks, presenting a 
systems-of-systems (SoS) approach. A Complex Network theory based topology-
driven method was presented to comprehensively analyze the vulnerability between 
interdependent infrastructures. 
(Haimes et al., 2007) proposed the inoperability input-output model for the analysis of 
the manner in which perturbations (e.g., intentional attacks, accidental events, or 
natural disasters) to a set of initially affected sectors impose adverse impacts on other 
sectors, due to their inherent interdependencies.  
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The Hierarchical Coordinated Bayesian Model (Z. Yan et al, 2006) was developed as 
an analysis tool of sparse data which can be used to infer extreme event likelihoods 
and consequences using hierarchical coordination. (Pant and al, 2011) described the 
interdependent adverse effects of disruptive events on inter-regional commodity flows 
resulting from disruptions at an inland port terminal, using a risk-based Multi-
Regional Inoperability Input-Output Model. (Zhang and Peeta, 2011) proposed a 
generalized modeling framework that combines a multilayer network concept with a 
market-based economic approach to capture the interdependencies among various 
infrastructure systems with disparate physical and operational characteristics. 
(Casalicchio et al., 2010) proposed an agent-based modelling and simulation solution 
for critical interdependence modelling. The approach, named Federated-ABMS, relies 
on discrete agent-based modelling and simulation and federated simulation. It 
provides a formalism to model compound complex systems, composed of interacting 
systems, as federation of interacting agents and sector specific simulation models. 
(Balducelli, 2005) developed interacting agents for modelling the discrete event 
simulation as a tool to approach interdependencies analysis and evaluation for critical 
infrastructures. 
The DECRIS model drew upon the experience obtained from the application of risk 
analyses within different critical infrastructures, to develop an all-hazard generic 
methodology suitable for cross-sector infrastructure analysis. A similar approach was 
derived in the COUNTERACT EU funded project. A generic security guide was 
developed which was focused exclusively on terrorist threats, using a human intent 
specific method to assess risks, based on harm (effect) and availability 
(vulnerability/threat). The approach lacked a mechanism to transfer the results of 
multiple risk assessments into a higher (hierarchical) level, in addition to the 
interconnected aspect of different infrastructures. Additionally, EURAM built a basic 
common methodology for the analysis of interdependencies between Critical 
Infrastructures (CI) of the same sectors and between CI of different sectors and 
different countries. The above approaches are very useful within their particular scope 
and frame of application. However, a gap that becomes visible is the lack of a generic 
and widely applicable risk assessment framework that can incorporate the concept of 
asset interconnection (and consequently the concept of network interoperability) into 
a holistic and integrated semi-empirical approach capable of being bringing together a 
broad range of networks (transport, energy, cyber, etc.), infrastructures (including 
critical ones) and response policies. 
The specific objective of the present work is to develop a comprehensive Strategic 
Risk Assessment Framework for interconnected systems taking into consideration that 
(a) interdependent and heterogeneous networks are interconnected and (b) that risk is 
propagated between them. It is designed to estimate risk mainly in interconnected 
networks and finally the estimation of a holistic risk in the network of networks 
 Strategic Risk Analysis Framework 2.
The process to derive the strategic risk analysis framework (RAF) is presented 
schematically in Figure 2. Its general principles follow a well-established path that has 
been followed in related literature, e.g., [12, 17, 18, 19], and in related funded studies 
(e.g., COUNTERACT , EURAM ). 
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Figure 2. Generic Strategic Risk Assessment Framework (Leventakis et. all, 2014) 
The proposed framework is comprised of four main phases: 
Phase 1: Assessment of present situation, which includes the detailed specification 
and description of the interconnected network (or network of networks) that is at risk.  
Phase 2: Risk Assessment, which will be determined by an estimation of the 
likelihood and consequences of an event.  
Phase 3: Response procedures, which includes specifying emergency response and 
business continuity operations. 
Phase 4: Risk mitigation, which includes a determination is to identify 
countermeasure / security upgrades that will lower the various levels of risk.  
The main benefit of the proposed framework in comparison to existing approaches is 
the combination of the below elements: 
 A risk analysis and assessment methodology for CI at a strategic level.
 Response measures and procedures integration.
 Transition from a single infrastructure modelling to a holistic “network-of-
networks” model.
 Compatibility with the EU Directive 114/2008 regarding the European
Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme.
 Extendibility to various types of critical infrastructures.
 Ability to incorporate framework to a risk assessment IT tool.
Network Assets3.
The identification of the network assets is the first introductory step as it builds the 
foundations upon which relevant methodologies will be applied. Under the scope of 
the proposed RAF, an asset is considered as the basic unit of any critical infrastructure 
network, and in general the following basic principle is assumed: Each network will 
be decomposed into assets, i.e., objects with specific and easily recognized roles. 
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In response to this approach, a conceptual framework for categorizing assets within 
any CI network is proposed comprising of: 
 
 Direct assets 
• Humans, goods, services related with CI operation 
• Movable assets 
•  Infrastructure 
 Indirect assets 
• Utilities, e.g., electricity, water 
• Information, e.g., signals 
 Auxiliary assets 
 
The major source of complexity in heterogeneous systems is defined by the way each 
asset affects the others as well as the intensity of that effect. An important step in 
understanding and consequently modelling that relationship is to first identify all 
possible expressions and variations of the so-called “interdependencies” which link 
together assets. All interdependencies can be categorized in he proposed RAF, based 
on the medium which each connection utilizes in order to manifest itself. These 
categories according to are: 
 
 Physical Interdependency: Two networks / assets are physically 
interdependent if the state of one is dependent on the material output(s) of 
the other. This sort of interdependency is realized when a physical linkage 
between the assets exists. 
 Systems Interdependency: Two networks / assets have a systems 
interdependency, if its state depends on the properties of a system 
transmitted through another asset. 
 Geographic Interdependency: Networks / assets are geographically 
interdependent if an incident in an asset may impact the state of assets in a 
defined spatial proximity. 
 Logical Interdependency: Two networks / assets are logically 
interdependent if the state of each depends on the state of the other via a 
mechanism that does not fall into any of the above. 
 
 Risk Assessment Framework Methodology 4.
 
A threat is any factual or probable condition (incident, fact or occurrence) that can 
inflict harm or death to passengers, personnel, damage or loss of  equipment, property 
or/and facility as well as undermining the positive image or prestige of the operator. 
 
In order for the attack or incident to inflict a measured impact on CI, certain 
vulnerabilities of the assets (e.g., security flaws, operational, functional, by design) 
must be exploited.  
 
These, on a second stage, should be exhaustively analysed by the security officers and 
risk managers of the CI network, and be used to define appropriate countermeasures 
and security policies that would considerably reduce the risk impacts. 
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Within the proposed RAF, a threat-risk matrix composed of the vast majority possible 
risks for a certain type of threat that could adversely affect the network operation, has 
been identified. For each identified risk a series of security incidents may be derived 
that would be the initiating mechanism of the proposed RAF, but are not introduced 
here due to space limitations. 
Risk is evaluated from an iterative process assessing the probability of occurrence of 
the threat (Likelihood) and the Consequences in the event of a realization occurs. 
Figure 3 presents an analytical description of the proposed RAF, taking into 
consideration the main categories of Likelihood  and Consequences The RAF has 
been designed to process diverse sources of information on an ordinal scale of 5 
categories or/and numerical scale. 
The advantage of the proposed approach is that for the estimation of risk, any type of 
information may be employed combining related scales in order to accurately estimate 
risk. 
Figure 3. General Risk (Single Asset) Assessment Framework Methodology 
Likelihood is the frequency of occurrence of a particular threat. In a more generic 
approach it is expressed by the generic formula: Likelihood = Intention to harm X 
Capability, which is directly related to the carrier of the threat as well as the 
vulnerability of the target. 
Consequences are the result of the realization of a threat and defined as the harmful or 
damaging effects and can comprise physical harm, injury, death, loss, damage to 
property or revenue as well as loss in reputation and credibility of the company and of 
the critical infrastructure in general. The proposed approach estimates the 
consequences building upon a two level hierarchy. Level 1 is a generic category of 
consequences, quantified in a 5 class system (Negligible, Small, Medium, High, 
Severe), whereas Level 2 may have numerical / logic / categorical / binary / etc. 
values. A detailed analysis of the consequences is presented in the work of 
(Leventakis et al.,.2014) 
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Business continuity planning is the process of identifying critical systems, identifying 
reasonable threats, and creating a long-term strategy for reducing the impact of 
interruptions to the business and stabilizing critical business functions. It consists of 
several tasks that together constitute a set of integrated procedures to minimize the 
impacts of a security incident, ensuring operations remain viable. For the business 
continuity approach is multi-dimensional meaning that consequences have been 
accounted for damage to the asset, loss of service, impact on personnel, capability to 
use asset at risk and impact on the network flow. 
The proposed risk analysis framework has the inherent ability to propagate risk in 
interconnected assets, employing the proposed Impact Propagation Matrix (IPM) 
which will be extensively analysed in the following section. However, there is the 
additional capability to account for the impact (i) in the network operation containing 
the asset at risk and (ii) in the entire “network of networks” of a region. 
The Risk Assessment Matrix is a classic tool to conduct semi-quantitative risk 
assessment, widely applied in many different frameworks. Some basic principles that 
were adopted within the present RAF that the output risk index is determined only by 
the mapping of the consequences and the likelihood to a single risk level, all of which 
can be divided into different levels, respectively, with qualitative descriptions and 
scales  
Aggregating the risk between different levels is a crucial task that significantly tests 
the validity of the proposed approach. Although a variety of different options can be 
applied, the one selected here as returning the most reliable estimates is the Weighted 
Mean. A subjective assignment of weights (wi, summing to 100%) can be assigned to 
the different classes based on their presumed significance, whilst some maybe be 
ignored. By assigning individual impact rating to ordered numbers (xi) the final value 
may be estimated as: 



i
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Risk Propagation5.
The core idea of the approach developed for modeling risk propagation in the 
framework is that a user defined security scenario which originates in an asset of any  
network can cause diverse impacts and affect other interconnected assets or networks. 
It builds upon the fundamentals of Markovian chain process, so that the state of an 
asset will be dependent upon its previous state and/or the states of its interconnected 
assets. The state of an interconnected asset (Xn) is thus a result of the nature of the 
incident affecting the originating asset, the characteristics of the asset under 
consideration (risk countermeasures, means of immediate response, etc.,) and the type 
of interconnection between the assets. 
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Figure 4, presents an example of the interconnected network assets (which  in 
generalization A and B may be heterogeneous  networks), to aid in understanding of 
the defined process. 
 
  
 
Figure 4. Example of Assets within Interconnected Networks 
 
Step 1: Scenario outline definition and description of the initial incident(s) that 
occur(s).  
 
Step 2: Estimate Risk of incident in the Asset A1.  
 
Step 3: Apply the response procedures to the asset at risk.  
These will be enforced in order to account for the optimal response to the asset-at-
risk, ensuring that disruptions to the network services are minimized. They can be 
classified into Emergency response and Business Continuity. Both procedures 
described will result in several assets of the network being considered as non-
operational and a geographical interconnection established to the asset at risk.  
 
Step 4: Determine the Assets that are interconnected to A1. 
The next step involves the process of identifying those Assets that will be affected by 
the impacts of the incident in asset A1. The new set of assets-at-risk, i.e. those linked 
to A1 by any type of linkage, will be determined by (i) the type and nature of the 
initial incident, (ii) the type and characteristics of the interconnection between the 
assets. To that end a separate Incident Propagation Matrix will be designed for each 
type of interconnection (Physical/System/Geographical/Logical). Additionally, due to 
the highly interconnected properties and functionality of the operation of the network 
asset, it is anticipated that the security incident in any asset, may trigger a different 
security incident in the same asset, thus establishing a self-interconnection. 
 
Step 5: Estimate the probability of incident initiation at interconnected assets 
This will be modeled through the definition of an Incident Propagation Matrix (IPM) 
which will evolve through a Markov chain process into the risk assessment procedure. 
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Conceptually, the Incident Propagation Matrix (IPM) is a probabilistic input / output 
matrix where inputs are the security incidents and output(s) are also security incidents, 
on the immediately interconnected asset, with the exception of geographically linked 
assets. It shows in a consolidated form the probability of incidents triggering in linked 
assets resulting from the initial security incidents. 
 
As triggered incidents are occurring at interconnected assets the likelihood of 
subsequent incidents is calculated based on the probability of the previous incident 
multiplied by the probability of the current incident occurring, given that the previous 
incident has already occurred. This is based on the definition of the conditional 
probability formalized    as such: )()()( ApABpABp  . 
 
Where A is the generating incident and B is the current incident considered to happen, 
P(B∩A) is the probability of both A and B occurring and P(B|A) is the conditional 
probability of B occurring after A. In order for this principle to be applicable in cases 
where 5-level scale likelihoods are used we introduce the “Likelihood Matrix” which 
is the tool used to map the probabilities of the initial incident and the conditional 
probability found in the IPM to the probability of both incidents occurring. 
 
Step 6: Estimate Risk in interconnected asset 
The Risk in the interconnected / linked asset(s) is estimated using the main approach 
(Steps 1 and 2). However, it has to be noted that: The likelihood of the cascading 
incident equals to the defined probability value of the Markovian process estimated in 
step 4. 
 
Step 7:Incident termination 
Subsequent incidents related to non-zero probabilities can never be brought down to 
zero since they are multiplied by also non-zero probabilities. This can cause an 
endless loop which practically serves no purpose other than overloading the system 
with insignificant incident occurrences. In order to alleviate this we set a probability 
threshold under which the  calculated probabilities are considered to be practically 
zero and thus the incident propagation from that incident is effectively terminated. 
 
 Risk Barriers 6.
 
The effective risk assessment should consider a range of control measures (mitigation 
strategies) and additionally provide a basis for the selection of control measures. Risk 
control measures are relevant in all security phases, before, during and after a 
potential threat may be executed, i.e., 
 
a. Preparedness before   a   potential threat may be
 executed including preventive/detection measures; 
b. Capacity for response, relief and mitigation, during an incident; 
c. Capacity for recovery after an incident has occurred. 
 
The introduction of a suitable methodology may lead to a combined approach for (i) 
optimise the use of resources, (ii) determining the effectiveness and costs of different 
control options, (iii) improving the overall decision-making process and (iv) providing 
a basis for allocating resources in the most effective manner. The risk assessment 
process should provide the following in relation to control measures: 
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a) identification or clarification of existing and potential control measure 
options; 
b) evaluation of effects of control measures on risk levels (likelihood / impact / 
interconnection); 
c) basis for selection or rejection of control measures and the associated 
justification of adequacy; and 
d) basis for defining performance indicators for selected control measures. 
 
The most common control measures that should be evaluated in terms of: 
a) Viability that relates to the practicability of implementing the control 
measure within the facility; and 
b) Effectiveness which is related to the effect of the control measure on the 
level of risk. For example, the reliability and availability of control measures 
influence the likelihood of an incident occurring, while the functionality and 
survivability of the control measures during the incident influence the 
consequences. 
 
The evaluation of options for control measures within the proposed risk assessment 
framework should allow the determination of additional benefit gained from 
introducing additional or alternative control measures. The proposed approach is build 
on the capability to search for gaps in the existing control regime, where the 
introduction of further control measures may seems appropriate. 
 
In order to incorporate the notion of Risk Control Measures (RCM) in the overall risk 
assessment process a Risk Mitigation Matrix (RMM) was introduced into the 
framework.  This is a two-way matrix used to adjust the initial likelihood and/or 
consequence estimation  of a threat on an asset based on the available pro-active 
measures in place that can lower the likelihood of a threat, its consequences or both. 
The columns of the matrix represent the different levels of effectiveness of the overall 
risk control measures and range from “Ineffective” to “Very Effective”. The initial 
level estimated for the likelihood or  consequence (rows) may be decreased by a 
varying number of levels based on the effectiveness of the risk control measures. The 
output of the matrix (cells) represents the revised likelihood or consequence level 
estimation for the specific threat on the asset in question taking into account all 
relevant risk control measures. 
 
First and foremost, it is important to define the risk mitigation in terms of its 
properties, (effectiveness, costs) as proposed in the risk analysis framework. Once 
these are defined then the likelihood mitigation matrix will be estimated. 
 
 Case Study 7.
 
The following section introduces the application of the developed framework on a 
case study concerning an onshore liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG) terminal. It is assumed 
that risk analysis, includes receiving terminals and land transport of LNG. as in Figure 
of a planned import terminal with three storage tanks and with the capability of 
docking two LNG carriers at once. 
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Figure5.  Receiving terminal artist’s rendering of docks, transfer lines, and storage tanks 
(www.cheniere.com) 
 
The safety systems aboard an LNG carrier are required by the following:• 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974; IMO 
International Gas Codes (IGC); Flag State Regulations; Classification Society Rules. 
 
In addition to the required safety systems on board LNG carriers, additional safety 
systems have been installed as a result of recommendations from the Oil Companies 
International Marine Forum (OCIMF) and the Society of International Gas Carriers 
and Terminal Operators (SIGGTO). Typical operating conditions for an LNG 
receiving terminal it could be found in ref (J. L. Woodward,2010) 
 
An LNG receiving terminal consists of four areas: 
1. the dock and storage tank area, connected by the LNG transfer line loop; 
2. the LNG process area for regasiﬁcation; 
3. the utilities area; and 
4. the supporting area. 
 
A transfer line loop delivers liquid from the docked LNG carrier to the storage tank 
and returns displaced vapor to the carrier tanks to avoid drawing a vacuum in the 
carrier or building pressure in the terminal tank. The transfer line loop recirculates at 
other times. A boil-off compressor recovers vapors 
 
 
 
Figure6. Flow diagram of an LNG regasiﬁcation terminal (www.final-yearproject.com) 
evaporated during the transfer. Liquid is pumped to the pipeline pressure and is then vaporized. 
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The LNG process area primarily vaporizes LNG to natural gas with a heat source. The 
LNG process area may have a distillation column to separate and recover heavier 
components called natural gas liquids (NGLs). NGL includes propane and butane and 
may have a higher price than the LNG and can be sold separately. It may also be 
necessary to adjust the heat of combustion of LNG to deliver a consistent product to 
pipeline customers. If the heat of combustion or more speciﬁcally the “Wobbe Index” 
is too high, this requires either diluting the natural gas with nitrogen or air or 
extracting ethane and heavier components (C2+ extraction), so end users do not have 
to adjust their equipment. 
 
The utilities area provides services required by the plant including instru- ment air, 
nitrogen, fuel gas, power generation, emergency power, ﬂare and blowdown system, 
drain systems, waste water and efﬂuent treatment, demin- eralized water, ﬁre water, 
and backup diesel-driven ﬁre water pumps. 
 
The supporting area includes maintenance shops, parts storage, ofﬁces, and the like. 
In order to apply our proposed methodology the following procedure is 
recommended: 
 
1. Describe the initiating event. (i.e. terrorist attack) 
2. Identify interdependencies. Perform qualitative analysis. 
3. Perform a semi-quantitative assessment of the risk of the scenario. 
4. Perform a detailed quantitative analysis of interdependencies  
5. Evaluate risk and measures to reduce interdependencies. Define risk barriers 
6. Cost/benefit analysis. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The paper introduced a strategic risk analysis methodological approach that is 
applicable on Critical infrastructures. The innovation aspect of the introduced 
approach in comparison to standard risk assessment methodologies lies with its 
inherent ability to estimate risk in interconnected and heterogeneous networks based 
on a repetitive process of risk evaluation and assessment of severity, taking into 
account the Likelihood of occurrence and the Consequences on each interconnected 
asset. These additions complement traditional risk assessment techniques and improve 
modelling capacity by incorporating various realistic concepts (risk barriers, risk 
propagation, asset interconnections, etc.,) that add up to a multi-faceted and holistic 
framework. In order to verify the applicability of the approach proposed an initial 
conceptual application to an LNG terminal is presented 
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Abstract 
The paper provides an overview of some specific aspects related to the use of 
probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSA) in tasks related to Emergency Zoning (EZ). 
The PSA specifics in performing EZ tasks are presented considering also in general 
the options to solve the EZ tasks by using deterministic approaches for the same tasks 
Keywords: Deterministic, probabilistic, analyses, emergency zoning. 
1. Background
1.1 Status of the issue 
The paper provides an overview of some specific aspects related to the use of 
probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSA) in tasks related to Emergency Zoning (EZ). 
The PSA specifics in performing EZ tasks are presented considering also in general 
the options to solve the EZ tasks by using deterministic approaches for the same 
tasks. A more detailed evaluation of the issues related to EZ and the specifics of the 
use of PSA was performed in [1]. 
The evaluation was also in line with some new trends in using PSA applications for 
EZ tasks, as part of the Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process, as well as 
of the harmonization process for EZ requirements. In the process of the evaluation of 
the issues, that have to be solved in using PSA for the EZ tasks the following aspects 
were considered: 
 EZ is an area of interest for the harmonization process within EU. In this context,
the Emergency Zoning Planning (EPZ) is a very important part and it needs
definition of the applicable tools. The EPZ are usually defined as in Figure 1.
Where the notations are:
 On-Site: Internal zone, under control of NPP operator 
 PAZ: Precautionary Action Zone 
 UPZ: Urgent Protective action planning Zone 
 LPZ: Long-term Protective Zone (Food Restriction Planning Zone- 
 FRPZ) 
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 The use of PSA could prove of significant use in EZ tasks because it is the best-
suited tool to be used in order to comply with targets as applying RIDM in EZ 
tasks. 
 The complementary use of probabilistic and deterministic tools for EZ tasks is 
mostly desired and details on PSA tasks for EZ are needed in this case. 
 
The paper [1] presents the status of some important aspects on the Emergency 
Planning Zones and Radius Sizes. 
 
There are some suggested EZ and Radius sizes for Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) 
considered in this moment in EPZ. For instance for the threat category I, i. e. for 
NPPs, IAEA document [2] in its Appendix 5 provides suggestions for the 
approximate radius of the EP zones and food restriction planning radius as given in 
the following Table 1. 
 
The radii selected are based on calculations performed using deterministic tools [3]. 
However, the process of defining the radius involves also expert judgment and 
subjective opinions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Radii defined for EZ [1] 
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Table 1. Sample case radii [1]. 
Combination 
cases (where D 
and F are 
weather 
categories) 
50 mSv 
D75% 
1Day 
50 mSv 
F100% 
1Day 
50 mSv 
D75% 
7Day 
50 mSv 
F100% 
7Day 
500 mSv 
D75% 
1Day 
500 
mSv 
F100% 
1Day 
500 
mSv 
D75% 
7Day 
500 mSv 
F100% 
7Day 
Abbreviations 
(see Figure 6)  
UPZL _ 
D0D1 
UPZU 
_50F1 
UPZBE 
_50D7 
UPZEX
U_50F7 
PAZEX
L_500D
1 
PAZBE 
_500F1 
PAZL   
_500D7 
PAZU   
_500F7 
 
 
The current approach to EP is, in general, traditionally deterministic, when usually a 
reference accident is defined to be used as a basis for drawing up corresponding 
emergency plans essentials on EP. 
 
Nevertheless, the use of PSA could be helpful as a complementary tool for some 
aspects as mentioned before. 
 
However, the use of PSA is limited. In this context, it is important that questions 
related to areas of applicability for probabilistic and deterministic analyses, as shown 
in Figure 2 [1] are determined prior to any decision of areas of PSA applicability to 
EZ tasks. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Applicability areas for deterministic and probabilistic methods [22] 
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Figure 2 shows that the expectation for PSA to have a higher impact in EZ is for the 
tasks in which the optimization of adopted (unnecessary) conservatism in safety 
margins is needed coincidently with a higher and/or measurable and reviewable 
degree of certainty on results. 
 
This is actually the case for some EZ tasks as for instance the definition of EZ radius 
and the trend of harmonization in EZ on those issues. 
 
1.2 Status of the existing generic results and approaches on EPZ for NPP 
 
Other important aspects on EZ, except the definition of the EZ radius presented in the 
previous paragraph, which are considered of relevance for the investigation of the 
combined use of deterministic and probabilistic approaches are related to the: 
 Postulated events and accidents for the NPP  
 Definition of source terms 
 
1.3 Specific features of PSA of importance in its use in EZ tasks 
 
The PSA objectives and context are of high impact for its use on any application, 
including for EZ. In [16; 18] a set of results for various risk metrics in PSA studies is 
presented for all the period since early 1980’s.  
 
These surveys and the information on PSA referred in previous chapters present the 
PSA studies status. PSA studies are performed for various objectives and goals and 
with various limitations. Their intended use for various applications is also very 
diverse. Therefore, for all those situations there are some limitations well known for 
PSA, which have a direct high impact if they are to be used for EZ applications.  
 
1.4 PSA metrics  
 
PSA risk metrics are expected to have an important impact on the EZ application. The 
existing situation of PSA studies is summarized in [18] for the whole period since 
PSA started to be developed. As it is shown in Figure 3, there was a continuous 
change of requirements to risk analysis and thus a certain evolution of risk metrics 
can be noticed.  
 
By risk metrics it is understood further mainly CDF (as the main result from Level 1 
PSA -L1 PSA), LERF (as the main result from level 2 PSA - L2 PSA) and risk (as the 
main result from Level 3 PSA - L3 PSA). 
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Figure 3. Risk metrics [22] 
 
 
Figure 4. Risk acceptability criteria [23] 
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2. Description of methodology
2.1 The main PSA tasks changes for its use to EZ applications 
Assuming that the generic aspects of PSA procedures are considered as discussed 
above and illustrated in previous chapters, then the next step in the use of PSA for EZ 
application is to define how specific tasks of L1, L2, L3 PSA are applicable and 
which are the differences (if any). 
It is considered that, in principle, the tasks of PSA are applied as defined by standards 
for each level of PSA without modifications in order to use them in EZ application. 
However, some of the tasks need either special attention or some modifications for 
such a case. The next part presents those specific aspects for the tasks, which are 
considered to be of higher impact for EZ applications and some details on how some 
of the tasks in PSA have to be performed. 
The tasks will be coded as Task PSA_EX_X. The coding is used in order to underline 
the tasks which are important and to which more attention should be devoted. There 
are also some references not only to NPP of generation II+ and III, but also to 
generation IV. PSA starts by considering diverse and all sources of radiation and all 
scenarios challenging them, and therefore, it is highly suitable for EZ application. The 
results and insights from L2 PSA, in the format of LERF calculations based on 
various scenarios combined between L1 and L2 PSA in a process called “binning”, 
which is presented at PSA_EZ_1 below, lead to a conservative envelope of the EZ 
parameters.  
This process is possible by application of the PSA procedure, which combines inputs 
from source term evaluation with containment impact - in event trees for 
containment, CETs, and by including results on phenomenological evolution of 
various scenarios calculated in the severe accidents codes, as it was described in 
previous chapters.  
In fulfilling all below tasks for EZ application, no major change from standard 
procedures is expected. On the contrary, it is expected that the PSA approach of 
addressing all scenarios and challenges might be highly beneficial, providing more 
conservatism in comparison with the deterministic evaluations. 
The logic of combining initiating scenarios and end states of containment and the 
final proposal of source terms might be the most important specific set of tasks from 
L2 PSA, making the difference between the deterministic and probabilistic 
approaches in EZ application. 
Task PSA_EZ_1: Source Terms Evaluation 
The identification of radioactive sources, of the timing of the release, of the quantity 
and chemical form of radioactivity released and the modeling of dispersion inside 
containment is a very important part requiring special calculations. In case of this EZ 
task a special attention is allocated to the choice of the source of radiation and the 
scenarios postulated. The PSA approach could bring, as a new part in this task, the 
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possibility to evaluate more comprehensively all the range of initiating events (as 
postulated in PSA) and to perform a series of severe accident calculations to define 
and refine the source term parts. 
 
Task PSA_EZ_2: Sensitivity and uncertainty (S&U) analyses in L2 PSA 
methodology 
The S&U analyses might be the next significant specific set of tasks from L2 PSA of 
high importance for the EZ application. This is due to how the following items are 
performed: 
 Definition of PDSs; 
 Number of nodes and endpoints defined in the containment event trees; 
 Number of source terms and release categories defined; 
 The assumptions resulted from the phenomenological codes runs; 
 The independent alternative approaches are used in severe accident analyses; 
 The independent alternatives perform a correlation between the probabilistic 
and deterministic descriptions; 
 The S&U are actually performed. 
 
Task PSA_EZ_3: Definition of the plant damage states 
Definition of fault sequences that lead to core damage, which are identified in L1 
PSA are taken forward into the L2 PSA. The groups obtained, called plant damage 
states (PDS), are defined in terms of the attributes that would influence the way that 
the accident progresses to challenge the containment integrity and to release of 
radioactive material to the environment. 
 
The PDS attributes are specific to the type of reactors (PWR, BWR, heavy water 
channel type, etc.) as well as also for gas reactors. For generation IV gas reactors, for 
which there is no sense to consider core damage, but only release categories (RC), 
binning process is of much higher importance than for LWR. Things are also more 
sensitive to systematic errors for channel reactors. 
 
The binning rules and results of the binning for PDS are of high importance and need 
to be subject to careful and independent reviews in order to assure accurate L2 PSA 
results. 
 
Task PSA_EZ_4: Accident progression analysis 
This L2 PSA task model the progression of the accident from core damage to the 
challenges to the containment and the subsequent release of radioactive material for 
each of the PDSs by using an event tree approach in the format of CETs or APETs. 
These event trees need to model all the significant physical and chemical processes, 
which might be actually the source of potential important systematic modeling errors. 
Those event trees require also inputs from specialized codes calculations. For the 
generation IV gas reactors with confinements the release categories defined for the 
CET are of special importance. The latest developments in PSA technique also take 
the advantage of integrated PSA models (including internal and external events, all 
modes of operation PSA models in one unitary model). This is of special help for the 
performance of intensive sensitivity calculations, which are considered in order to 
evaluate the impact of the modeling aspects on the results. 
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Task PSA_EZ_5: Severe accident modeling 
The tasks of L2 PSA related to severe accident modeling are considered also to be 
subject of intensive review and check. This is mainly because the physical and 
chemical processes that are expected to occur during severe accidents typically 
involve many simultaneous phenomenological interactions for which detailed 
experimental information may be sparse or not available and therefore they use 
mathematical and computer simulation. For the generation IV reactors this is of one 
of the highest priorities. 
 
Task PSA_EZ_6: Containment performance analysis 
L2 PSA quality and accuracy of results potentially to be used in EZ applications 
depends on the containment performance analysis. For the water reactors of 
generation II+ and III, a series of containment integrity issues were identified during 
the experience accumulated so far and they could be found in [16;18]. Mechanisms 
challenging the containment function and the containment failure  modes were 
extensively illustrated in [1]. Typical gas reactor confinement has, however, other 
problems and the whole mechanism is different. An illustration of such a confinement 
is shown in [20]. The energies of the released gas, the radioactivity carried away, and 
the timing, which have very high impact on severe accident concepts and the 
definition of EZ, give the difference. Nevertheless, the process required by this task is 
the same as the similar L2 PSA task, performed not for EZ application. 
 
Task PSA_EZ_7: Quantification of L2 PSA model 
The tasks of quantification in all PSA levels, including L2 PSA are important and 
related to the accuracy of the models, which are built using various software codes. 
The PSA models include also assumptions and interface with results from 
deterministic analyses. The quantification of the frequency of the various sequences 
from the containment event trees uses the data on frequencies of the PDS’s, derived 
from the L1 PSA, and the conditional probabilities of the event trees. These 
probabilities include failure of safety systems such as the containment spray system 
(quantified also using fault trees) structural failures of the containment (quantified 
using a model of the performance of the structure), and the occurrence of physical 
phenomena where the split fractions relate to the analyst’s evaluation. 
 
For the split fractions, the numerical values are derived from judgment supported by 
available sources of information. After obtaining frequencies for PDS, fatalities are 
calculated for each release category (in case of generation IV gas reactors), or for 
PDS (for the water reactors) as shown in Figure 5. The results of L2 PSA are then 
post processed and used for PSA applications as licensing or EZ in the form of 
fatalities. It is important to mention that in Figure 5 the summary table for all the 
release categories and the total fatalities for all distances are already summed and 
normalized for the risk metric of L3 PSA, because the example is actually illustrating 
such a case. 
 
  
34
Proceedings of the 52nd ESReDA Seminar, May 30-31, 2017 
Lithuanian Energy Institute & Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania 
 
 
Figure 5. Main steps for the calculation of risk criterion (PSA level 3) [1] 
 
 
Task PSA_EZ_8: Use of computer codes and various models 
A significant set of problems has to be solved for new applications in PSA for the 
computer codes used. The situation is increasingly complicated from L1 to L3 PSA 
because more advanced and higher-level codes are used and coupled, that results in 
dependency of their interface on connecting assumptions. 
A special category represents the separate phenomena codes for L2 PSA, which are of 
two groups as it was mentioned in [1]. 
 
For each of those codes extensive verification and validation (V&V) was performed 
for water reactors. Some examples of the V&V actions for MAAP codes are 
presented in [47, 49] 
 
Though for those codes their V&V process is very important, the most important 
aspect for PSA calculations is to be able to define and perform V&V for all the PSA 
flow path of the calculations using diverse codes. 
 
As it was shown in [20], in case of performing such calculations for a generation IV 
gas NPP, there are some very important aspects to mention 
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 The error evaluation and uncertainty calculations should consider the fact that 
a set of codes are used for the full L3 PSA calculation; 
 It was established that some diffusion codes have an error variation with the 
distance from the source (i. e NPP in EZ application); 
 Many phenomenological codes are providing results with their own 
uncertainties and 
 limitations, which have to be considered while being prepared as inputs to 
other codes; 
 There is a need to define a procedure for uncertainty calculation of the whole 
calculation flow path for the risk metrics adopted in the EZ application. 
 
Task PSA_EZ_9: L3 PSA process 
In the L3 PSA, a large number of CET end-points are grouped to provide the interface 
between the L2 PSA and L3 PSA consequence analyses. This grouping and 
classification for L2 PSA and L3 PSA interfaces is called also “binning”, like the 
similar action between L1 PSA and L2 PSA. This subtask is of utmost importance for 
the PSA results and subject to extensive sensitivity analyses. 
 
The flow path of L3 PSA as shown in [20] in a format of a series of code calculations 
and other assumptions, and this aspect is not usually mentioned. However, the 
definition of the calculation sequences and the codes to be used is one of the most 
important in order to obtain the risk metrics. The results are presented usually in risk 
metrics (risk for instance) and its uncertainty band. 
 
Task PSA_EZ_10: Use of results and various risk metrics 
PSA results are mainly in a form of risk metrics. As it was shown previously in 
Figure 5, there was a certain development of risk metrics requirements during the 
years. One reason for that is that not all the PSA like risk metrics are suitable for 
decision making process of many PSA applications. This statement is fully applicable 
for EZ, for which the use of CDF is the less desirable and adequate and the use of risk 
is the best option. This is also illustrated by the latest developments as shown for a 
case of using L3 PSA in applications similar to EZ [19]. In this case the risk metrics 
are represented in early fatalities/year, early injuries/ year, latent fatalities/year, 
thyroid cancer/year, whole-body person* rem / year, based on a series of sensitivity 
calculations to derive the envelope of the EZ parameters. 
 
PSA calculations are done so that they lead to a reasonable envelope of the risk 
metrics of various scenarios and this is the main difference from deterministic 
calculations valid for EZ applications of PSA. The risk metrics are then represented 
with the range of their variation for all scenarios [20] for any type of NPP, including 
generation IV ones, as illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
If the dependence of the risk metrics of a large set of parameters is considered, then 
one can actually obtain a set of acceptable risk surfaces as shown in Figure 8. To 
conclude on the use of various risk metrics, Figure 6 shows that the applicability of 
L3 PSA risk metrics to NPP EZ is much better than L2 PSA, while L1 PSA risk 
metrics is not expected to be of some help for the definition of EZ. 
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Figure 6. Sample case results for EZ radii as defined in Table 1[1] 
 
Results of the case study use of PSA for EZ 
PSA results for risk metrics as decided by the analysts (but considering the limitations 
mentioned above) can be used in order to evaluate parameters important to EZ like 
for instance PAZ and UPZ. Since PAZ and UPZ should be roughly circular areas 
around the facility, the results should be represented in a corresponding format. The 
PSA calculations are practically able to evaluate suggested PAZ and UPZ radii. 
 
Task PSA_EZ_11: Use of PSA results for defining NPP EZ 
PSA application for EZ includes the modeled barriers and scenarios aspects, common 
in nuclear safety for any kind of analyses (deterministic or probabilistic) as for 
instance DBA, BDBA, SA, fission product characteristics, meteorological 
considerations, exposure pathways, adverse health effects, and avoiding adverse 
health effects. 
 
PSA performs evaluation of risk metrics considering all those aspects but using the 
strengths of the PSA method able to derive an envelope of all the challenges to the 
installation (initiating events) in one single unitary and systematic approach. 
However, there are limitations due to PSA performance and methodology, specific to 
each country and group of users, which could produce supplementary difficulties in 
the interpretation of PSA results for applications like EZ. For example, grouping of 
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NPP events including accidents by frequency of their occurrence differs in different 
countries. 
 
Nevertheless as shown in Figures 7, 10, and 11, the expected PAZ and UPZ are 
distributed within a range of values. In order to decide on the final values, more 
information is needed to be available for the decision makers. It can be also 
mentioned, as shown in [20] that practically there is no expected fundamental 
difference for the calculations of EZ parameters of radii in case of a gas NPP of 
generation IV in comparison with a water reactor NPP. This is true even if decision 
on whether to have or not PAZ/UPZ and which are to be their magnitudes is still a 
debated issue. 
 
For the sake of underlying the computational aspects of the radii in a deterministic 
like approach versus a probabilistic like approach, a set of simplified formulas can be 
derived as per (1) to (3): 
 
ddddddd U +  D  Diff  C   S =Rad R       (1) 
 
   ppppppp U +  D  Diff  C   S =Rad R  
  UdxDpfpDifffCpfRpfSpfR )(5)((4)(3)(2)(1D  Diff  C   S  ppppp  (2) 
 
  pdp U +  )(5)(4 f3(Cp)  )(2 )(1 Rad =Rad  DpfDiffpfRpfSpf   (3) 
 
Where,  
 
Sd   -  Source term in deterministic approach 
Rd  –  Reactor failure criterion in deterministic approach 
Cd  –  Containment failure criterion in deterministic approach 
Diffd - Diffusion criterion in deterministic approach 
Dd -  Fatalities criterion in deterministic approach  
Sp   -  Source term in probabilistic approach 
Rp  –  Reactor failure criterion in probabilistic approach 
Cp  –  Containment failure criterion in probabilistic approach 
Diffp - Diffusion criterion in probabilistic approach 
Dp -  Fatalities criterion in probabilistic approach  
 Ud,p -Uncertainties in deterministic, respectively probabilistic calculations 
 U - Final total uncertainties 
f1(Sp), f2(Rp), f3(Cp), f4(Diffp), f5 (Dp) - Distribution functions for the   
probabilistic criteria 
f total -  Convolution of functions f1 to f5 
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For the cases represented in Table 4, a representation of PAZ and UPZ is shown in 
Figure 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Risk surfaces for a PSA set of results [22] 
 
The calculations from probabilistic point of view require combination of all the 
probabilistic criteria distributions, which is done by calculating convolution integral 
as shown in Figure 8. If the calculations have been performed for generation IV 
reactors, then there are not expected any changes in the type of results. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Convolution integral for total impact of factors in formulas (1)-(3) 
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Final results of L1, L2, or L3 PSA are actually represented by a set of surfaces within 
a certain error band, as a function of the probabilities of events and parameters 
governing the model. 
After performing those calculations, the results are obtained in the form from (4) with 
some uncertainty band and a certain connection with the expected deterministic like 
result: 
 
  pdp U +    Rad =Rad  ftotal    (4) 
 
The calculation of the convolution integral is embedded in the PSA codes calculation 
and the flow of calculation was already shown in [20]. The formulas shown above are 
illustrating the fact that there is a traceable connection between the deterministic type 
of results and the probabilistic/risk metrics ones. 
 
2.2 Results and some concluding remarks on the main aspects of the PSA use for 
EZ tasks 
 
In the previous paragraphs there were illustrated some specific aspects and details of 
implementing PSA for EZ application, including some samples of PSA practical 
results. 
 
However, it is of the highest importance to mention that obtaining risk metrics based 
EZ parameters does not constitute the end of the EZ application in PSA approach.  
 
On the contrary, if the PSA based results are not using a specific approach in 
reasoning, which is called “risk informed decision making” (RIDM), then the 
conclusions could be fundamentally wrong. In order to apply RIDM one has to use 
carefully the logical connectors between deterministic, probabilistic and correlation 
statements. 
 
The important aspects to be noted in relation to the use of PSA like results in the 
decision making process based on the use of decision tables is (as shown in [20]) that 
it is highly recommended to use a risk informed type of approach in formulating the 
final decision.  
 
This is due to the fact that risk results require probabilistic type of inferences in the 
judgments to build decision tables. This involves also a very clear description of the 
limits and strengths of deterministic and probabilistic results for EZ parameters. 
 
Based on the results of combination of various approaches (optimistic, pessimistic, 
etc.) using insights from all methods, i.e. deterministic and probabilistic, a decision 
on the EZ parameters can be taken. 
 
To summarize, it is highly recommended to consider deterministic and probabilistic 
approaches being complementary. An example of formulation of results interpretation 
of the EZ parameters by using different approaches, i.e. deterministic and 
probabilistic, and for various events and for various risk zones could be as follows 
[22]: 
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 If the decision is aimed at evaluating high foreseen risk situations above the 
acceptable limits, then the deterministic pessimistic statements may lead to the 
most conservative decision, even if that happens under less credibility than for 
the probabilistic ones. On the other hand, due to other reasons than technical 
ones, the deterministic based decisions could be expected. 
 If the decision is aimed at evaluating high or moderate foreseen risk situations 
below the acceptable limits, then there is no difference between the very 
pessimistic way of thinking and optimistic one, or a probabilistic one. 
However, there is an exception based on the fact, that the probabilistic 
evaluation has more credibility, which could make it the best option to choose 
for the decision. 
 If the decision is aimed at evaluating low and very low foreseen risk situations 
below the acceptable limits, then it may be based on the probabilistic 
approach, giving the fact that it generates the most conservative results with 
highest credibility. Evaluation of risk impact using extensive sensitivity cases 
is one of the key issues to support the probabilistic type of thinking and its 
more extensive use in decision making process. 
 
This is integrated in the verification and validation process, of which independent 
review and benchmarking play a very important role in confirming the truth-value of 
probabilistic statements. In a geometric representation that means, that the EZ radii 
could be illustrated as a set of spectrum available values from low bound to upper 
bound with a certain best estimate set of values, as shown in Figures 9 and 10. 
 
 
Figure 9.Representation of results for the case in Table 1 and Figure 6 underlying the relationship 
between various versions of calculations (optimistic vs pessimistic) 
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Figure 10.Representation of results for the case in Table 1 and Figure 6 underlying the relationship 
between various versions of calculations (optimistic vs pessimistic) 
 
The last very important point of the performed evaluations is related to EZ parameters 
of multiple NPP units from various generations on the same site, as shown in Figure 
11. 
 
 
Figure 11. Representation of results for the case in Table 1 and Figure 6 underlying the relationship 
between various versions of calculations (optimistic vs pessimistic) for a multiunit case 
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3. Conclusion 
 
The specifics of using PSA for EZ tasks are mainly depending on the possibility to 
solve the problems of RIDM application for EZ and the evaluation of the uncertainty 
and degree of conservatism in EZ decision-making process. 
 
One of the key challenges in dependable RIDM is the reconciliation of PSA results 
and insights with traditional deterministic safety analysis. This is particularly true 
when it comes to defense in depth and safety margins. PSA results may and often 
conflict with deterministic insights. If a method of reconciling these conflicts is not 
defined, then RIDM can become deterministic assessment, along with PSA.  
 
These results in PSA are an additional layer of requirements rather than a tool for 
optimized decision-making [11]. 
 
In [1] the issues raised by the use of PSA as a complementary tool for a balanced 
approach in RIDM on EZ issues has been done and illustrated on some specific 
examples, resulting in the realistic, feasible outcome from NPP emergency zoning 
practice.  
 
There is a general agreement that RIDM has the potential to contribute towards 
maintaining and improving nuclear safety. It can complement the deterministic 
approach to nuclear safety and maintain the concepts of defense in depth and 
adequate safety margins. However, RIDM is broader concept than just the use of PSA 
in NPP applications. RIDM uses the results of PSA as one input to the decision 
making process, but allows for consideration of other factors, in particular aspects of 
safety management and safety culture. At present, these aspects are included in PSA 
only to the extent that they are reflected in the plant-specific data used, but they are 
not explicitly modeled in PSA [12]. 
 
RIDM in NPP EZ is a process, which can be used by the utility and the regulator, and 
provides the framework for risk informed regulation in this area. The objective should 
be to enhance regulatory effectiveness, using risk information to optimize nuclear 
safety regulation. 
 
Whether risk informed regulation is of benefit to utilities depends to a large extent on 
the common understanding developed with the regulatory authorities. 
 
Since the preparation of a PSA imposes a considerable burden in terms of the human 
and financial resources that need to be expended, it is of utmost importance to define 
clearly what is expected from the utility and how the results will be used. This 
common understanding can be developed in a dialogue that includes all stakeholders. 
RIDM would strengthen the perception that the operator is assuming the primary 
responsibility for safe operation. RIDM in areas that affect licensee requirements 
necessitates review (and, ultimately, approval) of PSA and supporting information by 
the regulatory body. A suitable regulatory framework and regulatory staff with 
considerable technical capabilities in the areas of PSA and risk informed decision 
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making are prerequisites for such review and approval. This constitutes a 
considerable burden for countries with small nuclear programs and limited numbers 
of regulatory staff [12]. 
 
It is necessary to ensure the availability of high quality PSA to support RIDM. The 
meaning of “high quality” in this context can vary and is defined as being 
commensurate with the intended use. Several IAEA as well as EU Member States 
have developed national PSA guidelines, and the IAEA has prepared guidance on 
PSA quality for applications in NPP at the international level [13]. 
 
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) has developed a standard on 
PSA. Additional efforts to promote the production of high quality PSA include peer 
reviews, establishment of user groups for similar type of plants, pooling of data and 
preparation of reference PSA [12]. 
 
RIDM in NPP emergency zoning can be successful - like in other areas - only if all 
stakeholders understand the process and the results obtained. 
 
In addition to the main nuclear regulatory body, a licensee has to deal with several 
other regulatory organizations, e.g. those responsible for environmental protection. If 
the concept of RIDM in NPP emergency zoning is not shared by these other 
authorities, this might complicate the decision making process. Thus, consistency 
between the approaches followed by different authorities would be beneficial. Owing 
to the state-of-the-art understanding and increased characterization of NPP severe 
accidents as well as advanced understanding of PSA technology, which can be 
currently considered mature enough, overall management of NPP severe accidents 
could be – and also should be - analyzed as an integrated complex process. 
 
The interrelationship of NPP emergency operating procedures, safety and risk 
assessments, severe accident management guidelines, and emergency off-site actions 
should be planned and organized to minimize the consequences of such accidents. 
This approach might be a contribution to ensure the continued safety of NPPs and to 
improve effectiveness of regulatory practices in EU Member States. 
 
As the transition to risk informed regulation is taking place gradually more or less 
worldwide, activities conducted within this project represent comprehensive 
application of PSA technology to contribute to NPP emergency zoning issues. This 
report indicates clearly that the current, state-of-the-art PSA technology is 
significantly able to contribute – as a complementary tool - to the traditional 
engineering, deterministic approach to addressing various issues of NPP emergency 
planning practices, especially emergency zoning and might be highly topical at 
present in terms of regulatory effectiveness in EU Member States. 
 
And finally, there is one more facet of the subject matter: some safety consequences 
resulting from economic pressure on NPP operators as a result of deregulation of 
electricity markets. 
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Although deregulation is not the only reason why nuclear operators have intensified 
their efforts to reduce costs and become more efficient, it is clear that the industry is 
changing and that regulators must prepare for this new situation. This report would 
not like to outright advice regarding any prioritizing. 
This must follow from the assessment of the national situation in each EU Member 
State.   
However it was the intention of the authors of this paper to hope that the paper 
insights will be of help in this assessment and in thorough consideration to the 
subject. 
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Abstract 
 
During recent years, both the nuclear and non-nuclear industry and regulatory 
bodies have recognized that probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has evolved to the 
point that it can be used increasingly as a tool in decision making and particularly in 
risk informed inspection. In this paper the Risk Based Inspection (RBI) or Risk 
Informed In-Service Inspection (RI-ISI) and Integrated Risk Informed Decision 
Making (IRIDM) approaches are considered. PSA are complementary to the 
deterministic and defence-in-depth philosophy and is advocated to be used in safety-
related decision making, e.g. for optimizing activities related to in service inspection, 
testing, and maintenance. 
 
The following topics are discussed in this paper: 
- The integration of deterministic and probabilistic approaches in order to define 
integrated risk measures and approaches for risk-informed decisions when 
deterministic and probabilistic methods integration are used; 
- Decision making and risk management in order to minimize risk, using proper 
inspection and maintenance procedures, as well as seek other benefits additional to 
safety improvements and risk reduction. 
 
The methods application includes results, obtained through the author’s participation 
in a number of related research and students projects. 
 
 
Keywords: Risk-informed Approach, Probabilistic Modelling, Risk Management, 
Decision Making, In-service Inspection. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In general, the risk measures minimization and application to inspection is risk 
informed action and is related to the process of decision making. The general concept 
of risk informed decision making (RIDM) was described in TECDOC-1436 [1] and 
further discussion of the integrated risk informed decision making (IRIDM) process 
was given in INSAG-25 [2], which presented a framework for the decision making 
process. One of the aims of these publications was to provide a common 
understanding in the international nuclear community (designers, suppliers, 
constructors, licensees, operators, technical support organizations, and regulatory 
bodies) of how to implement a risk informed decision making process. However, both 
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publications did not provide guidance on how the IRIDM process should be 
established and carried out in practical manner or even specifically for risk measures 
minimization and application to inspection. 
 
The risk-informed approach with appropriate risk measures/estimates aims to 
integrate systematically quantitative and qualitative, deterministic and probabilistic 
safety considerations. There is explicit consideration of both the probability of events, 
i.e. failures, and their potential consequences, supported by consideration of sound 
engineering practice and managerial arrangements. Estimates of risk, likelihood and 
consequence, are based on knowledge or data from experience, or derived from a 
formal, structured analysis such as a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). 
 
1.1 Key Elements of the IRIDM Process 
 
The key elements of the IRIDM process are shown in Fig. 1 below, which is based on 
the descriptions of a framework and the process given in INSAG-25 [2]. The IRIDM 
process shown in Fig. 1 below includes several Key Elements (KE), each of which 
has implicit risk aspects. Each KE comprises several Constituent Factors (CF) (not 
shown on Fig. 1 below), which further define the safety requirements and other 
conditions, and are used to evaluate the options being considered. In any particular 
application, not all the KE, nor all their CF, will be relevant to the issue under 
consideration. The aim of defining this framework is to better focus licensee and 
regulatory attention on design, operational and security issues commensurate with 
their importance to public health and safety. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Key elements of the IRIDM process (based on IAEA INSAG-25 [2]). 
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1.2 Stages in Performing General IRIDM Process 
 
The general process for the RI Decision Making includes the following main stages: 
• Stage I Characterization of the issue and team formation; 
• Stage II Preparation for the evaluation of the options; 
• Stage III Assessment, integration and documentation; 
• Stage IV Selection of the option to implement; 
• Stage V Implementation of the selected option; 
• Stage VI Performance monitoring. 
 
The stages listed above reflect the logical order of tasks to be performed. Some of the 
associated activities may be performed in parallel. Hence the order of stages does not 
represent a sequence in time. Iterations between the different stages may also be 
necessary. After completion of stage V, the results of implementation of the selected 
option are monitored. 
 
The IRIDM process as carried out in the organization should also be periodically 
reviewed and improved if deemed necessary. The IRIDM process can be adjusted 
specifically to risk measures minimization and application to inspection. 
 
2. Issues of Integrated Risk-Informed Decision Making 
 
As considered in various papers and projects, like in the ongoing project 
ASAMPSA_E (see [3] and acknowledgements), there is no common understanding 
on the correct (or even appropriate) approach to decision making regarding risk in the 
scientific community as well as with actual end-users. Depending on the subject 
matter to decide and the role and the interest of the decision maker or stakeholder, 
different approaches to decision making are advocated or rejected [1], [5], [6], [7], 
[8], [9]. Moreover, the acceptability of these approaches to the stakeholders or the 
society obviously depends on the culture of the society in question and the specific 
values and believes on risk acceptance on a personal and societal level [10]. For the 
purpose of risk minimization, work on the ethical or legal or theoretical foundations 
of decision making [11], [12], [13] is clearly out of scope, as it is more a discussion 
on cultural influences. 
 
It is important to note that the aforementioned issues have partial implications for the 
further discussions contained in this paper. Decision makers are influenced by factors 
that transcendent natural science and cannot be resolved in a strictly objective manner 
in this sense. Consequently, implicit and explicit utility considerations on decision 
alternatives will necessarily have a strong subjective component. Furthermore, the 
relevance of information, e.g. from PSA, the acceptability of certain kinds of risks, 
and finally the adequacy of risk measures to support decisions will depend on the 
decision maker. In the end, the decision maker has to decide which aspects of risk and 
thus which risk measures are relevant for each alternative. Therefore, the discussions 
in this paper have to be understood as options for decision makers. The presented 
approaches have been identified as suitable for a wide range of typical situations and 
they might help to select the best decision alternative. The approaches should not be 
interpreted as a fixed set of rules which can be applied to every situation. Similarly, 
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they might lead to results which decision makers do not agree with. Thus, even if 
decision makers and PSA analysts follow the approaches in the paper, they should be 
free to select alternative approaches. It is therefore essential that PSA analysts and 
decision makers agree on the scope of approaches application at an early stage. 
 
2.1 Integration of Deterministic and Probabilistic Approaches 
 
Various recent researches and analyses of complex systems safety methods show that 
integration of various methods can present more accurate and practical results, which 
cannot be obtained by single methods used up to now. Two approaches basically 
different in its nature are based on deterministic analysis and probabilistic analysis. 
They also can be practically applied for decision making even without any 
consideration of risk. 
 
Actually, the risk measure is defined in different ways for specific purposes. There is 
no such one way of defining risk, which is always more adequate than another, since 
this will depend on the purpose of defining risk. The developed Integrated and Risk-
informed (IRI) approach uses risk measures based on qualitative or quantitative 
information. IRI approach is not a probabilistic approach, which is alternative to the 
deterministic one, but it is a combination of both. In the integrated risk-informed 
approach fundamental deterministic safety principles, mainly defence-in-depth and 
sufficient safety margins, have to be maintained, even if probabilistic evaluation 
would indicate the safety level, which is already high enough. 
 
The risk measures used in risk-informed approach is related to decision models. It is 
important to stress that risk information (e.g. from PSA) in IRI approach is not used 
in order to find the best solution in terms of safety but to select the most efficient 
solution among a number of alternatives, while achieving the required safety level. 
The main elements of integrated risk-informed approach: 
• Safety analysis, using deterministic approach and defence-in-depth philosophy; 
• Probabilistic evaluation of risk (insights from PSA); 
• Knowledge from operating experience. 
 
One basis of integrated approach, the doctrine of determinism, assumes that any 
failure has a cause and can be explained and in reality, there are no random failures. It 
is a matter of knowledge in order to identify, model and explain the cause of any 
event or effect. Another fundamental concept of deterministic doctrine is that 
everything could be understood by analysis. 
 
The quantitative analysis in deterministic approach considers the performance of 
components and compares it with required performance capability under design basis 
conditions. The analysis process involves the identification of functional failure 
modes or states of components. In addition, the performance margins between 
component specific performance capability and the defined design basis performance 
capability is analysed for each identified functional failure mode or state. 
 
The pure deterministic approach is very effective to achieve a very high safety level. 
The used or assumed simplicity and predictability also somehow helps in decision 
making. However, its main disadvantage is that it is not efficient regarding the use of 
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resources (human, financial, others) according to the impact on risk. The decisions 
produced by deterministic design principles usually have a very high range of 
conservatism. This is natural, because the same criteria are applicable for high-risk 
systems and low risk systems. In addition, it is possible to recognise that some 
practical situations are too complex to clearly identify what is conservative and what 
is not. An action that is good from one side may be bad from another side (e.g. 
possible safety-security conflict for decision making). In spite that probabilistic 
approach can be conservative as well, the more advanced ranking of problems and 
resources, used for decision-making, is based on measure, received using integrated 
risk-informed approach. Also, the more advanced ranking process can be based on 
probabilistic sampling and probabilistic sensitivity analysis. 
 
2.2 Definition of Integrated Risk Measure 
 
The definition of risk measure depends on the approach to risk. The choice of a 
qualitative or quantitative approach is based on the level of available detailed 
information and the level of rigor and confidence required (e.g. for regulatory 
acceptance). In determining the integrated risk-informed measure, associated with 
operation and inspection of a given plant structures, systems and components, in 
general, four aspects are considered, namely: 
1. The failure mode or state; 
2. The likelihood of detectable failure; 
3. The likelihood of reliable detection of failure; 
4. The consequences of failure. 
 
The integration of deterministic and probabilistic approaches is proposed to be made 
using different methods. The nature of simpler qualitative approach is that it can only 
act as an indicator of risk, which can be used for simple screening, and does not 
constitute a risk assessment. Without strict definition, the risk is proposed to be 
expressed as the combination of the qualitatively assessed actual frequency of failure 
and the consequences of failure. In developed scheme, the actual frequency of failure 
is quantitatively expressed as the combination of likelihood of detectable failure (i.e. 
empirical frequency) and likelihood of unreliable detection of failure (i.e. probability 
of non-detection). 
 
If qualitative ranking, such as high, medium, and low are used, the rank of this risk 
kind is limited because there are only nine possible combinations. In this case, a 
simple bar matrix is proposed to be illustrated in a manageable fashion as schema for 
risk estimation and results visualization (see the following figure). The values of this 
matrix are the combination of probabilistic importance evaluation (high, medium, and 
low) in the actual failure frequency axis and deterministic importance evaluation 
(high, medium, and low) in the consequence axis.  
 
In general, the risk level increases if there is the increase in the actual and empirical 
frequency of failure and in the probability of non-detection of failure events as they 
affect the increase of empirical frequency of failure. In quantitative expression case, 
the normalized parameters’ values (e.g. 1, 0.1, 0.01, and etc.) can be used for risk 
evaluation. 
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Figure 2. Simplified schema for qualitative risk estimation and results visualization. 
 
In order to reflect the impact of inspection and probability of non-detection, the more 
precise and formal mathematical quantitative definition of risk for one component can 
be expressed as follows: 
 
∑∑∑ ⋅⋅⋅⋅=
i d s
iic scCdsPidPpfR )|()|()]|([ . (1) 
 
Here, Rc is the risk of consequence expressed by measure c, fi is the frequency of the 
detectable initiating event i (i.e. failure frequency), pi is the probability of non-
detection of initiating event i, P(d|i) is the conditional probability that the initiating 
event i will lead to plant damage state d; P(s|d) is the conditional probability that 
plant damage state d will lead to the source term (radioactive release) s, and C(c|s) is 
the conditional consequence measure, c, given the occurrence of source term s. The 
proposed risk measure is more complex than the typical one as the failure frequency 
is evaluated, using the separation of information, related to the probability of 
empirical failure and the probability of detection of failure. 
 
The results of typical probabilistic risk assessment study in nuclear industry can also 
be treated as risk measures. The selection of appropriate quantities, resulting from 
PSA as risk measures, and target quantities for optimisation is a very important step 
(see [4] to get a view on existing risk measures). The results of optimisation depend 
on this selection. For instance, risk measures in nuclear industry can be defined for 
each component in terms of annual core damage frequency (CDF) and, if available, in 
terms of annual frequency of large early release (LERF). However, in order these 
measures to be consistent with RC measure, the reliability of detection and the 
conditional estimates of initial events probability should be investigated additionally. 
 
Operational Experience Application 
 
Plant specific operating experience should be used in determining both the initiating 
event frequencies and initiating event consequences. A continuous plant specific data 
collection and processing system should be set up and maintained as it is considered 
important for the achievement of reliable data. For that purpose, there is a demand to 
have the operating experience feedback programmes which yield plant specific data 
for the use in the PSA. Generic data is used only when plant specific data does not 
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exist or it is so scarce that reasonable and reliable estimates cannot be provided. The 
estimation of reliability parameters (e.g. failure frequency) are supported by a 
Bayesian updating of generic data if necessary. 
 
Ideally, the considered parameters of risk model should be based on detail operational 
data of considered system. However, due to small quantity or unavailability of 
system-specific data the risk assessment often has to rely on various sources and 
types of information: 
• The general engineering (expert) knowledge; 
• The failure data in other similar but not identical systems; 
• The failure experience with the specific-system being studied. 
 
In such cases, expert judgment, generic information, or surrogate data are used 
directly or in combination with (limited) system-specific data. In general, various 
information types can be proposed to be considered and integrated. 
 
If PSA results are to be used for risk-informed applications, the data requirements 
should be far stricter than in a typical use of PSA results. The measure, based on IRI 
approach, includes the data reliability measure, which is related to degradation level 
detection efficiency (i.e. failure inspection reliability) and represents the generic data 
reliability insights and insights regarding uncertainty of failure events occurrences 
and classification. Typically, the data and detection reliability (probability of non-
detection) insights are not included in the PSA scope and appropriate deterministic 
analysis of consequence. 
 
2.3. Risk-Informed Assessment and Results Visualization 
 
The risk associated with different systems, components and structures has become 
subject to re-evaluation when the results of additional information became available. 
Detailed, systematic, plant specific analyses with an operational experience are 
thought to give realistic and relevant estimates of used risk measures. Such risk 
estimates could be considered as useful also for the risk-informed applications, e.g. 
modification of the inspection and testing strategy. In this section, the general model 
of risk-informed assessment as well as formulas for risk measure calculation and 
visualization is presented. 
 
The first task for risk informed (RI) approach application is the determination of the 
high-risk components or locations. The procedure for risk ranking and decision-
making is proposed to be based on division of overall system risk into so called 
components risks measures. For practical applications, these measures can be 
calculated as the product of degradation frequency estimate P and estimate C of 
consequence probability to degrade the overall safety. If there are some degradation 
states k (e.g. crack with small leak, crack with large leak) up to maximum degradation 
state D - failure (e.g. pipe rupture) then the total conditional risk due to the 
component i degradation influence on the main system is proposed to be expressed as 
such sum: 
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Each summand reflects the conditional risks due to the component i degradation state 
k influence on the main system and they are assumed to be mutually exclusive. In 
fact, the risk Ri reflects the risk of the single (ni=1) component i or the risk of similar 
components group i with ni components influence to overall risk to degrade the safety 
of system. As an example, in Nuclear Industry the influence to overall risk can be 
expressed as Conditional Core Damage Frequency (CCDF), where the overall system 
risk reflects the total Core Damage Frequency (CDF). The conditional risk due to 
some subsystem S specific degradation states influence on overall system safety is 
proposed to be expressed as follows: 
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In practice, the conditional probability to degrade the safety of system (consequence 
Ci,k) can be assessed as safety barrier used for CCDF calculation in PSA. As an 
example, the CCDF for different postulated Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) events 
can be used as such safety barrier. These safety barriers in most cases can be taken 
from PSA model. The calculation of frequencies (probabilities estimates expressed 
per time unit), related to the degradation states occurrence, usually needs a separate 
model which includes the information and assumptions concerning failure detection 
procedure and its reliability. 
 
Visualization of Risk-informed Measures 
 
The risk-informed measures can be estimated for each state of degradation in similar 
component (or location) of considered subsystem. In order to simplify the risk 
interpretation, according to the dominating risk part, like in approaches of other 
authors [14], [15] only two generalized values CPlot and PPlot (as one point 
coordinates) for each component are defined (as example, see figure 2). 
In case of two degradation states (e.g. leak and rupture): 
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In case of D degradation states: 
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The total risk R* coordinates C* and P* are proposed to be expressed as follows: 
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Figure 2. Conditional core damage frequency per weld for various piping. 
 
The presented general model for risk-informed assessment and result visualization is 
proposed to be used in order to model failure detection (e.g. inspection) and risk 
reduction process. The presented modelling method is very useful for risk ranking 
and decision making purpose [17]. In future, it would be interesting to discuss how 
the results of practical decisions based on such decompositions differ (if at all) from 
decisions based on various sensitivity and importance measures. 
 
3. Decision Making and Risk Management to Minimize Risk 
 
The content of this section is mainly directed towards the investigations of decision-
making framework and how general decision-making and inspection process can be 
applied for risk reduction. In this section, some aspects, that may be considered when 
discussing a strategy for risk informed in-service inspection and testing, are presented 
as well. 
 
General Procedure of Decision-Making. The main steps of proposed decision-making 
procedure (see the following figure) are: 
• The analysis of issue and the available data sources; 
• The quantitative modelling of considered details; 
• The simulation and ranking of alternatives; 
• The quantitative selection from alternatives; 
• The analysis of decision and final case. 
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Figure 3. Decision making procedure. 
 
Considering risk reduction procedure, it can also be treated as general inspection and 
testing procedure with specific parameters and objective to minimize total risk. The 
following separate actions of general inspection (including testing) procedure are 
proposed: Objects selection, Targets specification, Tools qualification, Physical 
process, Results evaluation, and Experience feedback. Governed by scope, objectives 
and strategy of inspection and testing, the proposed general inspection procedure can 
be regarded as a closed loop (see the following figure). 
 
 
Figure 4. Elements of a general inspection procedure. 
 
In order to perform a selection of objects (structures, systems and components) for the 
risk-informed ISI/IST programme and to optimise the testing and inspection 
frequencies, a more detailed procedure needs to be implemented for such 
applications. So, the scope of general inspection procedure was considered in order to 
investigate the possibilities of using the plant specific PSA analyses, minimise the 
risk and effectively allocate resources for in-service inspection and in-service testing. 
Therefore, according to the general decision-making and inspection procedure, the 
general inspection analysis and risk reduction procedure is proposed and presented in 
the following figure. 
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Figure 5. Inspection analysis and risk reduction procedure. 
 
When making decisions under uncertainty it is reasonable to use all parameters and 
related available information, old and/or new, objective or subjective. This is 
especially true when the consequences of the decisions can have a significant impact, 
financial or otherwise. If directly applicable data for a specific parameter is 
sufficiently plentiful, it may be practical to derive an uncertainty distribution from the 
data using classical statistical approaches. 
 
However, in many cases, a useful assessment of uncertainty cannot be obtained solely 
from existing performance data, which may be in doubt e.g. if obtained under 
different operating conditions. In these cases, it is necessary to do the best that one 
can, integrating such information into a state-of-knowledge probability distribution 
for the parameter in question. An important basis for information integration in such 
cases is Bayes’ theorem.  
 
In developing the approach of risk-informed decision-making, which takes into 
account the uncertainties, various decisions have to be made. Firstly, it has to be 
decided how the numerical results are to be compared with any acceptance 
guidelines. Furthermore, recognizing that not whole uncertainties are represented in 
the probability distribution, a decision has to be made on how to handle these issues. 
The proposed decision is to allow a variety of models and assumption, but require 
alternates to be considered, e.g. by performing sensitivity analyses to determine 
whether the decision will change if alternates are used. The decision would then be 
made by assessing the relative changes of those alternatives’ impact on the task 
function(s). 
 
There is a general agreement that there are substantial uncertainties in any risk 
measure. Therefore, for most applications, it is left as a general expectation that a 
decision maker will give less credit to risk values with a larger uncertainty. 
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4. Risk-informed in-service inspection 
 
Traditionally, the inspection and maintenance strategy is deterministically based on 
the intuitive or quasi-quantitative assessment of safety. The PSA is proposed to be 
used to support new inspection program and reduce the risk, taking into account the 
relative risk significance of the components or locations. Once the new ISI program 
has been defined, the PSA can help to demonstrate that the effect on the overall risk 
due to program changes can be acceptable. 
 
The main objectives of ISI program, based on the IRI approach, is related to the 
estimation of the likelihood of severe damage (e.g. core damage) and consequences 
(e.g. large release of radio nuclides) and application of this information in order to 
select most risky components and locations for ISI and maintenance. In addition, in 
such program the following problems presented in the following figure should be 
solved. 
 
 
Fig. 6. ISI problems and solutions supported by IRI approach. 
 
Using the integrated risk-informed approach, it is possible to estimate and compare 
the existing ISI program with set of new possible programs and according to the 
safety and acceptability requirements and optimization criteria, to suggest the ISI 
program improvements. 
 
The steps for risk-informed inspection program development were summarised in the 
following list of tasks: 
• Analyse the system and components degradation and failure mechanism; 
• Estimate data reliability and the probabilities of degradation and failure P; 
• Assess the conditional probabilities of the worst consequence C; 
• Using probabilities P and C formulate risk measure R; 
• Perform the calculated risk ranking for each part of system; 
• Considering the parts with highest risks define a new inspection program; 
• Estimate the total risk changes (e.g. risk in new case - risk in previous case); 
• Estimate costs and positive effects due to the new inspection program; 
• According to the results, make recommendations concerning further 
inspection. 
 
Moreover, the ISI, based on RI approach, should be considered as a living program. 
Therefore, as part of its implementation process, performance monitoring, periodic 
WH AT to inspect Selection of significant 
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WHO to inspect Determination of inspection 
availability and reliability
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HOW to inspect Selection of optimized 
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update and corrective action program need to be established. Data reliability, 
probabilistic analysis of degradation and failure occurrence as well as risk measures 
formulation and estimation. 
 
In general, ISI programs are intended to address all dynamic systems that are 
subjected to degradation. The incorporation of risk insights in the programs can help 
inspections to focus on the more important locations. The ISI, based on IRI approach, 
broadly consists of ranking the elements for inspection according to their risk 
significance and developing the inspections strategy (frequency, method, size limits, 
etc.) corresponding to their risk significance. It provides a framework for allocating 
inspection resources in cost effective manner and helps to focus the inspection 
activities where they are most needed. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
During recent years, both the nuclear and non-nuclear industry and regulatory bodies 
have recognized that PSA as Probabilistic Safety Assessment has evolved to the point 
that it can be used increasingly as a tool in decision making and particularly in risk 
informed inspection. From the IRIDM as Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making 
and PSA point of view, it is possible to mention that PSA methods are flexible 
enough to provide the decision maker with almost all technical values which he might 
ask for risk minimization.  
 
This covers information about the plant (e.g. frequency of various plant damage 
states), environmental data (e.g. frequency of different source terms) and health 
effects (e.g. frequency of radiation exposure to the public). It is nevertheless prudent 
that decision makers are aware of the strengths and weaknesses of PSA and seek 
support of PSA experts, especially to discuss whether the PSA status is consistent 
with its application to support decision-making. 
 
Typical ISI can be routinely carried out by the utilities in order to detect and 
characterise possible material degradation in a timely way. It is clear that by 
performing ISI, utilities are acting effectively in order to reduce the likelihood of 
failure of these components. Furthermore, it is clear that the selection of systems and 
components with consideration for their consequences of failure has a direct bearing 
on the effectiveness of ISI, in terms of their contribution to overall plant safety.  
 
The application of ISI is entirely consistent mainly with the deterministically based 
philosophy of defence in depth. However, ISI programmes carried out to current 
requirements essentially reflect qualitative engineering judgements. This means that 
without the benefit of quantitatively based risk-informed insights, a disproportionate 
effort may be expended on the inspection of certain items that do not contribute 
significantly to the overall plant risk. Equally, there is a possibility that certain risk 
significant items may not be covered in the inspection programme.  
 
The benefit of the risk-informed approach to ISI is that it increases existing 
engineering judgement and experience in a way that helps to refocus ISI according to 
the assessed contribution. 
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The use of risk assessment in the optimization of the ISI helps to focus limited 
resources. In addition, one of the outcomes of the optimization may be a reduction in 
operational and maintenance costs while maintaining a high level of safety. 
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Abstract 
 
Critical Infrastructures (CI’s) are essential to maintain our way of life, based on 
secure, safe and dependable equipment, in essential areas as they are Energy 
Production and Distribution and Transportation. Today most of the attention and 
action on CI’s is focused security, because of last terrorist events. But if we look to 
the past accidents with important repercussions they happened because of misuse or 
lack of maintenance.  
In this paper we present a case where the lack of monitoring of a road bridge lead to 
an accident with 59people dead in March, 2001. The consequences of this accident 
were the imposition of a national policy of risk safety assessment of all bridges, 
especially in situations of changes in the use of bridges, with an increase of 
unexpected stresses arriving on to them. 
 
 
Keywords: Critical Infrastructures, Railways Bridges, Risk Assessment. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In today’s developed societies we are more and more dependent on technological 
equipment on our daily lives and to deliver services or goods. But there are 
infrastructures that are vital for our quality of life. Those infrastructures are 
considered critical and they must be dependable, meaning that all of us expect that 
those services or goods are available and can be provided in a safe way and without 
any interruption, enabling economic and social sustainability. 
 
In Europe, the Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the 
identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment 
of the need to improve their protection, defines on its Article 2 that ‘critical 
infrastructure’ (CI) means an asset, system or part thereof located in Member States 
which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, 
security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of 
which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to 
maintain those functions [1]. 
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In the same directive, on its Annex I, the sectors of European critical Infrastructures 
are listed and they are two: Energy (electricity, oil and gas) and Transport (road, rail, 
air, inland waterways ocean and short-sea shipping and ports). 
 
In the USA the Department of Homeland Security considered that there are 16 
critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical 
or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or 
destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination thereof [Retrieved from: 
https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors]. 
 
The CI sectors that were considered in the US are : Chemical; Commercial Facilities; 
Communications; Critical Manufacturing; Dams; Defence Industrial Base; 
Emergency Services; Energy; Financial Services; Food and Agriculture; Government 
Facilities; Healthcare and Public Health; Information Technology; Nuclear Reactors, 
Materials, and Waste; Transportation Systems and Water and Wastewater Systems 
[2]. 
 
Even if the definitions of the CI in the EU and in the USA are not exactly the same, 
they are very similar and they are mostly directed to the security concerns caused by 
malicious activities at the different levels of these systems, cyber or physical. 
  
Also the resilience of these systems under a possible attack has been studied and as a 
result CI’s are more resilient today than they were in the beginning of this century. 
These concerns about terrorist attacks to CI’s are understandable in face of the last 
events, and the results can be considered to be quite good till now, as the terrorist 
attacks have had little or no impact on the CI’s availability. 
 
But there are other concerns about CI’s that must not be overlooked. A look into past 
and relatively recent disasters involving CI’s shows that the different government 
agencies around the world have not considered as they were expected to do the 
effects of poor reliability in the design and most of all on the operation and on the 
poor maintenance of CI’s. 
 
Most of the Critical Infrastructures are by their nature complex systems or networks 
of systems with many interdependencies that are designed to operate in an optimal 
way, providing the functions for which they were designed in a reliable and safe 
manner. 
 
These CI’s are designed to function for long periods of time (most of the times for 
decades). So, they have to be maintained, adapted to new legislative demands for 
safety and the environment, to adapt to new capacity demands and to the introduction 
of new control technologies. Many times, due to the lack of financial resources their 
expected lives are extended well beyond the one foreseen in the original requirements 
for design. 
 
Also, in many sectors different countries have promoted deep reorganizations of their 
public sectors, because of financial restrains. Some public institutions became 
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completely or partially privatized, others were outsourced to private organizations 
and many new projects pf CI’s are private or Public-Private Partnerships.  
 
These contracts with private organizations are usually made for a certain number of 
years. Also, sometimes they imply the deregulation of the systems, what is relatively 
new in Europe in certain areas like energy or railways. 
 
So, many concerns are arising about the vulnerability of these complex systems, 
because one must be sure they are able to support the new capacity demands that 
imply bigger stresses to the equipment or if they age in a reliable and safe way. And 
the fact that new and inexperienced managers entered in these new “markets” can 
involve increased risks due to the lack of experience in running such infrastructures. 
All these factors trying to promote more efficient and less costing services can cause 
greater vulnerabilities that are multifaceted in nature [3]. 
 
2. Bridges in Portugal as an example 
 
From what we have come to realize over time, the countries of Europe and other 
developed countries have the skills and competences that are necessary to respond to 
the threats that are being put to Critical Infrastructures. 
 
However, if we take a look to past and relatively recent accidents involving CI’s one 
can conclude that the concerned authorities were very attentive towards preventing 
terrorist attacks, but paid little attention to misuse (usually overstress) and above all 
to poor maintenance. This may be the consequences of possible political gains 
through terrorism prevention that does not exist when the budgets on operation and 
maintenance are discussed. 
 
In Portugal, in the 90s of the 20th century, a policy of deregulation of the basic 
sectors of the economy was implemented, with the partial privatization of these or 
with the introduction of "commercial" models for the management of public 
infrastructures. 
 
In the case of bridges, with the exception of large bridges, its management and 
maintenance was decentralized at that time and it was delivered to regional entities. 
These entities had little preparation and lack experience in the maintenance of this 
type of equipment. 
 
As a consequence of this, a decrease in the maintenance capacity was noticed 
immediately, especially in infrastructures that demanded a greater technological 
knowledge, as it is the case of the bridges. The most complicated situations occurred 
in old bridges and those whose pillars are flooded every year. 
 
The worst consequence of this policy occurred on March 4, 2001, and which 
consisted of the collapse of the Hintze Ribeiro Bridge, inaugurated in 1887, and 
which made the connection between Castelo de Paiva and the town of Entre-os-Rios, 
over the Douro River in the north of Portugal. 
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From this accident resulted in the death of 59 people, including the passengers of a 
bus and three cars that tried to reach the other margin of the river Douro. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The bridge “Hintze Ribeiro” in Entre-os-Rios, Portugal (1997). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The bridge “Hintze Ribeiro” the day after it collapsed. 
 
A parliamentary commission of inquiry concluded at that time that the cause of the 
fall of the bridge was "the descent of the river bed in the fourth pillar zone", related to 
the "inert extraction activities of the river bed".  
 
This descent of the pillar caused the loss of support from the ground beneath the 
foundation coffin (by erosion and reduced load resistance) that caused the collapse of 
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the pillar abutment. Also, it was noticed a “lack of proper monitoring of the 
infrastructure functional conditions”. 
 
At that time and with the exception of large national bridges, such as the 25 de Abril 
Bridge in Lisbon and most of the railway crossings, inspected by the National 
Railway Network (Refer), there was no entity in Portugal that monitored and 
maintained the structures of the bridges. The service responsible for the inspection 
and maintenance of the bridges existed in fact, but was eventually dissolved two 
years before when the Government decided to extinguish it and transferred the 
responsibility to local entities.  
 
From that accident, it was concluded that was indispensable to have a national 
inspection plan because there were reasons to believe that other bridges in the 
country could be in a situation similar to that of the bridge that collapsed. A bridge 
inspection initiative was created and two years later a report was produced 
mentioning that at least about 200 structures needed maintenance work. 
 
3. Safety Assessment for Critical Infrastructures: a case example 
for railways bridges 
 
At that moment, it was imposed a policy of safety culture for the operation, 
monitoring and maintenance of the Portuguese bridges. In particular, if there were 
expected new and higher stresses on the use of the bridges a safety assessment should 
be performed and a monitoring and maintenance plane should be approved by a new 
national safety board. 
 
In particular, for railways bridges that were expected to support the stresses imposed 
by new heavier and faster trains (the “Pendolino”) the safety assessment should be 
made before the trains could travel at the high expected speeds. 
 
The dynamic behaviour of railway bridges has become an issue of main concern 
between scientists and engineers over the last 20 years, due to the extensive 
construction of new high-speed lines and also the use of old lines for higher speeds. 
Fast trains can induce resonance situations in railway bridges, being the short-to-
medium-span bridges where the main structural elements are simply supported (S-S), 
the most critical in this regard.  
 
When the train travels at a resonant speed, high levels of the deck vertical 
acceleration are to be expected, which can result in adverse consequences such as 
ballast deconsolidation, passenger discomfort or higher risk of derailment. 
 
The present case study is the Canelas Bridge, located in the Northern line of the 
Portuguese railway. The bridge has six simply supported spans of 12 m each, 
resulting in a total length of 72 m. The bridge deck is a composite structure 
consisting of two half concrete slab decks with nine embedded rolled steel profiles 
HEB 500. This kind of structural system is called filler beam and is a very common 
structural solution for small span bridges in the European high-speed railway lines. A 
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general view of the bridge used as case study is shown in Fig. 4, as well as the typical 
cross section of the bridge deck. 
 
The structural system of the bridge consists of simply supported beams. However, the 
rail is continuous and this continuity affects the dynamic response of the bridge. This 
is included in the numerical model that was applied to simulate the bridge behaviour 
by extending the rail 10.5 m in both directions over the length of the bridge.  
 
Experimental campaigns on the bridge were performed in order to confirm the 
simulation model and that allowed knowing that all the spans have similar dynamic 
response and for this reason there was no need to include all the spans in the finite 
element model, which allowed for the consideration of a lighter numerical model. A 
schematic view of the bridge model used can be seen in Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Bridge model 
 
To perform the experimental work, it was designed and developed a set up that 
allowed to monitor the bridge during its normal operation. 
 
There is a great amount of characteristics that the designer of the Structural Health 
Monitoring System must have into account when choosing the data acquisition 
system for a certain application. However it is possible to name a few factors that 
should always be matter of study: 
 
• Resolution usually referred to the number of bit of the analogue-to-digital 
converter; 
• Sampling frequency; 
• Processing power; 
• Embedded communication module, important to transmit data to a remote 
post; 
• Power consumption; 
• Cost. 
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Figure 4. Canelas Bridge: (a) general view; (b) typical cross section of the bridge; (c) 
detail of the bearing. 
 
Another big issue when deploying sensors in a structure is the place where they are 
located. Even high quality sensors cannot produce useful data if placed in the wrong 
places. There is a need to study the structure and realize its key points in order to find 
where it is worth to put these transducers. 
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Figure 5. Composition of a Structural Health Monitoring System for a railway bridge 
 
The measures that were performed on the vertical acceleration of the ballast and on 
the structure of the bridge made possible to validate the results obtained by 
simulation for higher speeds [3]. 
 
The applied methodology for the simulation and the selected variables, their 
simulation identification number as well as their corresponding distribution and 
variability were pre-defined and can be seen in [4]. Four distinct response parameters 
were analysed in the screening procedure: natural frequencies, displacements, 
accelerations and reactions. 
 
In order to establish speed limits for high-speed trains that might pass on the bridge, a 
safety assessment of Canelas Bridge was performed based on the obtained results for 
the different simulation scenarios. This analysis was based on the acceleration values 
recorded at mid-span of the bridge, which proved to be the most restrictive aspect of 
the response. In this work the acceleration limit was considered to be 7 m/s2, which 
is the value that some laboratory tests confirmed to be the limit for the beginning of 
the ballast instability. 
 
After analysing the results from the safety assessment some conclusions can be 
drawn. First of all, the estimated speed limit obtained was 295 km/h. This limit was 
obtained considering the typical values used in ultimate limit states, using probability 
values up to 10 4. It could also be observed that if a more conservative approach was 
used, and this probability was lowered to values up to 10 5, no significant difference 
would be obtained, decreasing the speed limit to 290 km/h. 
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So, it was defined that the speed limit for trains passing over the Canelas Bridge 
would be 290 km/h. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Nowadays it is expected that Infrastructures that are considered Critical to our way of 
life cannot fail and should always to be available to provide goods and services. 
 
A lot of attention has been given to the security of these Critical Infrastructures. That 
can be explained easily by the last dramatic events in different parts of the globe. 
 
But if we take a look to the most important accidents and incidents in Critical 
Infrastructures, most of them have happened not because they have been under 
terrorist attack, but because there was a lack of a safety assessment to new 
operational stresses under higher demands or because there was not in place an 
efficient monitoring system for the health condition and a proper maintenance. 
 
In Portugal, after the collapse of the Hintze Ribeiro Bridge in March 2001, a safety 
assessment is obligatory for bridges, if they are submitted to higher stresses to 
understand their behaviour. For that purposed a methodology was developed that 
allowed to state the safe conditions for the bridge operation. A case study was 
presented.  
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Abstract 
While the importance of transportation infrastructure in emergency management is 
recognized, the role of critical infrastructure (CI) operators has yet to be fully 
established, especially when it comes to providing aid to the public. This paper 
addresses this under-researched issue by drawing on key themes that emerged from a 
review of the literature on public expectations of transportation CI operators in 
disaster management and presenting the results of an online questionnaire-based 
study of disaster-vulnerable communities. Results indicate that members of the public 
expect CI operators to contribute to emergency response, to provide a means of 
evacuation, and to aid in long term recovery. The paper concludes with 
recommendations for how CI operators can meet these expectations.  
Keywords: public expectations, emergency management, critical infrastructure 
operators, evacuation 
1. Introduction 
The coordination and active participation among the different actors involved in 
emergency management (EM) is often cited as a prerequisite for effective emergency 
management. While the importance of transportation infrastructure1 in emergency 
management is recognized [2], less often examined is the role that critical  
 
                                                 
1
 Transportation networks provide mobility to the public through the use of private vehicles and public 
transport as well as provide the transportation of goods via roads, railways, waterways, airways, and 
transport lines [1]. 
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infrastructure2 (CI) operators3 should play. While an “expectation gap” between what 
services the public expect CI operators to provide after a disaster and what CI 
operators are realistically able to deliver is a recurring theme in the literature [4], [5], 
few studies have empirically investigated what members of the public expect in 
relation to aid provided by CI operators during and after disasters. This paper sets out 
to add to the existing research in this area by examining public expectations for CI 
operators to provide aid during and after a disaster. This paper addresses these under-
researched issues by drawing on key themes that emerged from a review of the 
literature on public expectations of transportation CI operators in disaster 
management and presenting the results of an online questionnaire-based study of 
disaster-vulnerable communities in France, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. It 
concludes by proposing recommendations for how CI operators can meet public 
expectations regarding aid.  
2. Transportation in disaster management 
Transportation infrastructure is a necessary component for emergency response 
activities such as transporting people to hospitals, evacuating people to safe zones, or 
bringing people essential goods such as food and water. The importance of restoring 
transportation networks in the aftermath of disasters was demonstrated during the 
2011 Great East Japan Earthquake where the rapid reopening of the transportation 
network allowed authorities to reach and help the victims [2]. Transportation also 
plays a key role in the recovery of other critical infrastructures and damage to 
transportation infrastructure is often linked to cascading effects, whereby disruption 
spreads from one system to another. The repair of damage to transportation assets is 
considered a prerequisite for key agencies charged with rescuing stranded residents, 
restoring power, and beginning recovery [3]. For these reasons, during times of crisis 
society benefits greatly from resilient transportation networks. Indeed, expectations 
for transportation infrastructure during and after a disaster are high. There is an 
expectation that a minimum level of mobility can be achieved, even if that requires a 
change in means of getting around (using public transit instead of a private vehicle, 
bicycling instead of taking the subway, etc.), as was the case during the 2012 
Hurricane Sandy when NYC subway users walked, biked or carpooled to maintain 
mobility [7]. Furthermore, after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and the 2010-
11 Queensland Floods residents who had lost access to their private vehicles expected 
there to be an offer of public transportation available [2], [8].  
  
                                                 
2
 The European Union defines CI as “an asset, system or part thereof that are essential for the health, 
safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and its disruption or destruction would likely 
have a significant impact upon the ability of a Member State to maintain those functions [1].”   
3
 CI operators are the actors who are in charge of the critical infrastructure. For example, the Oslo Port 
Authority for the Oslo Harbour or SANEF, a French motorway operator, for the A4 highway. 
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2.1 Evacuation 
Evacuation is sometimes a necessary part of disaster response. Either the public 
decides for themselves to evacuate (either due to official warnings or not), or they are 
forced to evacuate by the authorities. In order for people to evacuate by themselves 
they need to be provided information (usually from multiple sources), understand the 
information (including that it is meant for them), confirm the information, be able to 
act on the information and then engage in the recommended actions [9]. Once the 
decision to evacuate has been taken, people expect to be able to evacuate safely and 
in a timely manner [9], [10]. People require transportation infrastructure to carry out 
evacuation actions. Most people expect to evacuate using their own private vehicles, 
as was the case during the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami [11] and 
Hurricane Rita in Texas [12]. However, not all persons have access to a private 
vehicle and some people may simply prefer to use public transport instead. As such, 
there is an expectation to be able to evacuate even without the use of a private 
vehicle, especially since the resources required, such as buses, already exist in most 
cases [13].  
3. Methodology 
3.1 Research Questions 
Three research questions emerged from the literature reviewed above:  
1) Do citizens expect CI operators to provide aid during crisis situations? 
2) Are there any noticeable similarities/differences between public expectations based 
on demographic factors?  
3) How can CI operators meet these expectations? 
In order to investigate these questions, the EU Horizon 2020 project IMPROVER4 
designed an online questionnaire-based study. Ethics approval was sought and 
obtained from the respective authorities prior to data being collected. The target 
population for the questionnaire was adults aged 18 years and over who were familiar 
with four project Living Labs, or clustered regions of different types of infrastructure 
which provide specific services to a city or region. These were: Barreiro Municipal 
Water Network, Oresund Region, Oslo Harbour, and French transportation networks 
(roadways). To maximise the response rate, the questionnaire was translated into six 
languages (English, French, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, and Portuguese) prior to its 
distribution.  
                                                 
4
 IMPROVER: Improved risk evaluation and implementation of resilience concepts to critical 
infrastructure. The overall objective of IMPROVER is to improve European critical infrastructure 
resilience to crises and disasters through the implementation of resilience concepts to real life 
examples. 
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It was structured as follows: first, a brief description of the project was provided and 
participants were informed of their right to withdraw from the project at any time, as 
well as how all data would be handled during the project. For the purposes of this 
questionnaire, respondents were presented with the following definition of a disaster: 
“an event which has catastrophic consequences and significantly affects the quality, 
quantity, or availability of the service provided by the critical infrastructure.” 
Respondents were also provided a definition of CI operators. Second, both multiple 
choice and Likert scales were used to measure participants’ expectations. Participants 
were asked three questions regarding expectations of aid. The first asked, “After a 
damaging disaster, I expect aid from (check all that apply)” and listed the following 
actors: neighbours, volunteers, first responders, emergency management personnel, 
firemen, police, critical infrastructure operators, others, and I do not expect aid. The 
next two questions used a Likert scale: “During and immediately after a disaster, I 
expect critical infrastructure operators to provide means of evacuation for the local 
population e.g. providing free buses to safe areas” and, “Following a disaster, I expect 
critical infrastructure operators to aid in my long term recovery.” The questionnaire 
also asked about the participants’ demographics. Data from the questionnaire was 
collected between 28 March 2016 and 30 April 2016. The questionnaires were 
translated back into English at the data entry stage. The questionnaire was 
disseminated through the project’s consortium partners’ contacts as well as through 
the Living Labs. 
3.2 Sample characteristics 
The sample consisted of 403 respondents. Due to the dissemination method, this self-
selected sample was not broadly representative (at least by age, sex, or education 
level) of the European population, nor those of the geographical locations from which 
participants were drawn. Sample characteristics showed that 57% of participants were 
male, 41% female, with 2% choosing not to answer that question. Most were highly 
educated, with 77% reporting that they have a university degree or higher 
qualification. Both young and old people appeared to be underrepresented in the 
study. Respondents aged 18-24 accounted for only 8% of the total sample, with 16% 
identifying themselves as aged 55 years and above. While 26 nationalities responded, 
88 percent of the questionnaire sample consisted of French, Norwegian, Portuguese 
or Swedish respondents. As such, comparisons depending on nationality were carried 
out only for these four nationalities. Slightly over 40% of respondents have 
previously experienced a disaster. For those respondents who received aid in the past, 
none of them declared to have received help from CI operators.  
4. Results 
4.1 Actors from whom aid is expected 
When asked from which actors respondents expect aid after a disaster, actors 
commonly associated with disaster response were the most chosen (See Figure 1). 
Over 90% of respondents selected firemen and first responders and over 80% selected 
police and emergency management personnel. CI operators are the next most chosen, 
with  
73% of respondents expecting them to provide aid. There appears to be slightly lower 
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expectations for volunteers (64%) and neighbours (57%). Only 1% of respondents 
stated that they do not expect any aid. 
 
Figure 1: Respondents' expectations for aid after a disaster 
4.1.1 Factors affecting expectations 
Some demographic factors appear to influence expectations. When it comes to 
nationality, French respondents appear to be the least likely to expect aid from the 
police (See Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Expectations for aid based on respondents’ nationality 
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Portuguese respondents have very high expectations for volunteers (73%) compared 
to the other nationalities studied (49% for Norwegian, 51% for French and 59% for 
Swedish respondents), and Norwegian respondents are the least likely to expect aid 
from neighbours (39% compared to over 50% for the other nationalities studied). 
Female respondents have slightly higher expectations of emergency management 
personnel, volunteers and neighbours than male respondents (with a 12 point, 9 point 
and 7 point difference, respectively). Lastly, respondents who have experienced a 
crisis expect more from their neighbours, but those who haven't have higher 
expectations of volunteers. No differences were found based on age or education 
level. 
4.1.2 Aid from CI operators 
While overall CI operators are often chosen for expectations of aid, some 
demographic factors appear to influence these expectations. A significant difference 
was found based on education level, with 74% of respondents with higher education 
choosing CI operators’ aid compared to 57% for those respondents with a lower 
education level. When it comes to differences based on nationality, French 
respondents are the least likely to expect aid from CI operators (63%), compared to 
Swedish (69%), Norwegian (72%), and Portuguese (76%) respondents (see Figure 2). 
Respondents who have had disaster experience are less likely to expect aid from CI 
operators (68%) than those who have not (75%). No significant differences were 
found regarding the respondents’ gender or age.  
4.2 Expectations to aid in evacuation 
Overall, the questionnaire found that 96% of respondents agree or strongly agree that 
CI operators should provide means of evacuation to the local population (see Figure 
3).  
 
Figure 3: Evacuation expectations 
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No respondents strongly disagreed with this statement. No significant difference was 
found among respondents based on sex, age, education level, nationality or previous 
disaster experience. 
4.3 Expectations of aid from CIOs in long term recovery 
When asked if they expected CI operators to aid in their long term recovery, 75% 
agreed or strongly agreed (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Long term recovery expectations 
Portuguese respondents have a much higher expectation that CI operators aid in their 
long term recovery than the other nationalities studied, with 92% agreeing or strongly 
agreeing. Norwegian respondents are the least likely to expect CI operators to aid in 
their long term recovery with 51% agreeing or strongly agreeing and are most likely 
to disagree or strongly disagree (16% compared to 7% or less for the other 
nationalities studied). Respondents with previous disaster experience are less likely to 
expect CI operators to aid in their long term recovery (68%) than those who have no 
previous experience (78%). 
5 Discussion 
Overall, expectations for CI operators to partake in emergeny management appear 
high. While less often chosen than actors typically associated with emergency 
management such as firefighters or policemen, CI operators were more often selected 
than volunteers or neighbours. Low expectations of aid from neighbours and 
volunteers appears in contrast with the literature which acknowledges that neighbours 
are most often the true first responders in a disaster event and the high expectations 
for NGOs to provide aid during disasters [14], [15]. Despite the fact that no 
respondents who have received help in a past disaster received help from CI 
operators, still 68% expect aid in the future. This could imply that respondents think 
that CI operators should have helped them in the past, but further research is needed. 
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When it comes to evacuation, the findings seem to reflect what was found in the 
literature review, demonstrating that people expect to be able to use transportation 
assets provided by CI operators in order to evacuate.  
Concerning the differences found based on gender and education level, literature is 
divided on how these factors affect expectations [16].  For gender, this is probably 
due to the fact that women’s civil liberties and role within society may vary from one 
state to another. Women more than men have been found to use their specific social 
network in the response and recovery phases [17] and this could explain why female 
respondents were proportionally more numerous than male respondents to expect aid 
from neighbours and volunteers. As for education level, a better place to look may be 
income level, as people with higher education level tend to have higher incomes, and 
people with lower incomes have been found to have lower expctations of CI operators 
[18]. However, as socio-economic status was not examined in this study, further 
research is needed.  
The cultural differences found may be due to differences in how crisis management is 
organised in the different countries and should be studied in more depth. French 
respondents’ low expectations of police may be due to low trust levels. Whereas 
Nordic countries such as Sweden and Norway have nigh levels of trust in their police 
[19], French citizens have been found to lack trust in their police [20]. This may help 
explain the differences in expectation levels and should be researched further. The 
reason for differences in expectations to receive aid by volunteers is also unclear. 
Indeed, Portuguese respondents have the highest expectations of volunteers however 
levels of volunteering have been found to be relatively low  in Portugal, compared to 
medium high in France or very high in Sweden [21]. High expectations of volunteers 
could then have more to do with trust in civil protection to provide aid during a 
disaster than tendency to volunteer, however more research is needed. Lastly, 
literature also confirms our finding that previous disaster experience affects 
expectations [22], [23].  
5.1 Limitations 
The limitations of the study should be acknowledged in the interpretation of the 
results presented above. As discussed earlier, this was a self-selecting sample that was 
not representative of the demographics in the four respective Living Labs nor the 
European population. The international aspect of the survey may also cause an 
inaccurate generalisation of the findings, as social and cultural backgrounds may 
create different meanings for the Likert scale [24]. Furthermore, people often respond 
to surveys by providing snap judgments based on available information and may be 
influenced by emotional or contextual factors [25]. Auestion wording may also 
influence stated expectations [26]. By asking if the respondent expects something, 
they may be more likely to say yes. This is furthered by the fact that research has also 
shown that disaster victims rarely passively wait around for someone else to take care 
of their needs [27] and having high expectations towards CI operators to act in a 
disaster may indicate a gap between expectations and the ability of citizens in 
responding to crisis situations. 
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6 Recommendations for participation in emergency response by 
transportation infrastructure operators 
Meeting public expectations will help to provide a more thorough emergency 
response effort. Furthermore, meeting public expectations helps to maintain 
operators’ image during and after crisis times. Here we present a brief look into some 
recommendations based on the outcomes of this study for how transportation 
infrastructure operators could help contribute to emergency response.  
6.1 Participate in emergency planning 
CI operators should be active participants in the elaboration of emergency plans. Risk 
and vulnerability assessment for each critical infrastructure, as well as coordination, 
cooperation, and communication between the critical infrastructures and emergency 
management are crucial to meet public expectations and avoid cascading effects [28]. 
Studies have shown that a lack of inclusion of CI operators in the disaster planning 
process has led to evacuation failures [29]. For example, one of the main reasons 
cited for why the Regional Transit Authority was unable to evacuate the people who 
need assistance during Hurricane Katrina was that they had not been part of the 
creation of the local emergency plan [13]. Lastly, disaster planning is often cited as a 
key component in both social and organisational resilience [16].  
6.2 Provide evacuation  
Transportation infrastructure operators should provide a means to evacuate free of 
charge to the public in times of crisis in order to meet public expectations. It is 
important to keep in mind the capacity of the infrastructure to support evacuation. 
The unavailability of transportation assets (employees, readiness of equipment) may 
also hinder evacuation [29]. During both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, one 
of the reasons cited for the failure of buses to evacuate residents is that few of the 
transit drivers reported into work, with some already having evacuated themselves 
[29], [30]. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind road traffic congestion during 
evacuations, which could vary depending on either the number of people who 
evacuate or the time of the disaster event. Indeed, during the 2005 Hurricane Rita in 
Texas and the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami people evacuating experienced road 
congestion [13], [29].  
6.3 Provide recovery transportation  
Both the literature and results indicate that there is an expectation for transportation 
infrastructure operators to contribute to long term recovery by offering alternative 
means of transportation to victims. Literature shows that people expect to be able to 
maintain their mobility even after the loss of private vehicles due to a disaster. As 
such, it is recommended to have an offer of public transportation available to disaster 
victims to help them regain a sense of normalcy after the event.   
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7 Conclusion 
After examining public expectations, it appears that CI operators should provide aid 
during disasters as well as aid in their long term recovery. Transportation 
infrastructure operators should also contribute to crisis management by providing the 
public with a means to evacuate. Indeed, even respondents who in the past received 
help during a disaster, none of whom received help from CI operators, expect CI 
operators to provide aid in the future. While expectations did vary based on age, 
gender, education level and nationality, expectations remained high in all cases. It is 
important to keep in mind that this was a self-selecting sample that was not 
representative of the demographics in the populations studied. 
Based on these findings, recommendations for participation in emergency response 
by transportation infrastructure operators are to 1) participate in emergency planning 
2) provide evacuation and 3) provide recovery transportation.   
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Abstract 
In the paper, a general risk assessment procedure for critical infrastructure (CI) is 
based on the assessment of criticality of CI elements due to the consequences of loss 
of their functionality, and estimation of probabilities associated with these 
criticalities. Bayesian networks method was applied to estimate probabilities of 
unfunctionality of CI elements to capture the impact of various factors, which 
influence CI functionality. Implementation of the proposed approach is illustrated by 
pilot calculations for energy CI of Lithuania. 
Keywords: Critical infrastructure, criticality assessment, unfunctionality probability 
of CI elements, risk assessment. 
1. Introduction
Our societies largely depend on the functionalities of several infrastructures, which 
are generally indicated as Critical Infrastructures (CI). The importance of such 
infrastructure is emphasized by several governmental initiative including the 
European Council Directive 2008/114/EC (European Council 2008). Specifically this 
Directive asks for identifying and assessing the different infrastructures on the base of 
their risk considering the “most realistic worst case”. However, in the framework of 
the Directive noted no risk assessment methodology was developed and the Member 
States are following their own methodologies. 
Energy critical infrastructure as a complex system requires being analysed (modelled 
and simulated) taking into account interconnections between elements of particular 
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systems and cross-border dependencies and interdependencies. On the other hand, 
various factors, such as natural and technological hazards, socio-political and 
geopolitical threats, etc., can influence the functioning of energy system elements 
(and energy system as a whole). Thus, the all-hazard approach is essential to perform 
comprehensive risk assessment.  
An approach of risk assessment for critical energy infrastructure as a continuation of 
previous work (Augutis et al. 2016) for criticality assessment of CI elements due to 
the loss of their functionality is presented in the paper. While the functionality of CI 
elements depends on various factors, the all-hazard approach was decided to be 
implemented by using Bayesian networks (BNs) as a technique capable of capturing 
the impact of various factors and much more, BNs are applicable to model cascading 
effects. Both probabilities of losing the functionality of CI elements and criticality 
leaded by the loss of particular CI elements contribute to comprehensive risk 
assessment for CI via risk matrix.  
2. Risk assessment approach for critical infrastructure
In general, the classical procedure of risk assessment (scheme is presented in 
Figure 1) is universal and easily adaptable, and it is supposed to be sufficient for risk 
assessment for critical infrastructure as well.  
Figure 1. Scheme of risk assessment procedure.  
Detailed description for each step of proposed risk assessment procedure is given in 
subsections 2.1 – 2.4 below. 
2.1 System description 
In the case of CI description, complex system, network, graph or even system-of-
systems concepts can be applied. Generally, any CI can be characterized as a complex 
system (CS), which is defined as a system where the collective behaviour of its parts 
entails emergence of properties that can hardly, if not at all, be inferred from 
properties of the parts (Complex systems society). 
CI as complex systems are rational, well designed, perform their functions over 
periods of time and under a variety of threats. Interconnected and interdependent 
critical energy infrastructures also can be defined as complex systems, consisting of 
physical facilities, transmission lines, roads, railways, human decision makers, etc. 
However, complex systems can be modelled as a network and defined as a graph, 
where nodes are components, connections and relationships are links. 
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Operations of any critical infrastructure can be dependent upon each of the other CI, 
i.e. dependencies and interdependencies between infrastructures exist, which have to 
be defined. There are various dimensions and types of CI interdependencies, which 
vary widely and each has its own characteristics. Usually, four principal classes of 
interdependencies – physical, cyber, geographic, and logical – are defined and 
examined (Rinaldi et al. 2001). However, more types of CI interdependencies exist in 
reality, such as economic, technological, social/human, political/policy/legal, 
organizational/business, etc. For example, in the energy CI, there is a physical 
dependency between electricity production generators and the gas supply system. 
Usually, interdependencies are considered when examining the more general case of 
multiple critical infrastructures connected as a “system-of-systems”. A system-of-
systems (SoS) consist of multiple, heterogeneous, distributed, occasionally 
independently operating systems embedded in networks at multiple levels that evolve 
over time (DeLaurentis 2007). Alternatively, the term “complex systems” is also used 
in defining SoS: “Systems-of-systems are large scale concurrent and distributed 
systems that are comprised of complex systems” (Kotov 1997). 
System representation as a multigraph is widely used in order to perform simulations. 
Thus, directed multigraph is considered 
G = (V, E), (1) 
where V – set of nodes (vertices), V = {z1, …, zN}, E – set of edges, E = {l1, …, lM}, 
which cover all elements of analyzed system(s) and relations between them. 
2.2 Hazard identification 
Hazard identification for critical infrastructure is also one of the steps in the risk 
assessment procedure. Hazard can be any “dangerous phenomenon, substance, human 
activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, 
property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or 
environmental damage” (UNISDR 2009). Usually, hazard is referred as synonymous 
to threat for CI. 
Every CI is surrounded by a variety of hazards of various origins. They depend on the 
country where the critical infrastructure exists, its geographic and political 
region/context. Relatively hazards for critical infrastructures can roughly be divided 
into several types as natural, technical, economic, socio-political and geopolitical 
(Table 1). 
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Table 1: Types of hazards for critical infrastructure. 
Type of hazard Description 
Natural Adverse and extreme natural phenomena, such as hazards occurring in the air 
(extreme wind, tornado, showers, extreme fluctuation of temperature, drought, 
lightning, fogs, storms, blizzards, frosts, etc.); hazards occurring on the ground and 
under the ground (earthquake, tsunamis, floods, movement of ground, volcanic 
eruption, subsidence of ground, erosion of coast, etc.); external fires (fires of the 
woods environmental the CI, fires of peat, etc.). 
Technical Caused by the unreliable functionality of CI and result from various accidents and 
failures that occur due to technical reasons and may cause serious disruptions of CI 
or even a complete termination of CI functioning. 
Economic Economic crises, isolation of the system, domination of a particular source of fuel, 
producer or supplier, the presence of monopolies in the case of critical energy 
infrastructure. 
Socio-political, 
geopolitical 
The existence (or imagined existence) of these hazards has a substantial impact on 
decision-making with regard to CI development. These hazards, albeit being not as 
evident as natural disasters or technical accidents, are significant and might have 
severe consequences. Terrorism and cyber-attacks can also be defined as socio-
political threats. 
Technical, economic, socio-political and geopolitical hazards usually may be referred 
to human caused hazards of two types: non malicious and malicious (Table 2). 
Table 2: Human caused hazards for critical infrastructure. 
Non malicious Malicious 
Explosions (explosions of gas, fuel, ammunition, chemical substances, etc.); 
transport accidents (aircraft crash, accident of automobile and water transport, 
failure on railways, etc.); failures related to transportation of a dangerous cargo 
(accidents in transportation of explosive, poisonous, toxic, radioactive, easily 
inflammable and other cargoes); emergency events on industrial and military 
objects (explosions, wreck of technical constructions, outflow of toxic and 
poisonous substances, explosions of the ammunition, the non-authorized shots of 
rockets, having dug gas and oil pipelines, etc.); loss of critical infrastructure. 
Cyber-attacks, 
diversions and 
acts of terrorism. 
The loss or disruption of critical infrastructure is considered separately as a human 
caused hazard (unintentional, accident) in this methodology. The inclusion of CI loss 
as a specific hazard highlights the fact that the probability of such an event is 
important in the CI risk assessment procedure. 
2.3 Probability estimation and consequence analysis 
Natural environmental of the system is full of potential hazards which may cause the 
negative effect to the particular elements of the system and to the system as a whole 
as well. Let us assume that the impact of hazards is considered as a disruption of 
functionality of particular element (or group of elements). Disruption (fully of partly) 
of the functionality of the whole system can be as a result of cascading effect due to 
dependencies and interdependencies of elements in the reference system.  
Authors propose to simulate the functioning of the system when one element or group 
of particular elements is not operating (Augutis et al. 2014; Augutis et al. 2016): to 
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assess system ability to cope with the loss of one or several elements in the sense of 
meeting the demands of final consumers for consequence analysis. For instance, 
disruption of gas supply for heat and electricity generation can be treated by a 
diversification of the fuel.  
Criticality of element(s) in CI was introduced in previous works (Augutis et al. 2014; 
Augutis et al. 2016) as a measure to assess the impact of the loss of one or group of 
elements in the system due to its (or their) role in the system (more details are 
provided in the subsection 2.3.1).  
Assessment of consequences is one of two key pillars in risk evaluation. The second 
component is probability of losing the functionality of one element or group of 
elements in the system for a particular period due to various hazards.  
2.3.1   Criticality assessment as consequence analysis 
Calculation of system element’s criticality as a measure for quantitative consequence 
analysis due to the loss of this element (criticality of a group of elements can be 
calculated as well) was proposed in previous work (Augutis et al. 2016). Criticality of 
the kth element is defined as 
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satisfying equality 
1)(...)(1 =++ tt CNββ . (4) 
For example, ck(t) = 1 means that an operation of the whole system are completely 
stopped, if the kth element is not functioning; ck(t) = 0.15 means that 85% of final 
consumers demands are met, if the kth element is not functioning.  
The approach is applicable to the assessment of criticality of a group of elements: for 
this purpose, )(tS ki  in eq. (2) is replaced by “supply to ith consumer”, when a 
particular group of elements does not perform their intended functions. 
86
Proceedings of the 52nd ESReDA Seminar, May 30-31, 2017 
Lithuanian Energy Institute & Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania 
2.3.2   All-hazard approach for estimation of element unfunctionality probability 
The functionality of system elements depends on various factors as technical 
reliability, internal and external hazards, the functionality of other elements, etc. 
Thus, approach to estimate probability of functionality of the element should capture 
all these aspects, i.e. all-hazard approach is required for the purpose. Bayesian 
networks (Pourret, Naim 
& Marcot 2008) as a powerful tool towards overall approach were proposed to 
estimate the probability of the functionality of each element in the system. 
BNs are widely used for various critical infrastructures: modelling of water supply 
network (Francis, Guikema & Henneman 2014), risk analysis for maritime transport 
system, by taking into account its different factors (i.e., ship-owner, shipyard, port 
and regulator) and their mutual influences (Trucco et al. 2008), scenario analysis for 
energy sector (Cinar & Kayakutlu 2010), evaluation of cascading effects in a power 
grid (Codetta-Raiteri et al. 2012), vulnerability analysis considering cascading effects 
(Khakzad & Reniers 2015), operational risk assessment (Barua et al. 2016), etc. 
A particular BN model is constructed to estimate the probability of functionality for 
each element. It consists of analysed ith element as node-child and nodes-parents 
which represent external (human-made and natural) and internal hazards and related 
elements on the referred system (scheme is presented in Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Fragment of the topological scheme of the 
reference system and Bayesian network for one its 
element.  
Probability of unfunctionality of the jth element is calculated as joint probability of its 
corresponding random variable Zj to have value “False” (F) 
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where random variables H(h)1, … , H(h)s, H(n)1, … , H(n)m, H(i)1, … , H(i)l correspond to 
external (human-made and natural) and internal hazards respectively, and random 
variables Zi, i∈{k1, …, kr}, 1 ≤ k1 < … < kr ≤ N, correspond to the functionality of 
related elements in the system.  
 
BNs of more complex structure are possible, once current node-parent(s) depend(s) 
on other factors. For instance, reliability of element, as one of the main internal 
factors having an impact on the functionality of the element, can be assessed via BN 
as well (Tien & Der Kiureghian 2016). 
 
2.4 Risk evaluation  
 
Certainly, a risk evaluation is based on the evaluation of risk metric(s), while risk 
metric serves two important functions: it enables to talk about risk; to communicate 
and discuss the results of risk analysis and the aspects of risk that are important and it 
facilitates decision-making by providing a quantitative measure for risk evaluation. 
The choice of risk metrics is essential as it directs what kind of information to get 
from the risk analysis and whether the results are considered as legitimate and 
informative by decision-makers and stakeholders (Johansen & Rausand 2014). The 
criteria were summarized in an overall discussion on informative, value-related, and 
analytical issues that affect the interpretation and choice of risk metrics by 
I.L. Johansen & M. Rausand (2014).  
 
Indicators as importance measures (Fang, Pedroni & Zio 2016) and risk matrices 
(Kröger 2008; Kjøllea, Utneb & Gjerdea 2012; Theocharidou & Giannopoulos 2015) 
can be indicated as applicable and beneficial to CI analysis. Birnbaum’s and Fussell-
Vesely importance measures were used in previous works (Augutis et al. 2016). 
Importance measures approach very well identifies the most critical elements of the 
system in a quantitative way. Despite this merit, the approach based on importance 
measures give an incomplete picture of the possible risk associated to the loss of 
functionality of one or more elements in the system.  
 
In this case, risk matrix distinguishes for its capability to capture two highly 
important components as a severity of consequences and probability of occurrence of 
these consequences (Theocharidou & Giannopoulos 2015). In general, risk matrix is r 
× c table (horizontal axis serves for categories of severity; vertical axis – categories of 
probability). Such classification of probability (Figure 3) is widely used in the risk 
assessment of various technical facilities. Meanwhile, number c (categories of 
consequences severity) strongly relies on chosen consequences analysis and 
calculated measures.  
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Risk matrix adapted to CI analysis is presented in Figure 3, where criticality of 
element(s) plays the role of the severity of consequences.  
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y 
(5) 
(4) 
(3) 
(2) 
(1) 
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
Criticality 
Classification of probability: 
(1) – very unlikely: expected to occur less than once in 10000 years 
(2) – unlikely:  expected to occur at least once in 1000 – 10000 years 
(3) – possible:  expected to occur at least once in 100 – 1000 years 
(4) – likely:  expected to occur at least once in 10 – 100 years 
(5) – very likely:  expected to occur at least once in 10 years 
■ – very high, ■ – high, ■ – medium, ■ – low (tolerable) risk. 
Figure 3. An example of adapted risk matrix for CI.  
Results presented in the light of such risk matrix are more informative and easily 
understandable for decision-makers and stakeholders. 
3. Pilot calculations
3.1 Energy system description 
In this paper, Lithuanian energy system is analysed for risk assessment taking into 
account criticality of energy infrastructure elements. Lithuanian energy system can be 
identified as system-of-systems since it consists of the electricity system, the district 
heating systems, fuel supply system for electricity and heat production and other 
having connections with each other. The connections among systems are both 
physical (e.g., electricity transmission network connected with generation sources and 
distribution network) and functional (e.g., thermal power plant, which connects gas 
pipelines, district heating network and electricity supply network, by transforming 
primary energy into the heat and electricity, which are supplied to consumers). 
Reversible connections also exist among different energy systems, such as natural gas 
supply to power plants to produce electricity, which is correspondingly needed for 
proper functioning of the natural gas transmission system. In this paper, Lithuanian 
energy system is considered as a graph with different nodes representing 
infrastructure elements. Usually, energy system connections are depicted as network 
systems or graphs. 
In the pilot calculations, elements of different energy system infrastructures in 
Lithuania are denoted as nodes: z1, z2, z3, ..., zN, where N – number of elements 
(N = 157). Elements of gas supply system – from z1 to z90, heat generation 
technologies  
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in six main cities (which used the natural gas as the main fuel) – from z91 to z126, 
power plants – from z127 to z133, technologies of renewable energy sources – from z134 
to z157. 
 
3.2 Criticality assessment  
 
Assessment of criticality of elements (defined in subsection 2.3.1) with regard to 
electricity demand of final consumers was carried out according to N-1 and N-2 
principles. “N-1” means that only one element out of N elements is not functioning 
(157 scenarios in analysed case, when N = 157), “N-2” – two elements in the system 
are not functioning at the time (12246 combinations in analysed case). A part of the 
results (Augutis et al. 2016) are presented in Figure 4: scenarios related to the highest 
values of calculated criticality of separate elements (1 scenario) and combinations of 
two elements (20 scenarios). The results of N-1 analysis revealed: the loss of 
functionality of the element z89 leads to the highest value of criticality. Element z89 
represents pipeline connecting the highest capacity electricity generation technology 
with the main natural gas supply system. The values of criticality of other elements 
did not exceed 0.1 (in the case of N-1 analysis). N-2 analysis demonstrated that pair 
of z89 and z131 associates with exceptionally high criticality comparing to other pairs. 
Element z131 represents power plant unit with the highest capacity, which can 
generate electricity using the alternative fuel. 
 
 
Figure 4. Scenarios of N-1 and N-2 analysis, associated to 
the highest values of criticality.  
 
3.3 Probability of element’s functionality  
 
Even relatively high criticality not always associates with the highest risk, if only the 
probability of this situation is negligible. Aiming at this, the probability of the loss of 
functionality was estimated for each element.  
 
In the paper, Bayesian networks for elements z89 and z131 are presented in more 
details. Element z131 is dependent on element z89, i.e. one-directional dependence: 
z89 → z131. Performing N-1 analysis, first of all, we estimate the probability of 
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functionality of element z89, then probability of element z131. Main hazards or factors, 
which may have an impact on the functionality of the elements z89 and z131 are listed 
in Table 3.  
Table 3: Hazard identification for elements (z89 , z131). 
Type of hazard Identified hazards For element z89 For element z131 
Internal rupture probability(1) technical reliability(2)
External (natural) earthquake 
flooding, 
extreme wind, 
earthquake 
External (human-made) sabotage  
or terrorist attack 
sabotage  
or terrorist attack 
Related elements in the system z87 & z88(3)
z89
(4)
 
alternative fuel 
(1)
 rupture probability can be estimated using approach, which captures results of  non-destructive inspections and 
failure data (Dundulis et al, 2016); 
(2)
 power plant safety report can serve for quantitative evaluation; 
(3)
 element z89 has direct connection with neighbouring elements z87 & z88 of natural gas transmission system;  (4)
 element z131 relies on the functionality of element z89, which should ensure supply of primary fuel (natural gas). 
Usually, initial probabilities of natural hazards such as extreme wind, flooding, are 
based on statistical analysis of historical data of the region, where analysed CI is 
located. The probability of earthquake occurrence in the territory of Ignalina nuclear 
power plant (in the north-east of the country) was applied to the whole territory of 
Lithuania (approx. 65300 km2). This assumption was made, because Lithuania is not 
located in the seismically active zone. 
Bayesian networks for elements z89 and z131 are presented in Figure 5 and Figure 6, 
respectively. A particular Bayesian network was constructed for each element in the 
analysed system towards estimation of probabilities of their functionality (N-1 
analysis).  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5. Bayesian network for elements: z89 (a), z131 (b). 
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N-2 analysis is not straightforward, particular when failures of not independent 
elements are analysed. For instance, the particular case of N-2 considering the failures 
of elements z89 and z131 is possible in two scenarios: 
1) element z89 fails (loses its functionality) and this causes a cascading effect to
z131, probability of this case is equal to “P(z89 = F)·P(z131 = F | z89 = F)”;
2) failure of element z131 occurs while element z89 is still working, but after that
failure of element z89 occurs as well, probability of this case is equal to
“P(z131 = F | z89 = T)·P(z89 = F)”.
Summarizing total probability of the failures of both elements z89 and z131is 
),()|()|()(
),(
89891318913189
13189
FZPTZFZPFZFZPFZP
FZFZP
===+====
=== (6) 
where probability P(z89 = F) is estimated in N-1 analysis, P(z131 = F | z89 = F) and 
P(z131 = F | z89 = T) are estimated within BN (Figure 6), setting evidence that z89 has 
failed or is functioning respectively.  
The same approach was used to estimate remaining probabilities of losing 
functionalities of any two elements (all possible combinations).  
Figure 6. Bayesian networks for N-2 analysis: z89 & z131: 
scenario 1 – setting evidence of failure of element z89 
(=>P(z131 = F | z89 = F)); scenario 2 – setting evidence that 
element z89 is functioning (=> P(z131 = F | z89 = T)). 
However, proposed approach assumes that failure probabilities in N-2 analysis
 
do not 
depend on the operative condition of the network, as it may be illustrated by several 
episodes (e.g. the Italian Black-out in 2003). Due to the re-distribution of the flows 
some links are going to operate in overload conditions and this considerably increases 
the probability of failure. Proposed approach should be considered as a first crude 
approximation. To take into account such phenomena, future studies should consider 
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the probability as condition dependent, i.e. the internal probability of fault will be 
increased in accordance with the increased load of the element.    
 
3.4 Risk evaluation via risk matrix  
 
Obtained probabilities of functionality of elements or their groups and associated 
criticalities are summarized into risk matrix (proposed in subsection 2.4). The results 
for analysed scenarios (21 out of 12403), associated to the highest value of criticality, 
are presented in Figure 7.  
 
● – scenarios of N-1 analysis 
○ – scenarios of N-2 analysis 
Figure 7. Results of pilot case study over the risk matrix 
(logarithmic scale is used for vertical axis). 
 
These pilot calculations demonstrate that most of all analysed scenarios of N-1 and  
N-2 analyses fall into the zone of tolerable risk and very few scenarios into zone of 
medium risk.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Risk assessment procedure for critical infrastructure based on CI criticality is 
presented in this paper. 
Previous studies (Augutis et al. 2014; Augutis et al. 2016) demonstrated capabilities 
of CI criticality assessment to identify critical elements (or groups of elements) in the 
system. Nevertheless, CI criticality assessment approach has to be enhanced towards 
comprehensive risk assessment for CI. Thus, this paper contributes to the 
development of the approach used for risk assessment of energy CI.  
Proposed approach is based on the assessment of criticality of CI elements and groups 
of them (as consequence analysis) due to the loss of their functionality, and 
estimation of probabilities associated with these criticalities. While the functionality 
of CI elements depends on various factors, such as technical reliability, internal and 
external hazards, functionality of other elements, etc., the all-hazard approach was 
implemented by using Bayesian networks as a technique capable of capturing all 
these aspects. Criticality of CI elements (as a measure of consequences) and 
probabilities of consequences occurrence are coupled within risk matrix that enables 
to evaluate the risk of CI.  
Implementation of the proposed approach is illustrated by pilot calculations for 
energy CI of Lithuania.  
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Abstract 
The Structural Health Monitoring combines a variety of sensing technologies for the 
detection, localization and characterization of a damage and damaging phenomena 
in order to predict the residual life of the structure. One of the important issues in 
structural health monitoring consists in finding the defect parameters in a structure 
through an optimization problem. This paper presents an application of this 
optimization problem on a simply supported reinforce concrete bridge girder. Four 
different cases are considered in the present work, according to the position of the 
sensors and the defects. The location of the defect and its effect on the reduction of 
the rigidity have been obtained using genetic algorithm which is an effective 
procedure to solve such problems. The results have shown that the proposed method 
is able to detect the damage accurately considering possible sources of error.  
1. Introduction
The level of safety of many in-service structures tend to be inadequate to current 
design documents. Therefore, one of the most important issues in civil engineering is 
the detection of structural damages, defined as changes in material properties and 
boundary conditions which adversely affect the system performance. So far, the most 
commonly used concept of monitoring is the periodical inspection which starts with a 
visual inspection [1]. More complex surveillance tasks can be realized with good cost 
effectiveness by using modern transducer and information technologies for 
monitoring with a high degree of automation.  
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The Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) is a set of techniques and methodologies for 
detection, localization, characterization and quantification of damages and damaging 
phenomena. These techniques are used, among others, to predict the residual life of 
the structure. SHM can be conceptually divided into two parts: first, the installation of 
sensing elements and of automated data acquisition system, and second, the 
interpretation of the acquired data which will lead to a comparison of measured and 
calculated data to validate model assumptions or to verify the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the monitoring system. In order to use a cost-effective maintenance 
strategy, the optimal solution consists of minimizing the total expected cost under the 
reliability constraints as follows [2]:  
min CE = CPM + CINS + CREP + CFAIL 
s.t. β ≥ 𝛽∗
where: 
CE  : is the total expected cost, 
CPM : is the preventive maintenance cost, 
CINS : is the inspection and monitoring cost, 
CREP : is the repair cost, 
CFAIL : is the failure cost, 
Β,   : are structural and target reliability indexes. 
The assessment of an existing structure follows a seven step process [3]: 
 Preliminary on-site inspection
 Recovery and review of all relevant documentation
 Specific on-site testing and measurements
 Analysis of collected data to refine the probabilistic models for structural
resistance
 Accurate (re-) analysis of the structure with updated loading and resistance
parameters
 Structural reliability analysis
 Decision analysis
On-site inspection, as mentioned before, starts with a visual inspection followed by 
destructive and non-destructive testing to evaluate the properties of materials, 
components or system. The Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are highly valuable 
techniques because they do not cause damage to the structure; however each one of 
these techniques has its advantages, disadvantages and limitations.  
The objective of Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) technology is to develop 
autonomous systems for the continuous monitoring, inspection, and damage detection 
of structures with minimum human involvement. The results of structural conditions 
may be recorded through a local network or to a remote center automatically by 
determining different classes of recipients responsible for decision-making. 
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Thus, the most important advantages of monitoring systems are: 
 real-time monitoring and reporting
 structural information on a continuous time basis (structural history)
 early detection of deteriorations and initializing deficiencies
 information for reliability based preventive maintenance operations
 saving in maintenance cost
 minimum human involvement
 reducing labor, visual inspection, downtime, and human error
 automation - improving safety and reliability
 calibration data for analytical models for validation and verification
2. Local and Global Structural Health Monitoring
SHM can be divided into two main approaches: (i) Local SHM and (ii) Global SHM. 
Local SHM techniques rely on direct evaluation of a structural member to evaluate its 
state with respect to the different possible defect and degradation types. Intermittent 
structural evaluation by mean of a visual inspection or by using various Non 
Destructive Evaluation (NDE) techniques that are applied directly by inspectors 
belong to the local approach. This approach also includes long term continuous 
monitoring using sensors embedded or attached to the structural member used to 
evaluate a specific performance parameter of the member.  
For example, a bridge pile can be monitored for tilting using appropriate sensors, a 
bridge deck girder can be monitored for excessive deflection during its service 
lifetime using deflectometers or long base deformation sensors (the results of which 
can be integrated to obtain the deflection of the girder at different points of its axis). 
While providing relatively precise measurement for performance parameters which 
are directly observed or for which specific sensors were installed, this approach is not 
practical for complex structures having numerous structural members. The exhaustive 
instrumentation of such a structure would not be economically feasible most of the 
times. Also, some structures may include features that cannot be directly accessed 
and/or measured, in such cases the performance of the related structural members 
must be assessed indirectly by means of global SHM techniques. 
In global SHM, a few sensors whose types, number and location must be judiciously 
chosen, are used to monitor the structure for the advent of specific failure modes. The 
parameters of the sensing scheme (types, numbers and location) must be optimized in 
order to maximize the following (sometime conflicting) objectives: 
1- Increase the probability of detection of a defect; 
2- Increase the reliability and precision of defect localization; 
3- Increase the precision of the evaluation of defect extent. 
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Global SHM approaches can be further divided into: (i) direct methods and (ii) 
indirect methods. In Global SHM direct methods, measurement datasets are used 
directly to attain the above mentioned objectives.  
 
Such methods usually involve one or several of the following techniques: pattern 
recognition, machine learning, classification algorithms etc. A typical global SHM 
scenario will consist broadly of the following steps: 
1- A set of different failure modes is made up by one or several experts based on 
mechanical analyses and investigations, and/or historical behavior of similar 
structures; 
2- For each failure mode specified in the first step, the corresponding predicted 
sensor measurements are calculated (via analytical models, Finite elements 
models, etc.); 
3- Actual real measurements are compared (using for example pattern 
recognition techniques) to measurement sets calculated at step 2. If a match is 
successful, then one can infer that the corresponding failure mode has 
occurred. 
The rational underlying global indirect SHM methods is the fact that under 
unchanging load conditions, any changes in variables measured by the sensors, is due 
to changes in the underlying structural characteristics (changing material properties, 
boundary conditions, etc.). 
 
Thus, global indirect SHM methods focus on updating our knowledge of the 
structural characteristics given the measured data. 
 
The great advantage of indirect methods is their ability to systematically and 
transparently take into consideration all uncertainties that affect the structural system 
as well as the measuring system. For example, one might face the following 
uncertainties in SHM problems: 
 
1- Uncertainties related to the true values of structural parameters (Young’s 
modulus, stiffness, geometrical dimensions, etc.)   
2- Structural model uncertainties that may affect predicted behavior of the 
structure for a given set of values of structural parameters; 
3- Measurement uncertainties that may veil the true values of measurement 
variables. 
 
A natural methodology that one might use in order to take into account the above 
mentioned uncertainties would be a Bayesian updating methodology that would take 
as a first step an initial subjective probability distribution of the structural parameters, 
and then, as new data becomes available the initial probability distribution will be 
updated accordingly. 
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3. Identification by genetic algorithms
The identification of the parameters of the sensing scheme (types, numbers and 
location) could be done by an effective algorithm, the genetic algorithm (GA). It is a 
search procedure that uses the mechanics of natural selection and natural genetics 
where chromosomes can be coded in two different ways: either as binary vectors or as 
real vectors. The sum of all bits, which represent one search variables, is called 
“Gene”, and the sum of all genes collected in a binary vector is called “chromosome”. 
For the initialization, a starting population P(t = 0) of n individuals is stochastically 
generated based on uniform probability within the given bounds. Then, the evaluation 
and interpretation of the objective function value provides a measure for the "fitness 
value". So to evolve towards the next generation of generally better solutions, the GA 
selects the highest performing candidates from the current generation using "survival-
of-the-fittest" learning and the selection probability for the recombination is 
calculated. 
The best solutions are then recombined with each other through an operation called 
“crossover” to form some new solutions which are used to replace the worst solutions 
of the original population. This type of recombination is defined by two steps:  
 at first individuals chosen for the recombination are mixed and then two by
two individuals are chosen as parents;
 in the second step, the parents’ chromosomes are recombined according to
different crossover schemes.
Another type of recombination is the mutation which consists on finding a new region 
of the search space and avoiding the convergence to a suboptimum by exchanging 
values in the chromosome.  
In general, the population size is kept constant so it is necessary to decide which 
individuals should survive or be substituted for the next generation, this step is called 
“substitution”. There are different kinds of substitutions like the elitism or 
cancellation of n worst elements or cancellation of n stochastically chosen 
individuals, etc. The process is then repeated until the desired fitness value is reached. 
4. Damage identification procedure
The occurrence of various crack patterns in a structure takes place during construction 
and/or after completion. A structure component develops cracks whenever the stress 
in the components exceeds its strength (Figure 1). Some types of cracking indicate a 
structural issue, when others do not indicate any type of issue other than normal 
weathering. Whatever the cause, it still remains important to detect a crack at its early 
age in order to avoid serious failures. 
The loads can be divided into two categories: primary and secondary loads. 
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In the case of bridges, the sources of primary loading include the own weight of 
materials from which the structure was built, traffic, weather conditions, natural 
catastrophes and loading conditions experienced during construction. Some of these 
loads act permanently so they are considered as dead loads while the others are not 
permanent, so they are called live loads. However, the secondary loads are those due 
to temperature change, construction eccentricities, shrinkage of structural materials, 
settlement of foundation, or other such loads. 
Figure 1: Cracks on a concrete beam after loading 
Because of the applied loads, bridge structures accumulate damage during their 
service life and the actual structure response to loading is degraded from the predicted 
design performance. Some of the most frequent defects on the elements of a bridge 
structure are: lateral movements or rotation of the substructure, excessive vertical 
displacement of the superstructure, cracks and open joints between the segments of 
the concrete, concrete cover depth defects, corrosion of the reinforcement, etc.  
For instance, if we want to study the case where cracks occur in a concrete bridge due 
to traffic loads: 
A defect dj in the structure will cause a degradation in the structure which will 
affect its mechanical properties. To detect the damage, one or more sensors 
like the linear variable differential transformer (LVDT) can be implemented. 
The deflection v given by these sensors will depend on a number of 
parameters such as the load Pi and its location bl, the position of the sensor kl, 
the span l, the Young’s modulus E and the moment of inertia I, in addition to 
the parameters characterizing the defect like its position cl and the induced 
reduction of the moment of inertia αI. 
In order to identify the defect parameters, the optimization problem should be set 
such as its solution leads to the best fitting of the defect identification. The fitness 
function is defined by the sum of quadratic difference between the calculated and 
observed deflections; this function takes the form:  
f = ∑ (𝑣𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑣𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑)
2𝑁
𝑖=1 (1) 
The best fitting is the one which leads to the minimum value of f, which should be 
ideally zero. However, due to uncertainties in the defect evolution and measurement 
techniques, the zero is never reached and the best solution will appear when f takes 
the closest value to zero. 
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As mentioned above, the genetic algorithms are effective to solve this problem. 
Figure 2 shows the flow chart of the genetic algorithm procedure. At first, a 
population of chromosomes is randomly created. Each chromosome containing 
several 8-bit variables, representing the defect parameters to calculate. Then, some 
individuals of the population are recombined by crossover with a given probability; 
this latter is chosen as 0.6. The others are subjected to mutation where one bit of the 
chromosome is switched to another bit (i.e. 0 is switch to 1, and 1 is switched to 0, at 
a single gene of the chromosome) with a given probability; a value of 0.3 is chosen 
herein for mutation probability.  
The crossover and mutation will result in new offspring being created. Subsequently, 
a truncation selection is applied on the new population in order to select the 
individuals with the best fitness.  
This procedure (i.e. population evolution) is repeated many times until the best fitness 
is reached. The computation time depends on the size of each population and the 
number of generations to reach convergence.  
Figure 2: Flow chart of the genetic algorithm. 
5. Application to bridge girder
The described procedure is now applied to a reinforced concrete bridge girder, 
presenting a damage for which the location and amount are unknown. The damage 
effect is the reduction of the moment of inertia of the affected cross-section. The 
applied SHM procedure aims therefore to identify the defect parameters: size and 
location. 
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Figure 3 plots the simply supported bridge girder with a length l and initial moment 
of inertia 𝐼0. The girder is subject to a moving load P located at a distance bl from the 
left support (which will be taken as the reference point). The moving load P 
represents for instance the wheel loads due to heavy trucks or vehicles. At the cross-
section affected by the damage, the moment of inertia decreases with time, and takes 
the value 𝛼(𝑡)𝐼0, where α(t) is a time-dependent reduction rate (between 0 and 1). 
The monitoring is considered by implementing, either one or two LVDT (Linear 
Variable Differential Transformer) sensors in the structure at a distance kl and k’l 
from the left support, in order to measure the deflections v at the sensor positions, and 
therefore to assess the damage at the unknown location cl.  
Figure 3: Defected beam implemented by sensors. 
Four cases will be considered in this application, depending on the location of the 
sensor, applied load, defect, and number of implemented sensors. In each case, the 
deflection v is calculated using the virtual work principle, leading to the following 
formula:  
𝑣 = ∫
𝑀(𝑥).?̅?(𝑥)
𝐸𝐼0
 𝑑𝑥
𝑙
0
  (2) 
where: 
M(x) represents the applied bending moment due to the load P, ?̅?(x) represents the 
bending moment under a unit load at the sensor location, E is the Young’s modulus, 
𝐼0 is the initial moment of inertia of the girder.  
In all the cases, it is assumed that P, l, k, k’ and 𝐼0 are known, and therefore the defect 
parameters are the only unknown of the problem: 
c is the variable defining the defect position, 
α(t) is the variable defining the decrease with time of the moment of inertia 𝐼0 
But since α is a function of the time t, it will be represented by a quadratic polynomial 
as follows:  
α(t) = 𝑎1 −  𝑎2 𝑡 −  𝑎3 𝑡
2        (3)
Therefore, the optimization problem to solve is defined in terms of four variables 
c, 𝑎1, 𝑎2 and 𝑎3. 
bl 
kl 
0.1
l
cl 
𝐼0 α𝐼0 𝐼0
P 
l 
k’
l
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The genetic algorithm used to solve the optimization problem described above is 
based on finding the parameter values corresponding to the best fitness value 
according to the following equation f = ∑ (𝑣𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑣𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑)
2𝑁
𝑖=1 . So, the best
results are given when f converges to zero. 
First, the probability of two individuals being recombined by crossover and the 
probability of an individual being subject to a mutation are not fixed. As it can take 
values between zero and one, our first task is to find the best combination of these 
two probabilities which will give us, after many generations, a curve of the fitness 
converging to zero. After many numerical tests, it has been found that when the 
probability of crossover is 0.6 and the probability of mutation is 0.3, the curve of the 
fitness would converge faster. For that reason, these two probability values are 
considered in the numerical application. 
Another issue to consider concerns the position where the crossover or the mutation 
would take place. Many crossover techniques exist like a single-point crossover or 
two-point crossover that defines which part of the chromosomes will be exchanged. 
In our case, since we have many variables to determine, we went through two 
options:  
 the first one was to use a single-point crossover over the chromosome and,
 the second one consisted in using a single-point crossover on each variable (or
gene) of the chromosome; so we have as many points as variables, each gene
being subjected to a crossover.
The same procedure was applied to the mutation where the chromosome was once 
subjected to a single-point mutation and another time it was subjected to a single-
point mutation on each gene. After comparing the results, we found out that the most 
effective technique was to apply the crossover and the mutation on each gene of the 
chromosome.  
For the numerical computation, the values of the girder parameters are as following: 
P = 100 kN  
L = 16 m 
E = 33000 MPa 
𝐼0 = 0.00858 𝑚
4
B = 0.5 
In the following, four cases are considered, according to load and sensor locations. 
The values taken for the parameters k and k’ vary, according to each the considered 
case: 
 Case 1: k = 0.5 
 Cases 2 and 3: k = 0.65 
 Case 4: k = 0.25,  and k’ = 0.65 
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5.1. Case 1: load and sensor at mid-span sensor 
In this case, the load P is also located at mid-span 0.5l, and also one sensor is 
implemented at the same location, i.e. 0.5l; in other words, b=k=0.5. The defect is 
located at an unknown position at the right half-length of the girder, Figure 4, i.e. cl ˃ 
0.5l.  
Figure 4: Load and sensor at the mid span of the beam 
The deflection at mid-span is calculated by: 
v = 
𝑃𝑙3
12𝐸𝐼0
(0.25 + ((𝑐 − 1)3 −  (𝑐 − 0.9)3)(1 −
1
𝛼
)) (4) 
For this case, with a population of 100 individuals and after 10 generations, we were 
able to reach a fitness of 19.208. The convergence curve is given in the following 
graph, Figure 5, where 8 generations are sufficient to reach the defect identification. 
Figure 5: Convergence of the fitness function in case 1 
The solution parameters take the values: 
𝑐 = 0.563 
𝑎1 = 0.996 
𝑎2 = 0.008 
𝑎3 = 0.00004 
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Therefore, the defect is located at 0.563 from the left support and the decreasing of 
inertia will be defined by the equation: α = 0.996 −  0.008𝑡 − 0.00004𝑡2.
5.2. Case 2: sensor between the load and the defect 
When the load, the sensor and the defect are located at various locations, bl, kl and cl, 
such that b ˂ k ˂ c, Figure 6, the deflection is given by:  
v = 
𝑃𝑏𝑙3
3𝐸𝐼0
((1 − 𝑘)(−0.5𝑏2 + 𝑘(1 − 0.5𝑘)) + 𝑘(1 −
1
𝛼
)((𝑐 − 1)3 −  (𝑐 − 0.9)3))    (5)
Figure 6: Load and sensor at a random position before the defect 
The population is composed of 100 individuals and convergence is achieved after 15 
generations, leading to the fitness of 12.486, Figure 7. 
Figure 7: Convergence of the fitness function in case 2. 
12
12.5
13
13.5
14
14.5
15
15.5
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Fi
tn
es
s 
Number of generations 
Convergence of the fitness function 
kl 
bl 
0.1
l
cl 
𝐼0 α𝐼0 𝐼0
P 
l 
105
Critical Infrastructures: Enhancing Preparedness & Resilience 
for the Security of Citizens and Services Supply Continuity 
The obtained results are: 
c 0.656 
1a  0.996 
2a  0.008 
3a 0.00004 
Finally, the defect is located at 0.656 from the left support and the decreasing of the 
moment of inertia is defined by the equation: α = 0.996 −  0.008𝑡 − 0.00004𝑡2.
5.3. Case 3: sensor outside of the load and defect range 
As in case 2, when the load, the sensor and the defect are located at various locations, 
bl, kl and cl, such that c ˂ b ˂ k, Figure 8, the deflection is given by:  
v = 
𝑃𝑙3(1−𝑘)
3𝐸𝐼0
(𝑏(−0.5𝑏2(3 − 2𝑏) + 𝑘(1 − 0.5𝑘)) + (1 − 𝑏)((1 −
1
𝛼
)(𝑐3 − (𝑐 + 0.1)3) +
𝑏3))  (6) 
Figure 8: Load and sensor at a random position after the defect 
With 100 individuals for each population, convergence is achieved after 17 
generations, , Figure 9. 
Figure 9: Convergence of the fitness function in case 3. 
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The solution is: 
c 0.363 
1a  0.996 
2a  0.008 
3a 0.00004 
Here, the defect is located at 0.363 from the left support and the decreasing of inertia 
will be defined by the equation: α = 0.996 −  0.008𝑡 − 0.00004𝑡2.
5.4. Case 4: two sensors 
In this case, two sensors are implemented at different positions, respectively kl and 
k’l, while the load and the defect are located at bl and cl, with: k ˂ b ˂ c ˂ k’, Figure 
10. 
Figure 10: Two sensors implemented at a random position before the defect 
The deflections at the sensor positions are computed as: 
v = 
𝑃𝑘𝑙3
3𝐸𝐼0
((1 − 𝑏)(−0.5𝑘2 + 𝑏(1 − 0.5𝑏)) + 𝑏(1 −
1
𝛼
)((𝑐 − 1)3 −  (𝑐 − 0.9)3))    (7)
v’ = 
𝑃𝑏𝑙3
3𝐸𝐼0
((1 − 𝑘′)(−0.5𝑏2 + 𝑘′(1 − 0.5𝑘′)) + 𝑘′(1 −
1
𝛼
)((𝑐 − 1)3 −  (𝑐 − 0.9)3))
(8) 
With 100 individuals in each population, convergence is achieved after 20 
generations, Figure 11.  
The fitness minimum is achieved with the following parameters: 
c 0.711 
1a  0.996 
2a  0.02 
3a 0.00004 
Hence, the defect is located at 0.711 from the left support and the decreasing of 
inertia will be defined by the equation: α = 0.996 −  0.02𝑡 − 0.00004𝑡2.
bl 
kl 
0.1
l
cl 
𝐼0 α𝐼0 𝐼0
P 
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l
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Figure 11: Convergence of the fitness function in case 4. 
6. Conclusion
This paper shows the efficiency of the structural health monitoring in assessing the 
size and location of damage in infrastructures. The genetic algorithms are applied to 
solve the identification problem, and show high capabilities in solving properly the 
system. The numerical application on bridge girder shows the efficiency of the 
adopted procedure, whatever the location and the number of sensors, regarding load 
conditions and defect location and size. The procedure can be extended to considered 
several defects in more complex structures. 
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Abstract 
The in-service inspection of pipes, mechanical components or other components from 
various critical infrastructures and facilities (including nuclear power plants, water 
and gas supply systems, etc.) is very important to safe operation of these objects. 
Degradation is occurring in the piping system and various components by 
mechanisms such as stress corrosion, fatigue and erosion. An application of Non-
Destructive Testing (NDT) methods are important to investigate the degradation 
mechanisms or to confirm the absence of degradation process and evaluate how 
defect growth will impact structural integrity during the time interval between 
inspections. For safe operation of piping it is very important to perform NDT of 
piping welds and to estimate the inspection frequency. 
The main influencing parameters of the pipe rupture and inspection were analysed by 
use of different structural reliability models, considering a range of various 
dimensions, materials, degradation mechanisms, loading conditions, NDT reliability 
and inspection procedures. In such way, the features of Risk Informed (RI) In-Service 
Inspection (ISI) in Long Term Operation were also investigated. Sensitivity analysis 
was performed to identify the key influencing parameters under foreseeable 
variations and uncertain values. In particular, the sensitivity analysis was performed 
for the real pipe cases of Boiled Water Reactor (BWR). The analysis of the effect of 
the variation of various parameters influencing the probability of pipe leak and 
rupture was performed. For instance, flaw geometry, weld residual stress, weld 
loads, flaw stress, stress corrosion cracking growth rate, fracture toughness, ISI 
efficiency, leak detection limit were considered in the analysis. 
Keywords: Pipe Rupture, Structural Reliability, Fracture Mechanic Analysis, 
In-service Inspection, Probabilistic Assessment, Sensitivity Analysis. 
1. Introduction
Effective maintenance, surveillance and in-service inspection are essential for the safe 
operation of a nuclear power plant or other critical infrastructures components. They 
ensure not only that the levels of reliability and availability of all plant structures, 
systems and components (SSCs) that have a bearing on safety remain in accordance 
with the assumptions and intent of the design, but also that the safety of the plant is 
not adversely affected after the commencement of operation. [1]. Over the plant’s 
operating lifetime, the operating organization should examine SSCs for possible 
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deterioration so as to determine whether they are acceptable for continued safe 
operation or whether remedial measures should be taken. 
For application of a non-destructive examination (NDE) and in-service inspection of 
the components of critical structures, one of the most important objective is to be able 
to detect possible degradation at an early stage. For example, this may enable to 
prevent the damage, to avoid a leakage and/or a possible rupture of pipe. The 
inspection could be devoted to locations within the plant where one, at the design 
stage, has indicated that the likelihood of fatigue, high stresses or large plastic 
deformations is the greatest. However, experiences from detected degradations in 
critical infrastructures have shown that other causes, in general not anticipated during 
design, are responsible for most of the damages. Examples are stress corrosion 
cracking in austenitic stainless steel piping, erosion-corrosion in ferritic piping and 
thermal fatigue in mixing tees. Obviously, there is a need for an In-Service Inspection 
(ISI) program that has the capability of more accurately finding the components 
where the probability of degradation is the greatest.  
In-service inspection is an integral part of defence in depth programmes for nuclear 
power plants, to ensure safe and reliable operation. Traditional in-service inspection 
programmes were developed using deterministic approaches. However, as 
probabilistic approaches are being developed, risk insights are being used to optimize 
in-service inspection programmes by focusing in-service inspection resources on the 
most risk significant locations [2]. It is recommended to use the results of the risk 
analysis to define a new risk-informed inspection program where the focus is set on 
the highest risk locations. 
In this paper, the analysis of leak and rupture probability analysis of the BWR type 
reactor pipe was performed as part of risk studies. The influence of inspection to 
probability of leak and rupture of pipe was estimated. In this analysis, the stress 
corrosion cracking mechanisms for BWR pipe is considered. Software AutoPIFRAP 
was used for this analysis. 
In order to ensure that components of critical infrastructures are reliable and safe in 
case of long term operation loading, it is very important to evaluate parameter 
uncertainty associated with loads, material properties, geometrical parameters, 
boundaries, degradation mechanisms and other parameters. Sensitivity analyses were 
performed to identify the key influencing parameters under foreseeable variations and 
uncertain values. The sensitivity analysis was performed for the real pipe cases of 
BWR. The analysis of the effect of the variation of various parameters influencing the 
probability of pipe leak and rupture was performed. For instance, flaw geometry, 
weld residual stress, weld loads, flaw stress, stress corrosion cracking growth rate, 
fracture toughness, ISI efficiency, leak detection limit were considered in the 
analysis. 
2. Structural reliability models and software
AutoPIFRAP was used for leak and rupture probabilities analysis and the sensitivity 
analysis of the BWR type reactor pipe. AutoPIFRAP - a special Excel spread sheet 
program system, which can perform and administrate the risk evaluations, sensitivity 
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analysis and investigate and compare different Risk Based Inspection (RBI) 
suggestions. One of the main AutoPIFRAP parts is the Subsystem of Integration. It 
must ensure the informational links between the AutoPIFRAP system and the 
PIFRAP Solver. The Subsystem of Integration can create the input file for each weld, 
start PIFRAP with this input file and read output file data (for the information flow 
see Fig. 1). 
Figure 1. The scheme of information flow between AutoPIFRAP and PIFRAP. 
In initial data preparation stage, the software for reliability analysis of growing cracks 
- PIFRAP (PIpe FRActure Probabilities) is used for obtaining the probabilities of leak 
and rupture. The probabilistic computer code PIFRAP [3; 4] is meant for evaluation 
of the leak and rupture probabilities of a specific cross section with a certain stress 
state and possibly containing a circumferential growing crack due to stress corrosion 
cracking (SCC). 
PIFRAP is based on very detailed and complete deterministic fracture mechanical 
models describing crack growth, for estimation of the crack opening areas and leak 
rate for through wall cracks, and for evaluation of the event of fracture or plastic 
collapse. In general, failure of piping due to crack growth is, at normal operation 
conditions and in materials commonly used, first revealed by the event of wall 
penetration and leakage, and not by total fracture of the pipe. However, when load 
events in addition to the normal operation loading are considered, fracture is likely to 
occur even before wall penetration. Thus, in PIFRAP several load cases are defined 
and evaluated.  
The leak rate in PIFRAP is calculated using the computer code SQUIRT developed 
by Paul, Ghadiali et all [5, 6]’. 
It is very convenient to perform sensitivity analyses by use of AutoPIFRAP. This may 
give valuable information of the relative importance of different input data to the 
failure probability. One quantity at a time is varied while the others are fixed to their 
respective reference values. 
In the analysis of leak and rupture probabilities and the sensitivity analysis, the pipe 
the geometry data, weld stresses, materials properties, crack growth data, leakage 
limits, inspection and safety barriers were evaluated. 
3. Analysis of leak and rupture probabilities
The analysis of leak and rupture probabilities was performed for the welds from 
BWR reactor small pipes. In this research the stress corrosion cracking as main 
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degradation mechanism was considered. The circumferential, internal semi-elliptic 
surface crack (majority of SCC piping cracks are of this type, axial orientation is rarer 
case) in a pipe weld heat-effected zone (HAZ) was evaluated. 
In the following fig. 2, the leak and rupture probabilities per year as function of time 
in operation are presented. Results of analysis demonstrated a clear advantage of ISI 
which ensures lower leak and rupture probability values. It was received a reduction 
of about one order of magnitude in leak probability values with inspections of 5 year 
interval for the BWR pipe welds (Fig. 2). 
a) 
b) 
Figure 2. Results for the cases without inspections and with inspections. The probability per year as a 
function of time in operation for a) leak and b) pipe rupture. 
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4. Sensitivity analysis of pipe rupture probability
The sensitivity analysis was performed considering welds of the BWR reactor small 
pipes. The main influencing parameters of the pipe rupture and inspection were 
analysed by use of different structural reliability models, considering a range of 
various dimensions, materials, degradation mechanisms, loading conditions, NDT 
reliability and inspection procedures. 
The sensitivity of rupture probability depending on flaw depth, flaw length, weld 
residual stress (WRS), flow stress, load level and growth rate of stress corrosion 
cracking (SCC) was evaluated. The sensitivity analysis results are presented in the 
following Fig. 3 (a – case with no inspection and b – case with 5 year inspection 
interval).  
In case of no inspection it is observed that a larger flaw depth provides almost 
negligible effect on pipe rupture probability. It is quite clear considering the small 
wall thickness (t = 4 mm) for the BWR small pipe welds. Similar trends can also be 
observed for the flaw length variation as presented in Fig.3. The effect of the flaw 
length is most significant for the pipe rupture probability with ISI case. As expected, 
the flaw depth has a larger influence on rupture probabilities when ISI is taken into 
account. For the part of the flaws (‘Low’ case) the inspection makes it possible to 
detect and repair the defects, thereby providing the higher relative risk reduction. It 
can be concluded that variation of the flaw size does provide influence on the rupture 
probability with ISI case. However, it is important to assess the flaw size with good 
accuracy in order to decrease an uncertainty and influence on the risk reduction level. 
The variation of WRS demonstrates a strong influence on the calculated probabilities 
suggesting that uncertainty of this parameter should be quantified for a better 
confidence of probabilistic assessment. However, the importance of WRS for rupture 
probability is larger than it may be expected. It can be observed in the Fig. 3 that weld 
residual stresses provide a significant effect on the probability absolute values of both 
cases, i.e. without and with ISI. A decrease in rupture probability by about 1 order of 
magnitude can be obtained by having a good control over WRS. This means that a 
proper validation and control of WRS by itself can provide an alternative strategy for 
managing risk for rupture in piping. Further risk reduction can be achieved by 
performing ISI with the appropriate inspection interval. 
The sensitivity analysis for the loads (primary loads (, )) variation are performed 
too. As expected, the variation of loads provided a significant influence on the 
calculated pipe rupture probability as shown in the Fig. 3. Similar to the effect from 
WRS distribution, the variation in primary loads gives an influence on the 
probabilities in both situations; i.e. with and without ISI. The lower loads (‘Low’ 
case) provide a decrease in rupture probabilities of almost 1 magnitude in comparison 
to the ‘High’ case. In addition, the ISI performance contributes to further decrease in 
the rupture probabilities. Thus, in order to decrease an uncertainty associated with the 
loads and obtain a more realistic risk reduction level it is very important to quantify 
as much as possible the precise loads in the piping system. 
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The variation in the flow stress was achieved by the relative change in yield stress 
and ultimate tensile strength. As expected, the variation of flow stress provided 
significant influence on the rupture probabilities (Fig. 3). Rupture probability 
decreases with higher values of flow stress even for the situation without ISI.  
The SCC growth rate demonstrated a strong influence on the rupture probabilities. 
For lower SCC growth rate, corresponding to the ‘Low’ case in Fig. 3 (a), the pipe 
rupture probability without ISI was 2.5 magnitudes lower in comparison with the 
values for the ‘High’ case. The SCC growth rate is often associated with a substantial 
uncertainty due to a complex nature of the SCC growth phenomenon.  
Therefore, this uncertainty is partly managed by ISI. The performance of ISI can 
contribute to a substantial reduction of the pipe rupture probability. It can also be 
observed from the Fig. 3 that the rupture probability without ISI for the lower SCC 
growth rate (‘Low’ case) corresponds to the rupture probability with ISI obtained for 
the ‘Baseline’ case. As expected, for higher SCC growth rate the effect of ISI on the 
calculated rupture probability becomes less significant, see the Fig. 3. 
Fracture toughness governs the critical crack size and therefore, as expected, the 
variation of fracture toughness provided influence on the rupture probabilities, but not 
significant (Fig. 3). 
The influence of the ISI efficiency is investigated considering the NDT detection 
capability quantified in terms of the variation of ISI interval (see Fig. 4). For the 
rupture probability, the effect of the ISI interval has the strong influence. 
The effect of leak detection limit is presented in Fig. 5. Variation of the leak detection 
limit provides a significant influence on the pipe rupture probability. Thus, the pipe 
rupture probability can be reduced by 1-2 orders of magnitude ranging from a poor 
leak detection limit to an advanced leak detection system with the limit of 0.03 kg/s.  
This decrease in the rupture probability is obtained for the situation without 
performing ISI. When the ISI is performed, the rupture probability is even more 
decreased. It can be observed from Fig. 5 that the rupture probability for a weld with 
the ISI with 5 year interval and poor leak detection system is about the same as for a 
weld without the ISI but with good leak detection limit. 
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a) 
b) 
Figure 3. The sensitivity of rupture probability depending on flaw depth, flaw length, weld residual 
stress (WRS), flow stress, load level and growth rate of stress corrosion cracking (SCC), a- no 
inspection case, b- 5 year inspection interval case. 
1.E-06
1.E-05
1.E-04
1.E-03
Low Baseline High
R
u
p
tu
re
 p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 (
6
0
 y
e
a
r)
Effect of flaw depth
Effect of WRS
Effect of fracture
toughness
Effect of SCC law
1.E-08
1.E-07
1.E-06
1.E-05
1.E-04
1.E-03
Low Baseline High
R
u
p
tu
re
 p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 (
6
0
 y
e
a
r)
Effect of flaw depth
Effect of WRS
Effect of fracture
toughness
115
Proceedings of the 52nd ESReDA Seminar, May 30-31, 2017 
Lithuanian Energy Institute & Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania 
Figure 4. Effect of the ISI interval on the pipe rupture probability. 
Figure 5. Effect of leak detection on the pipe rupture probability.
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5. Summary
The analysis of the effect of the variation of various parameters, including inspection, 
influencing the probability of pipe rupture was performed. In particular, the 
sensitivity analysis was performed for the real cases of BWR pipes. Results of 
analysis demonstrated a clear advantage of ISI which ensures lower leak and rupture 
probability values. It was received a reduction of about one order of magnitude in 
leak probability values with 5 year interval between inspections for the BWR pipe 
welds. 
The sensitivity analysis was performed to identify the key influencing parameters 
under foreseeable variations and uncertain values. The analysis of the effect of the 
variation of various parameters influencing the probability of pipe leak and rupture 
was performed. For instance, flaw geometry, weld residual stress, weld loads, flaw 
stress, stress corrosion cracking growth rate, fracture toughness, ISI efficiency, leak 
detection limit were considered in the analysis. 
The large part of considered parameters demonstrates a strong influence on the 
calculated probabilities suggesting that uncertainty of these parameters should be 
quantified for the confidence of probabilistic assessment and practical decision 
making reducing the chance of pipe rupture. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This work was supported by NUGENIA PLUS project “Justification of Risk 
Reduction through In-Service Inspection” (REDUCE), Grant agreement No: 604965. 
References 
[1] IAEA Safety guide, No. NS-G-2.6. Maintenance, Surveillance and In-service 
Inspection in Nuclear Power Plants. 2002. 
[2] IAEA Nuclear Energy Series, No. NP-T-3.1. Risk-informed In-service 
Inspection of Piping Systems of Nuclear Power Plants: Process, Status, Issues 
and Development. 2010. 
[3] Bergman, M. PIFRAP user’s manual, version 1.0, SAQ FoU-Report 97/07. 
1997. 
[4] Bergman, M., Brickstad, B. & Nilsson, F. A procedure for estimation of pipe 
break probabilities due to IGSCC. SAQ/FoU-Report 97/06. 1997. 
[5] Paul, D. D., Ghadiali, N. D., Ahmad, J. & Wilkowski, G. M., Seepage 
quantification of upsets in reactor tubes, SQUIRT User’s manual, version 2.2., 
Battelle, Columbus, Ohio, USA, 1992. 
[6] Ghadiali, N. D. & Wilkowski, G. M., Effect of crack morphology on leak rates, 
Summary Report to SAQ Kontrol1 AB, Battelle, Columbus, Ohio, USA, 1996. 
117
Critical Infrastructures: Enhancing Preparedness & Resilience 
for the Security of Citizens and Services Supply Continuity 
Energy Management Controller of a  
Resilient Micro-Grid for Critical Buildings 
Lenos Hadjidemetriou, Nikolas Flourentzou  
KIOS Research and Innovation Centre of Excellence, 
University of Cyprus, 1 Panepistimiou Avenue,  
20537 Nicosia, Cyprus  
Elias Kyriakides  
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, 
University of Cyprus, 1 Panepistimiou Avenue,  
20537 Nicosia, Cyprus  
Abstract 
The continuous growth of electricity demand and ever increasing society aware-ness 
of climate change issues directly affect the development of the electrical power 
systems. The adaptation of Renewable Energy Systems (RES) offers reduction to the 
gas emissions produced by the electricity production from fossil-fuel power 
generation but also causes vulnerability to the power system. Recent technologies can 
be embraced to enhance the robustness of electricity supply in critical buildings. This 
paper proposes a method which uses an advanced control scheme for enhancing the 
operation of the critical building micro-grid during power-cut by utilizing the RES 
production. The method offers two different power management strategies (depending 
on the expected power system recovery time) for a resilient hospital micro-grid that 
includes RES; achieving longest autonomy of the micro-grid in island mode, or 
maximizing the load served within the micro-grid. The proposed method will be 
verified by simulation and selected results will be presented. 
Keywords: Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), micro-grids, power management, 
renewable energy sources (RES).  
1. Introduction
One of the main objectives of this work is the utilization of the Renewable Energy 
Systems (RES) in micro-grid, which feeds one or more critical buildings. Two power 
management strategies are also studied for the micro-grid that can be benefit by 
maximum autonomy time and maximum load served during islanded operation. The 
resilience of the micro-grid is considered as priority of the study.  
A micro-grid is a cluster of electrical loads with intelligent central management and 
the ability to operate on power utility mode and/or island mode. Unintentional 
islanding can result in power quality problems, serious equipment damage, and even 
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safety from hazards to utility operation personnel. Therefore, a modern micro-grid 
requires active and passive algorithms that can used for islanding detection [1], [2]. 
This is conventionally achieved by the inverter(s) of RES, however, this paper 
proposes the Smart Hospital Controller (SHC). 
The design and operation of a future electrical power system requires refinement to 
achieve resilience [3]. The management strategy requires further development when a 
critical building/load is contained within micro-grid. In the literature, there are major 
developments in control of power converters in AC micro-grids [4]. Advance 
techniques for controlling the synchronization of RES to the micro-grid have also 
been developed [5]. The management of variable sources of power generation and 
consumption is challenging and requires the involvement of not only the state-of-the-
art technologies but also of the consumers [6].  
Accordingly, the proposed method offers a solution that automatically priorities the 
loads according to their criticality. Therefore, the most critical loads assure 
uninterruptible power supply. 
Despite the fact that the power system (which used to be hierarchically and 
unidirectional controlled), the RES (on both the distribution and the transmission 
grids), and communication between them (which requires not only physical but also 
cyber security) are nowadays assumed linked, the quality of service and power 
stability are actively controlled for local and global objectives [7]. This increases the 
complexity of the dependencies and proves the necessity of enhanced control 
strategies. Though [7] emphasise the importance of a main swathe between the micro-
grid and the main power line, this paper also proposes load management strategies for 
better control of distributed generation.  
Although the power systems were originally designed for local power supply needs, 
now are expanding beyond state borders and the power system is assumed a part of 
larger system [8]. According to the European Commission (EC) preparedness 
planning, the relevant equipment for ideal configuration on emergency management 
[9] requires a back-up power, with alternative solutions if the main electricity supply 
fails. The proposed strategy satisfies the requirements of the EC. The two strategies 
provide optimized balance between the maximum load served and the longest power 
supply autonomy for critical loads. These results are achieved by pre-defining the 
criticality level of the micro-grid loads.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. The significance of the paper on next 
generation infrastructure design is documented in Section 2. The resilient micro-grid 
architecture along with its smart controller and hospital load categories are 
thoroughly investigated in Section 3. The power management strategies for achieving 
significant benefits from RES utilization is analysed in Section 4. Section 5 provides 
the verification of the controller method and strategies. The conclusion of the paper is 
provided at the end.  
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2. Eliminating Micro-Grid Vulnerabilities
Is there a need to increase our interest about the protection and resilience of 
infrastructures? This interest is strongly related to initiatives, by several governments 
that from the end of the 90s recognised the relevance of the undisturbed functioning 
of CI for the wellbeing of their population [10]. According to the policy framework 
for climate and energy of the European Commission [11] the Member States of the 
EU need flexibility to choose policies that are best-matched to their national energy 
mix and preferences. Otherwise, the continuous increase of fossil fuel consumption 
will not only increase the greenhouse gas emissions, but will also affect the security 
of energy supply.  
The 20-20-20 targets, which are set by [12] aim for a 20% reduction in the overall 
fossil fuel consumption by the year 2020, compared to 1990 levels. According to the 
European Distribution System Operators' association (EDSO), Smart grids are a 
prerequisite to achieving the EU’s ambitious energy and climate objectives to 2020 
and beyond. The European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan) aims to 
accelerate the development and deployment of low-carbon technologies. The 
European Technology Platform for Electricity Networks of the Future encourages the 
technology research and development pathways for the smart grids sector. 
Advancements of information and communication technologies (ICT) cause 
infrastructure owners to augment current infrastructures with such ICT, [13].  
However, the introduction of smart grid technologies will be accompanied with many 
unexpected situations, which require years of experience to deliver reliable 
improvements [14].  
The transition period, of existing infrastructure to smart grid technology, is critical for 
emergency buildings/areas (such as hospitals, emergency/crisis management 
headquarters etc.) where the reliability is a major priority. The method, which is 
proposed in this paper, offers significant advantages to the existing infrastructure. It 
introduces a large degree of redundancy and protection while improving the energy 
efficiency.  
The proposed micro-grid is adoptable to the smart grid technologies and gives 
additional resilience to the next generation infrastructure concept, without 
compromising the efficiency of power consumption.  
3. Micro-Grid Description
This paper focuses on enhancing the operation of a resilient micro-grid for critical 
buildings. In particular, a large hospital is considered as a case study. This section 
describes the structure of the hospital micro-grid, its main components and the main 
power management technique.  
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3.1 Micro-grid architecture 
It is critical to ensure the uninterruptible power supply in a hospital. If the electrical 
installation of the hospital is designed as a micro-grid, it offers the advantages of 
being capable for an inter-connected and an islanded operation. To achieve these 
advantages, a number of technologies is required:  
• Battery Storage Systems (BSS),
• Diesel Generators (DG),
• inverter based RES (e.g., photovoltaic systems (PV) and Wind Turbine Systems
(WTS)), 
• flexible loads, and
• a central controller (Smart Hospital Controller).
The single line diagram of the architecture is shown in Figure 1. In such a micro-grid 
structure it is assumed that the SHC measures the power exchanged with the grid 
(), the power produced by the RES (), the power for charging (negative) or
discharging (positive) the BSS (), the power produced by the DG () and the
power demand by the hospital loads (	
). Further, it is assumed that hospital loads
are flexible and can be controlled (on and off) by the SHC. 
Figure 1. The main architecture of a hospital micro-grid 
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3.2 Load Categories 
The loads of the hospital are divided according to their criticality level, as presented 
in Figure 2. There are four levels of load criticality, having the equipment with 
primary significance (e.g., intensive care unit) to be fed by Level A and equipment 
with secondary significance (but still very important) to be fed by Level B. Level C is 
for less crucial loads but still important for the normal operation of the hospital and 
Lev-el D is for the least critical loads that can postpone their operation. Level C and 
Level D are more flexible and are divided in N and M partitions (each partition can be 
turned on and off by the SHC), respectively, in order to achieve longest autonomy or 
maximize the load served by the micro-grid. The total hospital load in respect to the 
energy sources of the micro-grid is characterized by the following equation.  
	
 =  +  +  +  (1) 
The criticality levels are set according to the maximum installed capacity, e.g., Level 
A has maximum installed capacity  but the actual consumed power () is less
when some equipment of Level A are not in use. Similar annotation has been used for 
the loads in each criticality level. The total hospital load with respect to the load 
criticality levels is characterized by the following equation:  
	
 =  +  +  +  + ⋯  +  +  + ⋯  (2) 
Figure 2. Hospital loads are divided to four levels of load criticality 
3.3 Battery storage system 
The Energy Capacity  of the battery is chosen appropriately to satisfy the
worst-case scenario:  
 ≥   _"# ∙  (3) 
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The power range of the BSS inverter is represented by: 
_%&' ≤  ≤ _%&' (4)
where _%&' is the maximum charging power and _%&' is the maximum
discharging power. 
According to the BSS technology for maximizing the battery lifetime, the charging 
power cannot be more than half of the discharging power.  
)_%&') ≤ 
_%&' 2+ (5) 
Combining (3) and (5) into (4), the inverter of the BSS has the following range: 
− 2- ≤  ≤  (6) 
3.4 DG and RES 
For enabling the islanding and autonomous operation of the hospital micro-grid, at 
least a DG is required. The power ratings of the DG should be able to serve the loads 
within Level A, Level B and Level C (Section 2.2) in order to ensure the 
uninterruptible operation of the hospital during black-outs. Thus, the power-rating of 
the DG is given by:  
 =  +  + ∑  (7) 
Where / = 1,2, … 3
The DG is equipped with a fuel tank that gives to a hospital few hours of autonomy 
without refilling the tank.  
For extending the power autonomy of the micro-grid it is useful to have some 
inverter-based RES. Thus, the distributed power produced by the RES can by very 
useful either for extending the autonomy of micro-grid or for maximizing the load 
served during black-outs (as it is presented in Section 3).  
3.5 Micro-grid operation 
The operational modes of the micro-grid are listed in Table I. In normal operation, the 
SHC operates in Mode 0. During Mode 0 the hospital is interconnected with the 
utility, , and the produced power by the RES is directly injected into the grid,
which is the standard practice in conventional grids. The total hospital load in respect 
to the energy sources of the micro-grid is characterized by the following equation:  
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 45
67 =  +  +  +  =  +  (8) 
 
Table I: Description of the operation modes of hospital micro-grid 
Operation 
mode 
Grid 
Condition 
Micro-grid 
Operation Starts Ends Comments 
Mode 0 Healthy Interconnected - - Normal Operation 
Mode 1 Black-out Islanding 8 8 +   9"# Time required for the  start-up of the DG 
Mode 2 Black-out Islanding 8 +   9"# 8 +   9"#+ %&' 
Time required for  
charging the back-up BSS 
after the DG is connected 
Mode 3 Black-out Islanding 8 +   9"#+ %&' 6%
:6  
Time until grid  
is recovered 
Mode 0 Healthy Interconnected 6%
:6  - Grid is recovered  Normal Operation 
 
 
However, in case of power-cuts and Black-Outs (BO), the hospital micro-grid 
operation needs to be continued. Therefore, when the BO occurs (8) the SHC 
detects the power-cut and instantly turns-off the Grid-connection Relay in order to 
proceed with an islanding operation. Immediately, the SHC activates Mode 1. During 
Mode 1, the inverter of BSS provides power from the battery pack to the hospital 
demand (positive values of  while the battery pack discharges) in order to serve 
all the critical loads included in Level A (). Mode 1 ends when the DG starts up 
(  9"#).  
 
 45
6 =  =  +  (9) 
 
Then, from   9"# until the %&' (the instant when the State of Charge (SoC) of 
the BSS returns to 100%) the SHC operates in Mode 2. During Mode 2, the DG is 
operating and the battery is charging (power flows from the GD to the BSS providing 
negative values of ). In this mode, the requirements of the SHC are to serve all 
loads included in Level A and Level B:  
 
 45
6 =  +  =  +  +  (10) 
 
while  has a negative value.  
 
Mode 3 is the interval from the moment %&' until the recovery of the power grid, 
;<=>?<;. During this period, the BSS is not charging or discharging and thus, the load 
is served mainly by the DG. The LS during Mode 3 is represented by:  
 
 45
6@ =  +  +  =  +  (11) 
 
When the utility is recovered the micro-grid can safely return to interconnected mode 
(Mode 0). 
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4 Proposed Power Management Strategies  
 
The SHC is designed to run in two power management strategies. The two strategies 
manage the use of the RES according to the needs of the hospital and the Black-out 
recovery time. Both strategies satisfy the requirements of Section 2.  
 
One of the strategies offers the longest possible autonomy time for the micro-grid, 
which is very useful in cases when the recovery time of the black-out is unknown. 
The second strategy offers maximum load served which reduces the impact of the 
black-out on the hospital services. The differences between the two strategies are 
listed in Table II. The strategies are not applied for Mode 1. During Mode 1 the RES 
(if they generate any power) are reducing the BSS discharging rate.  
 
Table II: Description of the operation in each mode 
Operation 
mode BSS DG RES Master 
Load Served  
(LS) 
Fuel  
Consumption 
Mode 0 Fully Charged Not used 
 is injected  
into the grid Grid 
Normal  
Operation - 
Mode 1 Discharging  
to serve  
Starting-
up 
 is used for  
serving the  
hospital loads 
Inverter 45 =  For starting-up  the DG 
Mode 2A Charging Operating 
 is used for  
extending the  
autonomy of DG 
DG 45 =  +   For serving   +  − P 
Mode 2B Charging Operating 
 is used for  
serving extra  
hospital loads 
DG 45 =  +   +6C  
For serving  
 +  
Mode 3A Fully Charged Operating 
 is used for  
extending the  
autonomy of DG 
DG 45=  +  +   
For serving  
 +  +  −  
Mode 3B Fully Charged Operating 
 is used for  
serving extra  
hospital loads 
DG 45 =  +   + + 6C  
For serving  
 +  +   
Mode 0 Fully Charged Not used 
 is injected  
into the grid Grid 
Normal  
Operation - 
 
4.1 Strategy A for longest autonomy  
 
The first power management strategy aims to achieve the longest autonomy possible 
during island mode. This strategy uses the power generated from RES to save the fuel 
of the DG. Therefore, the autonomy working time of the DG is extended. The 
autonomy extension is proportional to the generated . This strategy is preferred 
when the power system recovery is unknown.  
 
During Mode 2, strategy A ensures power supply in Level A and Level B. All power 
generated by RES is used to reduce the power consumption by the DG, and therefore, 
save some fuel. During Mode 3, strategy A ensures power supply in Level A, Level B 
and Level C. All power generated by RES is used to reduce the power consumption 
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by the DG, and continue to save some fuel until the utility recovers from the black-
out.  
 
This strategy can save a substantial amount of fuel when the power generated from 
RES is sufficient and it is significant when the black-out lasts for several hours.  
 
4.2 Strategy B for maximum load served  
 
The second power management strategy aims to serve the maximum load possible 
during the islanding mode.  The idea of the strategy is to use the power generated 
from RES to serve additional loads within the micro-grid. This strategy is applied 
once the recovery time of the power system is known and the fuel of the GD 
sufficient until the recovery.  
 
During Mode 2, strategy B ensures power supply in Level A and Level B. The power 
generated by RES is used to support additional loads from partitions of Level C (e.g., 
,  etc.). Therefore, even when the BSS absorbs power (to charge the battery 
unit) SHC provides power to Level C. During Mode 3, strategy B ensures power 
supply in Level A, Level B and Level C. The power generated by RES is used to 
support additional loads from partitions of Level D (e.g., ,  etc.). Therefore, 
when RES generate full power, the SHC can provide power to even supply Level D. 
 
5 Method Verification 
 
The resilient Micro-grid method of Smart Hospital Controller described in Section 2 
and the power management strategies described in Section 3 have been investigated 
using a simulation model in MATLAB. The model uses the values of Table III.  
 
Table III: Design data of the test-bed simulated micro-grid  
System Data 
RES   = 30 kW connected through an inverter 
During simulation  43% <  < 83% 
DG 150 kW, Fuel Tank for 6-hour autonomy  
with a Diversity Factor (DF) equal to 50%  
BSS _%&' = 50 kW, _%&K' = 25 kW,   = 12.5 kWh 
Installed capacity of  
Hospital Loads 
 = 50 kW,  = 75 kW,  = 3 kW,  = 4 kW,  
 @ = 5 kW, N = 6 kW, P = 7 kW,  = 12 kW,  
 = 15 kW, @ = 18 kW, N = 21 kW, P = 24 kW. 
Diversity Factor (DF)  
of Hospital Loads 
QRST = 0.6 ± 0.2, QRSV = 0.65 ± 0.15,  
 QRSWX = 0.7 ± 0.1,  QRSWY = 0.625 ± 0.125,  
QRSWZ = 0.525 ± 0.075, QRSW[ = 0.675 ± 0.075,  
 QRSW\ = 0.375 ± 0.025,  QRS]X = 0.6 ± 0.1,  
 QRS]Y = 0.525 ± 0.125,  QRS]Z = 0.4 ± 0.1,   QRS][ = 0.525 ± 0.075, QRS]\ = 0.4 ± 0.05. 
Back-Out (BO) information Black-Out (BO) occurs at  = 5 min  Black-Out duration: 150 min  
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This section provides the results of the micro-grid powers in three cases during 
blackout. The study covers the graph lines of following values during the four modes:  
• Power demand by the hospital,
• Power consumed by the hospital loads,
• Power supplied by the grid,
• Power supplied by the BSS,
• Power generated by the DG, and
• Power generated by the RES.
5.1 BO during the absence of RES 
The analysis of a BO incident has been done during the absence of RES. The 
graphical representation of the results is shown in Figure 3. The graphs verify that the 
SHC offers uninterruptible supply to Level A which includes all the critical loads.  
In Mode 2 the loads of Level B are supplied and the battery is charged. In Mode 3, all 
loads up to Level C are supplied until the recovery time of the BO.  
The curve of the fuel while is consumed is also observed. 
5.2 BO with strategy A 
The analysis of strategy A has been done when a BO occurs while some RES. The 
graphical representation of the results is shown in Figure 4.  
In Mode 2 the loads of Level B are supplied, the battery is charged, and the RES 
support the DG to save fuel. In Mode 3, all loads up to Level C are supplied until the 
recovery time of the BO.  
The fuel slope shows a significant reduction in fuel consumption. 
5.3 BO with strategy B 
The analysis of strategy B has been done when a BO occurs while some RES. The 
graphical representation of the results is shown in Figure 5.  
In Mode 2 the loads of Level B are supplied and some partitions of Level C are also 
supplied, and the battery has been charging. In Mode 3, all loads up to Level C and 
some partitions of Level D are supplied until the recovery time of the BO.  
The curve of the load served is higher than the previous examples. 
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Figure 3.   Hospital micro-grid operation when 
there is no RES production 
Figure 4.   Hospital micro-grid operation when 
there is a 30 kW installed RES and when the 
power management strategy A is followed for 
extending the autonomy of the micro-grid 
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Figure 5.   Hospital micro-grid operation when there is a 30 kW installed RES and when the power 
management strategy B is followed for maximizing the load served 
 
 
5.4 Summary of the results  
 
The significance of the SHC and the two strategies are shown in Table IV. It is 
observed that strategy B serves the maximum load and that strategy A saves more 
fuel.  
 
It is also observed that the RES power support BSS to prevents large discharge of the 
battery units. 
 
 
Table IV: Summary of the simulation results 
Type of Micro-grid  = 0  = 30 kW  Strategy A 
 = 30 kW  
Strategy B 
Micro-grid Load Served during black-out (%)  57.7 58.4 65.4 
Fuel Tank after Grid restoration (%) 58.3 68.2 62.9 
Min SoC of the BSS (%) 57.2 80.3 80.3 
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6 Conclusion  
 
Without compromising the benefits of the Smart Grid technologies, this paper 
proposes a method to enhance the resilience and the efficiency of a Micro-grid, 
towards the targets of the EU. The paper investigates a smart controller which 
measures and regulates the power demand of a critical building (using a hospital as 
case-study), the power consumed by the loads, the power supplied by the grid and by 
the battery system, and the power generated by the additional generator and by the 
RES.  
 
The paper proposes two different power management strategies for a resilient hospital 
micro-grid that includes RES. The proposed methods offer an advanced control 
scheme for enhancing the operation of the hospital micro-grid during power-cut by 
utilizing the RES production. Depending on the expected power system recovery 
time, the first strategy reaches extended autonomy of the micro-grid in island mode, 
while the second strategy served more electrical loads within the micro-grid. The 
proposed methods were verified by simulation results and selected results were 
presented.  
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Abstract 
The paper describes the flow network methodology approach and the results obtained 
by the probabilistic gas network simulator ProGasNet software tool. The ProGasNet 
has been applied to a number of test cases, all based on real gas transmission 
networks of the EU countries. The ProGasNet model provides an indication of the 
worst networks nodes in terms of security of supply and provides their numerical 
ranking. The paper shows an example of bottleneck analysis. The model is very 
powerful to compare and evaluate different supply options, new network development 
plans and analyse potential crisis situations. The flow network approach could be 
applied also to other commodity networks: power grids, water and heat supply 
networks. 
Keywords: energy security, security of supply, gas transmission system, reliability, 
Monte Carlo. 
1. Introduction
The Energy Union package [1] foresees building a resilient and secure energy 
infrastructure to serve the EU citizens. The EU energy security strategy explicitly 
defines resilient infrastructure as a backbone of the Energy Union. This is in 
particular important not only from technical perspective, like transmission network 
bottlenecks, but also in the light of new threats of this century: cyber-attacks, 
terrorism or climate change induced natural hazards. 
A number of energy supply disruptions due to economic, political or technical 
reasons highlight the need to study energy infrastructure networks from the security 
of supply point of view. After consequent gas supply disruptions during 2004-2008 
period and the major supply disruption in January 2009 due to the Russia-Ukraine 
dispute, the European Commission (EC) reacted by issuing Regulation 994/2010 [2] 
on security of gas supply, which requires the EU Member States to fulfil a number of 
requirements, including risk assessment, preventive action plan and emergency action 
plan, installation of cross border reverse flow capabilities, and supply and 
infrastructure standards based on the N-1 criterion. These and other measures proved 
to be important for the gas network resilience in a number of subsequent smaller 
supply disruptions (e.g. Libyan war in 2011, cold snap in early 2012).  
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In 2014 the EC released energy security strategy [3], highlighting strong EU 
dependence on imports and in particular on a few importers thus requesting the 
Member States to develop import diversification measures and emphasizing 
importance of liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminals. In addition, the EC 
Connecting Europe Facility co-funds many energy infrastructure projects developed 
in particular to enhance security of supply in gas and electricity sectors.  
Critical infrastructure (CI) issues have been recently addressed by various initiatives 
from research institutions and governments worldwide. The European Commission 
has taken the initiative to organize a network consisting of research and technology 
organizations within the European Union with interests and capabilities in critical 
infrastructure protection [4].  
The JRC has started to develop an in-house software tool ProGasNet for probabilistic 
modelling of gas transmission network with the aim to address security of supply 
issues including network reliability, bottleneck analysis, vulnerability and other 
aspects. The tool is based on so called flow network approach that is a mathematical 
way to distribute available resources in the network to the demanding customers by 
using flow algorithms, many variations of maximum flow algorithm being one of the 
most popular algorithms in the field. The tool under development at the JRC is 
applied to natural gas transmission networks, but very similarly it could be applied 
also to power grids, water or heat distribution networks. 
2. Methodology
From the computational point of view, the analysis of large infrastructure networks is 
very demanding. A review of simulation and analysis of interdependent critical 
infrastructures is presented in [5]. The literature overview in this field is very large 
and is growing analysing Cis from many perspectives: topological, flow based or 
physics based models. This illustrates diversity and complexity of the approaches 
proposed and problems to be solved. 
The development of the ProGasNet software tool targets to address European gas 
transmission network reliability, risk, security of supply issues, described in detail in 
the JRC report [6]. The results of the test cases indicate potential of the proposed 
method for network analysis and the need for further research. The current paper 
presents some results of the flow network approach. 
The ProGasNet uses a distance-based approach of a stochastic network commodity 
flow model. Priority based commodity supply pattern is based on distances from the 
source node, so nodes closer to the source are served first. This supply pattern is 
typical in gas transmission pipeline networks. In each Monte-Carlo simulation step, 
firstly component failures, especially pipeline failures, are sampled according to an 
empirical probabilistic law taken, for example, from a failure database. In order to 
estimate the maximum of transmitted flow from source nodes to sink nodes under 
reliability and capacity constraints given by the stochastically imperfect elements, 
which can randomly fail with known failure probabilities, we apply the maximum 
flow algorithm with multiple sources and multiple sinks. Moreover, in order to 
identify critical gas supply nodes, which are, under supply crisis conditions, normally 
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geographically far from gas source nodes, we estimate the distance from the virtual 
source to sink nodes. We use a Dijkstra's algorithm for calculating the distance 
matrix. Then, we compute a permutation matrix of the graph isomorphism problem 
according to the distance from the gas source. In this way we transfer the original 
model to the distance-based approach by a dynamic reordering of nodes and lines of 
the network graph model [7]. This graph isomorphism task is performed by linear 
algebra operations. Consequently, we are able to compute the flow matrix of the 
Maximum flow algorithm. To finish the simulation step, the computed flow matrix is 
transformed back into the original problem by an inversion linear algebra operation.  
Finally, Monte-Carlo simulations are used for estimating that the probability of less 
than demanded volume of the commodity (for example, gas) is available in selected 
network nodes. These simulated results are also used for the vulnerability (critical 
component) analysis. A combination of detected failures leading to the most 
dominant loss of the available gas is presented and analysed in depth by statistical 
methods. 
3. Test case study
3.1 Description of the study network 
Figure 1 shows topology of the test case gas transmission network. It is based on a 
real regional network topology and data, however location is not displayed. The 
transmission network topology is represented by a graph with nodes and links 
(edges).  
Figure 1. Topological layout of the study network. Thickness of 
the edges is proportional to the pipeline capacity. 
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The nodes in a gas network are the following elements: 
- Demand nodes (consumers connected to the transmission network; 
- Compressor stations; 
- Junctions of crossings of several pipelines; 
- Supply nodes (storages, LNG terminals, import points at cross-borders). 
The node data entered in the model depend on the node type. The demand nodes 
require only daily demand value (Table I). This value is taken as peak demand value, 
but it could be also average winter or summer consumption value depending on the 
purpose of the model. 
Table I: Network demand nodes, in millions of cubic meters per day (mcm/d). 
Node Demand Node Demand 
4 0.1 34 0.5 
5 3.2 35 0.1 
6 0.1 36 4.2 
7 0.3 37 1.3 
9 0.1 39 0.3 
10 1 41 0.6 
13 0.5 42 0.6 
17 0.1 43 0.2 
18 8.5 44 0.7 
20 0.6 45 1.3 
25 0.5 47 0.5 
26 0.8 48 1.8 
27 3 49 0.2 
28 6 51 7 
30 0.5 52 0.6 
33 0.5 53 0.1 
Table II shows maximum capacities and type (pipeline, UGS or LNG) of input supply 
nodes. In case of underground gas storages (UGS), also the output values of not fully 
loaded storages can be used. 
Table II: Maximum supply capacity. 
Node Type Capacity, mcm/day 
2 Pipeline 31 
11 Pipeline 7 
19 UGS 30 
4 Pipeline 4 
10 LNG 10.2 
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The total maximum supply capacity is 82.2 mcm/d. The total network peak demand is 
45.8 mcm/d, so the network has certain degree of spare capacity to compensate 
supply disruptions. All pipeline sections including their estimated capacity and 
lengths are available in the model, but not shown due to space limitations. For each 
network component, failure data must be provided. The following components 
(nodes) are considered for failures with corresponding failure frequencies: 
- Compressor station (CS) failure: 2.5E-01/yr; 
- Underground storage failure: 1.0E-01/yr 
- LNG terminal failure: 1.5E-01/yr 
- Pipeline failure: 3.5E-05 /km/yr. 
The model considers one month interval for computations. It is assumed that the same 
peak consumption in the network is constant during this one month period. 
The CS failure rate was computed using a typical model of a CS station and industrial 
reliability data. The UGS failure estimate is an expert estimate. The LNG failure 
estimate is based on literature references [8]. The pipeline failure rate was taken from 
pipeline incident database [9] and assuming that rupture occurs 10 less frequently as 
incident. 
The compressor station node is modelled as working or failed (on/off), for each state 
determining the corresponding capacity of the outgoing pipelines. The capacity 
reduction due to compressor station failure is normally estimated by hydraulic model 
computations or expert evaluation. As a consequence due to a CS failure, capacity 
reduction by 20% of the inlet pipelines and also the outlet pipelines until the next 
connection node is assumed. This assumption is based on physical flow models, 
however is not accurate in all cases and also multiple CS failures will have more 
severe effects on the network operation. Currently physical model is being developed 
in order to estimate the effect of the CS failures more precisely. 
3.2 Security of supply evaluation 
The pipeline import sources are not considered to fail due to lack of upstream 
network model, however they are modelled as on/off elements by scenario analysis. 
The following main 4 supply scenarios were analysed: 
- Scenario A: All currently available sources. Scenario A represents basic 
scenario when all sources can be used for supply;  
- Scenario B: All currently available sources, except Node 10. Scenario B runs 
the model with Node 10 (LNG) unavailable. This scenario provides an 
indication of the importance of the terminal for security of supply to the region. 
Such scenario can happen due to technical failure of the facility or connecting 
pipelines or failure to deliver LNG by sea; 
- Scenario C: All currently available sources, except Node 2 supply. Scenario C 
models situation when supply from Node 2 is unavailable. This scenario can 
test the system when the largest supply source is unavailable; 
- Scenario D: All currently available sources, except Node 19. Scenario D 
assumes that Node 19 (UGS) is unavailable due to technical problems, failures 
136
Proceedings of the 52nd ESReDA Seminar, May 30-31, 2017 
Lithuanian Energy Institute & Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania 
or inability to fill it up during summer period. This scenario is used to 
demonstrate importance of the storage to the whole network. 
The results also display scenarios E/F/G/H which equivalent to scenarios A/B/C/D 
respectively, but with Node 11 unavailable. This can be used to test importance of the 
source node 11. 
The probabilistic model is run for 1 million times and collects statistical estimates of 
various parameters in the network. The same results can be presented in different 
ways: statistical tables, probability tables or cumulative distribution function (CDF) 
plot. All three types of results are derived from the same sample and represent the 
same results, but highlights different points of view of the results. The probabilistic 
and statistical results are computed for a period of one month. For this time period, 
peak demand is considered to be stable and represent a critical period of severe 
winter. This assumption is considered to be conservative. Regarding the component 
failures, no repairs are considered. All failures are considered to occur during a period 
of one month, although they do not occur at the same moment. This is again a 
conservative assumption, but as our focus is security of supply, conservative 
assumptions are widely accepted in the probabilistic studies. 
Table III presents probabilistic results for the whole network demand and all 
scenarios. The network is well supplied in scenarios A/B/E and F, however scenarios 
D/H and C show obvious vulnerabilities in the network. The results indicate that 
supply in the region is not homogenous, but fragmented into two areas. The first area 
is strongly dependent on Node 2 supply source and the second – on Node 19 source. 
This is very evident because scenario C affects only one area and scenario D affects 
only the other area. These results are very evident when analysing not the total 
network supply, but area supply under given scenario. The probabilistic results are 
available for each scenario, but in the post-processing phase the CDFs are compared 
by Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and those that are not significantly different are 
represented by a single line meaning that there are no statistically significant 
differences among them, e.g. scenarios A/B/E/F in Figure 2. All scenarios supply at 
least 50% of the demanded gas by the network with acceptable security of supply: 
probability of having less than 50% of needed gas is in the range of 8E-03 – 2E-06 
per month. 
Table III: Probabilistic results for the whole network supply for all scenarios 
(D=45.8 mcm/d). D – demand volume, Mean – average available gas volume. 
Scenario D-Mean P(X=0) P(X<0.2D) P(X<0.5D) P(X<0.8D) P(X<D) 
DH 12.9 0 1.0E-06 2.4E-04 1 1 
C 6.5 0 1.1E-04 8.3E-03 2.2E-02 1 
G 0.3 0 0 8.3E-03 2.1E-02 2.7E-02 
ABEF 0.1 0 0 2.0E-06 8.5E-03 1.2E-02 
The same results can be explored graphically by CDF plots (Figure 2). The plot 
shows that scenarios D, H and C cannot supply all the needed gas and indicates the 
available maximum volume of gas. The scenarios A, B, E, F and G can supply all the 
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needed gas, but with different reliability levels. Such results are available for each 
network node or specified area (e.g. one country, like in Figure 3). 
Figure 2. CDF plot for the total network demand of 45.8 mcm/d. 
Figure 3. CDF plot for a part of the network (demand 12 mcm/d). 
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3.3 Bottleneck analysis of the study network 
As ProGasNet algorithm computes flows in each network link, bottleneck analysis is 
a quite straight-forward task. A criterion for a potential bottleneck is pipeline free 
capacity factor (PFCF) – percentage ratio of the difference between maximum 
capacity and average flow in the pipeline segment to its maximum capacity eq. (1). 
The ProGasNet was adjusted to make these calculations for each scenario by 
aggregating parallel pipelines. 
%100
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As a result, no bottlenecks were identified in the scenarios A, B, E and F, as all 
pipelines had rather high PFCF. However, in scenarios C, D, G and H a number of 
bottlenecks were identified. The results were filtered not to display source nodes and 
small pipelines to end users which are sometimes flagged as potential bottlenecks 
although they are not connecting any other network node. Below, an iterative 
bottleneck identification process will be described for scenario D: 
- Step 1: Pipeline 17->34 (capacity 6.5 mcm/d) has PFCF=0%. Capacity is 
increased from 6.5 to 15 mcm/d; 
- Step 2: Pipeline 34->18 (capacity 12.1 mcm/d) has PFCF=0.6%. Capacity is 
increased from 12.1 to 15 mcm/d; 
- Step 3: Pipeline 17->34 (capacity 15 mcm/d) has PFCF=0.7%. Capacity is 
increased from 15 to 18 mcm/d; 
- Step 4: Pipeline 34->18 (capacity 15 mcm/d) has PFCF=1.3%. Capacity is 
increased from 15 to 18 mcm/d; 
- Step5: Pipeline 10->9->8 (capacity 2.8 mcm/d) has PFCF=1.2%. Capacity is 
increased from 2.8 to 5 mcm/d; 
- Step 6: Pipeline 10->9->8 (capacity 5 mcm/d) has PFCF=1.4%. Capacity is 
increased from 5 to 8 mcm/d;  
- Step 7: The calculations used values the previous step. No more potential 
bottlenecks were identified. 
As clear from the above steps, some pipelines appear as bottlenecks several times 
after virtual increase of other pipelines capacity. Steps 5 and 6 indicate that selection 
of a new virtual capacity is a problem and might require several trials. Figure 3 shows 
the effect of Steps 1-2-4-7 to the whole network and the same network area as in 
Fig.2. The whole network benefits from all the process steps 1-7, however for the 
selected network area there is no statistically significant difference among the steps 2-
7: the supply situation cannot be longer improved in that part of the network. 
Similarly, the results can be analysed for all the demand nodes and areas.  
The bottleneck analysis iterative process for scenario C runs as follows: 
- Step 1: Pipeline 34->17 (capacity 6.2 mcm/d) has PFCF=0.9%. Capacity is 
increased from 6.2 to 12 mcm/d; 
- Step 2: Pipeline 18->34 (capacity 12.1 mcm/d) has PFCF=1.3%. Capacity is 
increased from 12.1 to 15 mcm/d; 
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- Step 3: Pipeline 34->17 (capacity 12 mcm/d) has PFCF=0.9%. Capacity is 
increased from 12 to 15 mcm/d; 
- Step 4: The calculations used values the previous step. No more potential 
bottlenecks were identified. 
Interestingly, bottleneck analysis for scenarios C and D identifies the pipelines 18-34-
17 as major bi-directional bottlenecks in the network. This finding confirms the 
conclusion that the network is not homogenous and supply nodes 2 and 19 supply two 
different parts of the network with a bottleneck connection between them. Note that 
under normal operation condition of the network, no bottlenecks were identified and 
they appear only when major supply nodes are unavailable. 
Scenarios G and H identify almost identical connections as bottlenecks, connection 
18-34-17 being the most significant. This suggests that planned new connection in 
Node 11 might not be fully utilised by the network consumers due to existing 
bottlenecks in the system.  
The other identified congested segments are limited by the source supply capacity 
which is outside the control of the system operator and require either expensive 
supply infrastructure development solutions or international agreements. 
4. Concluding remarks
The paper describes the flow network methodology approach and the results obtained 
by the probabilistic gas network simulator ProGasNet software tool. The ProGasNet 
has been applied to real gas transmission networks of several EU countries however 
geographical information cannot be disclosed. 
The ProGasNet model provides an indication of the worst networks nodes in terms of 
security of supply and provides their numerical ranking. It is recommended to use the 
results of the model in a qualitative (comparative) way rather than interpret numerical 
values directly. The model is very powerful to compare and evaluate different supply 
options, new network development plans and analyse potential crisis situations. 
The model has a number of advantages and limitations that must be considered by 
interpreting the results. The model at this stage cannot model adequately 
consequences of failures of compressor stations. Currently, it is assumed that pipeline 
capacity is reduced by 20% in the nearest section, however this assumption needs to 
be validated by physical flow computations. Failures of two nearby compressor 
stations would have severe effect on the network capacity, but this event is not 
considered in the current version of the probabilistic model. Further work is needed to 
overcome these limitations. 
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Abstract  
 
The society's vulnerability to natural disasters is increasing since the environment, 
climate changing in the last 10 years. Nevertheless, the vulnerability perception of the 
society, including the public and private sector leaders is still low which can be 
realized based on the last catastrophic natural disaster events around the globe. 
Therefore, the first step in a direction to increase the authorities and leader 
vulnerability perception is to assess the expected number of future natural disasters 
as well as their consequences. In order to provide a methodology to approach this 
problem the paper proposes the prediction of the expected number of natural 
disasters based on the Crow AMSSA model as well as the final prediction of the 
vulnerability based on Bow Tie analysis. The vulnerability criteria are also proposed 
as a baseline to support leader to take decision regarding the necessity to reduce 
their vulnerability face of natural disasters. 
 
 
Keywords: Vulnerability, expected number of storms, mean time between storms, 
Acceptable vulnerability, Bow Tie model. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Vulnerability is defined as a lack of protection or fragility that one system has 
and can be exploited by external forces. Such lack of protection or fragile are related 
to external events like nature catastrophes, security information and terrorism attacks 
or internal events like sabotage. 
 
In case of Systems' infrastructure, vulnerability describes how a system faces 
problems to carry out its intended function when exposed to materialized threats 
(Hofmann, 2012). The vulnerability of critical infrastructures as shown in figure 1 can 
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be divided into several dimensions to form a general framework for analyzing 
vulnerability that is: 
• Threat / hazard and unwanted event;  
• Exposure; 
• Susceptibility; 
• Coping capacity; 
• Criticality. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: General Vulnerability Framework 
Source: Hofmann, 2012. 
 
Threat can be defined as any event with the potential to cause some damage to 
systems, society and environment. Threats can be categorized into nature/weather 
related threats, human threats and operational conditions threats. A threat may lead to 
an unwanted event, understood as a disruption of the system. The vulnerability 
regards threat susceptibility and loss of coping capacity. Concerning infrastructures, 
the susceptibility succeeds if a threat leads to a disruption in the system and is 
depending on, for instance the technical components, the working force and the 
organization. 
 
On the system level, other factors like institutional and social factors also have an 
influence on the susceptibility. A system is susceptible towards a threat if the threat 
leads to an unwanted event in the system. The coping capacity describes the ability of 
the system itself to cope with an unwanted event, limit negative effects, and restore 
the function of the system to a normal state. The coping capacity can also be 
understood as resilience. 
 
2. Natural disaster 
 
Nature catastrophes are events triggered by nature forces like tsunamis, hurricanes, 
tornados, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, thunderstorms and universe space threats 
(Woo 1999). Whenever such event occurs, industrial accident and public 
infrastructure rupture may take place which has extreme consequences for the whole 
society such as flooding area, transportation service disruption, environmental impact, 
health damages and death. 
 
Throughout history, natural disasters have exacted a heavy toll of death and suffering 
and are increasing worldwide (Reyes, 2006). During the past 34 years, they have 
claimed about four million lives worldwide, adversely affected the lives of at least a 
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billion more people, and resulted in property damage exceeding $50 billion (Guha-
Sapir and Lechat 1986). 
 
In general terms, in case of disaster events (natural catastrophes, terrorism attacks, 
sabotage) we need to consider the application tools and our entities of interest to 
define impact and the most appropriated response to mitigate such disastrous effect. 
The figure 2 below summaries issues that must be considered in respect to the 
vulnerability of the system. 
 
 
Figure 2: Integrated Emergency Response Framework 
(IERF) proposed by NIST 
Source: Jain and McLean, 2003. 
 
Considering that such threats really exist in the world, it is necessary to have a 
measure of system vulnerabilities to monitor and mitigate the susceptibility of the 
system and avoid the bad consequence for the whole society. 
 
3. Vulnerability model 
 
In order to consider all vulnerabilities such as the disaster event, entities of interest 
and their impact, it is necessary to have a model. A model is a representation of some 
reality in the real world which enables us an easier understanding and predict. 
Therefore, to model the natural disaster vulnerability, the Bow Tie model is proposed 
as shows figure 3. The Bow Tie methodology is usually applied to a risk analysis 
which considers on the left diagram side the probable cause of the incident, the 
incident in the middle and the consequences on the right size. Among the causes and 
incident are the control measures and between incidence and consequences are the 
recovery measures.  
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In case of vulnerability analysis, the causes are threats like natural disasters, terrorism 
attack and hacker’s attacks. The control measures are protecting, check, monitoring 
and anticipate actions. The incident is the susceptibility of threats and recover 
measures a coping capacity to mitigate threats' effects. The figure 3 shows a Bow Tie 
model which describes the vulnerability of generic systems like industrial plants, 
trains, commercial building and aircrafts. 
 
 
 
 
Potential Causes (exposure) 
Control Measures 
Loss of Control (susceptibility) 
Recovery Measure (coping capacity) 
Consequences 
 
Figure 3: Bow Tie Vulnerability Analysis. Source: Calixto E, et al 2016. 
 
 
The threats events can have multiple effects on different systems on the same 
location, in other words, city state or country. Because of that, is necessary to have a 
complete Vulnerability analysis considering all systems affected because is necessary 
for prior which location requires support and which kind of support. Therefore, a 
Multi Bow Tie is a more appropriate model and allows accessing all threats' effects 
on different systems with different consequences. The figure 4 shows the Multi Bow 
Tie model to have a complete Vulnerability analysis. 
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Figure 4: Multi Bow Tie Model for Vulnerability Analysis. Source: Calixto, et al 2016. 
 
 
Considering that threats can affect system and society, it is necessary to consider 
different susceptibility for each threat group (Natural catastrophes, Terrorism Attack 
and Hackers Attacks).  In addition, different emergency plans will be carried out 
depending on threat characteristics.  
 
 
4. Vulnerability prediction 
 
The vulnerability can be defined qualitatively as the capacity of a certain threat to be 
susceptible to a system or society and cause a negative impact in this system or 
society. 
 
The system susceptibility can be described mathematically by the number of times 
that the threat tries to enter into the system and succeed during an interval of time t. 
Therefore, the susceptibility is a combination of threats number of success and 
control measures failure probabilities (coping failure probability). By this way, the 
System Susceptibility is defined in (1): 
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   (1) 
: 
i= threat 
i=0, 1,2... n 
j= threat´s control measure 
J=0, 1,2... m 
 
 
 
 
Since the threat is susceptible to the system, which means the control measure failed, 
the coping capacity is the last layer of protection to avoid that such threat causes a 
damage to the system or society. Therefore, the system or society's vulnerability is 
defined in (2): 
 
   (2) 
: 
i= threat 
i=0, 1,2... n 
k= susceptibility´s coping capacity 
k=0, 1,2... m 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Depending on type of threat, it´s possible to mitigate the vulnerability by reducing the 
threat susceptibility success by increasing the control measure effectiveness or by 
increasing the coping capacity success. In case of natural catastrophes, it´s hard to 
reduce the susceptibility success by reducing the frequency of natural disaster or by 
avoiding their effect on systems. In this case, the control measure are not so efficient 
to reduce the threat susceptibility but it´s possible to mitigate the society's 
vulnerability by increasing the coping capacity, such as an effective emergency 
alarms evacuation and emergency response, which will lead the population to a safe 
place with low number of casualties. Concerning the natural disaster, the most 
effective vulnerability mitigation is to avoid as much as possible the threat 
consequences by dislocating the population to a safe place before the threat 
susceptibility takes place.  
By the other hands, others threat like terrorism attack and hacker attach, the more 
effective is to reduce the susceptibility by monitoring the threats and reduce the 
frequency that such threats penetrate into the system. Once such threat is susceptible 
is very hard to predict or avoid the intended damage to the system or society. 
Considering that different threats like Natural disasters, terrorism attacks and hacker 
attacks can affect society or Industrial plants in the same interval of time, the Multi 
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Bow Tie Model described in item 3, will consider such multi effect. Consequently, 
the Total vulnerability is the sum of all vulnerabilities as defined in (3). 
 
 (3) 
 
: 
Vf = final vulnerability 
 
After defining the vulnerability, is also important to estimate properly the expected 
number of susceptible threats to help emergency response and security teams have a 
target and keep such number as low as possible. By this way it is possible to define 
the expected number of susceptibility in (4). 
 
Let be the cumulative number of failures observed in cumulative test time , 
and let be the failure intensity for the Crow-AMSAA model. Under the NHPP 
model, is approximately the probably of a failure occurring over the interval 
for small . In addition, the expected number of failures experienced 
over the test interval under the Crow-AMSAA model is given by (Crow, L.H., 
1974): 
 
 (4) 
 
The Crow AMSAA Model assumes that the intensity of the event is approximately 
Weibull event rate, thus intensifying of event on time defined in (5): 
 
       (5) 
 
 
Considering the initial event rate as: 
 
       (6) 
 
 
If we consider the event as a threat, the cumulative threat rate is approximately threat 
intensity we have: 
 
 
       (7) 
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     (8) 
 
When β=1,  
 
     (9) 
 
 
Where: 
=Expected Number of susceptible threats 
 
T=Accumulated time  
 
The equation above describes the threat intensity and depends on β value its increase, 
decrease on keeping constant along time. Is very important to have in mind that β in 
Crow AMSSA Model describes threat intensity behaviour and have not relation with 
Weibull distribution shape parameter. In fact, β is a shape parameter of threat 
Intensity Function in Crow AMSSA Model. Thus, in this model when β>1 means 
higher threat because threat intensity is increasing, in other words, the frequency of 
threats increases and control measures and coping measures actions are not reducing 
the vulnerability. When β<1, threat intensity is decreasing along time, in other words, 
threats frequency is reduced or control measures and coping measures actions are 
reducing the vulnerability. When β=1, the threat intensity is not getting higher or 
lower. 
To find the variable value in Crow AMSSA method, it is necessary to find the 
maximum value related to one parameter and that is achieved by performing partial 
derivation of the equation as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Applying the maximum likelihood method, we have (Crow, L.H., 1974): 
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This paper proposes that the expected number of catastrophic consequences in a 
cumulative time must be between 0 and 0.1 to be acceptable.  The different 
qualitative vulnerability class is defined in the table 1. Therefore, we can consider 
low vulnerability for values between 0 and 0.1, moderate vulnerability value between 
0.1 and 0.5, high vulnerability for values between 0.5 and 0.7, very high vulnerability 
for value between 0.7 and 1 and unacceptable vulnerability for values equal or higher 
than 1. 
 
Even in case of low vulnerability, the threat monitoring and data updated must be 
continuous but is not necessary for mitigations actions implementations. 
 
In case of high and very high vulnerability is necessary not only for monitoring the 
threats but also to improve the existing control measures or implement additional 
control measures as well as coping capacity improvement to achieve a low 
vulnerability level whenever is feasible. In case of high or very high vulnerability it is 
necessary to monitoring the threat and try to eliminate or block them whenever it´s 
possible, improve existing control measures and coping capacity as well as implement 
new ones when the mitigation actions are not enough.  
 
In addition, to mitigate the system and the society threat effect is recommended to 
shut down or isolate systems and dislocate the possible affected society to a safer 
location as much as possible. 
 
Table 1 - Vulnerability Indexes and classification 
Vulnerability Indexes Vulnerability Class Vulnerability consequence 
≥1  Unacceptable One or more deaths. 
0.7≤Vi<1 Very High Expected number of deaths very close to 1. 
0.5 ≤Vi<0.7 High Expected number of death close to 1. 
0.1≤Vi<0.5 Moderate Moderate expected number of deaths. 
Vi<0.1 Low Very low expected number of deaths. 
 
In fact, if coping capacities are not able to eliminate threats, there will be 
consequences and society, industrial population or both will be affected. By this way, 
is also important to estimate the number of deaths, causalities and cost caused by 
threats to have complete consequence analysis of vulnerability effect. Thus, the 
vulnerability related to such threats can be measured by the combination of threat 
susceptibility with the expected number of deaths, causalities or cost. Concerning the 
number of deaths, it´s important to have a perception of the whole society's tolerance 
of such threats' effects.  In fact, there’s no any acceptance vulnerability criterion for 
events such as natural catastrophes, terrorism attack and hacker attacks. Nowadays 
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and is a worldwide concept that as lower as possible better will be to the whole 
society.  
 
 
5. Vulnerability methodology application: Rio de Janeiro Flood 
natural disaster 
 
Once of the most frequent natural disaster which affect a large number of population 
every year around the globe is flood caused by heavy storms. In South America, it´s 
also a reality and especially in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, this event has been intensified 
in the last ten years. 
 
The first flood cause by heavy storms in Rio de Janeiro is dated in 1711 when no 
emergency response and neither report about such natural disaster was done. The two 
realities between the past 300 years and the last 10 years in Rio de Janeiro is the 
population density, which grew up specially in the last 50 years. As many of the main 
cities in South America such as Sao Paulo, Lima, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Caracás, 
Bogota e Buenos Aires, the high number of the population lives under bad social and 
economic conditions, which force a high percentage of such population to live in 
inappropriate and dangerous areas. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, huge part of the 
population, approximately 1.5 million people, around 24% of the population, live in 
favelas. Such reality is even worse in terms of vulnerability, because most of the 
favelas are on hills. Such areas have a high risk of landslides caused by heavy Storms 
which is facilitated by vegetation devastation which is motivated by houses 
construction as shows figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: Rio de Janeiro Favela. Source: Calixto, et al 2016. 
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In order to define the natural disaster vulnerability, which in Rio de Janeiro city is a 
Heavy storm vulnerability, the last seventy years with the eleven worse heavy storms 
are summarized in table 2. 
 
Table 2 – Heavy Storms in Rio de Janeiro effect (1966 – 2016)  
Storm 
date 
Concurrent 
Data 
MTBE  Disaster 
description 
Deaths Injures Families 
houses 
destroyed 
Economy 
Losses 
01/01/1966 255 0.00 Heavy Storm 
and flood area 
250 Not defined 50 000  Not defined 
01/01/1967 256 1.00 Laranjeira Hill 
slides 
200 300 Not defined Not defined 
01/03/1982 271 15.00 Pau da Bandeira 
Hill landslides 
6 Not defined 2 Not defined 
20/03/1983 272 1.00 Heavy Storm 
and flood area 
23 Not defined 150 Not defined 
01/01/1987 276 4.00 Serrana Hill 
Region 
landslides 
292 Not defined 20000 Not defined 
01/02/1988 277 1.00 Serrana Hill 
Region land 
slides 
289 734 18560 Not defined 
01/01/1999 288 11.00 Serrana Hill 
Region land 
slides 
41 72 180 Not defined 
01/02/2003 292 4.00 Serrana Hill 
Region land 
slides 
36 95 1693 Not defined 
01/04/2010 299 7.00  Bumba Hill 
landslides 
264 Not defined Not defined Not defined 
14/01/2011 300 1.00 Serrana Hill 
Region land 
slides 
1000 Not defined 14000 $300.000.000 
09/01/2016 305 5.00 Heavy Storm 
and flood area 
250 1000 50000 Not defined 
 
 
Based on table 2 description, is noticed that the intensity of heavy rains has been 
increasing in the last fifty years and unfortunately, the consequence of the society has 
been catastrophic with a huge number of deaths and injured population, population 
without houses and economic losses. The main concern now is when the next failure 
will go to happen, and to predict vulnerability, the first step is to calculate the time 
when the next heavy storms will occur. The table 3 shows the summarized calculation 
of the CROW AMSSA model parameters based on the methodology description on 
the item 4 and the information defined in table 2. 
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Table 3 – Expected Number of Heavy Storms in Rio de Janeiro prediction basis.  
N T b λi d λc N(t) MTBFi 
1 16 2.7725887 0.12618 0.227874402 2.64E-02 1.089 7.925 
2 17 2.8332133 0.13288 -0.254969115 2.78E-02 1.219 7.526 
3 21 3.0445224 0.15913 -0.377184473 3.33E-02 1.803 6.284 
4 22 3.0910425 0.16557 -0.411144177 3.46E-02 1.966 6.040 
5 33 3.4965076 0.23401 -0.871608438 4.89E-02 4.167 4.273 
6 37 3.6109179 0.25800 -1.077460618 5.40E-02 5.151 3.876 
7 44 3.7841896 0.29910 -1.485437273 6.26E-02 7.102 3.343 
8 45 3.8066625 0.30489 -1.548606109 6.38E-02 7.404 3.280 
9 50 3.912023 0.33357 -1.882510643 6.98E-02 9.000 2.998 
 
The Crow AMSAA parameters base on table 3 are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The time to have the next heavy storm is defined by the equation (11).  
 
 
  (11) 
 
≅ 53 years 
 
 
For the current time of 50 years (2016), we have nine failures. Therefore, in 3 years’ 
time the next failure will happen as shows the figure 6.  
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Figure 6: Cumulative number of Storms.  
 
The confirmation of the increased number of heavy storms is demonstrated in the 
figure 7 which shows the decreasing interval between heavy storms (MTBS). 
Therefore, for the next three years it is expected to have one heavy storm, which will 
lead to such catastrophic consequences for the Rio de Janeiro society. The 
vulnerability calculation considers also the mitigation event's probability.  Therefore, 
the Bow Tie model is applied to define the vulnerability of heavy storms based on the 
following definition: 
 
• Potential Causes (exposure): Heavy Storm 
• Control Measures (Control Measures): Monitoring weather, emergency alert 
and population reallocation 
• Loss of Control (susceptibility): Probability of heavy rain affects the Rio de 
Janeiro city 
• Recovery Measures (coping capacity): Emergency response 
• Consequences: Deaths 
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Figure 7: Mean Time Between Storms tendency. 
 
Concerning the next five years, the expected number of heavy rain is 1.7, the 
following Bow Tie elements which the probability of failures values is defined below 
as: 
 
• Potential Causes (exposure): Heavy Storm = 1.0 
• Control Measures 1(Control Measures): Weather Monitoring and Alert = 
100% 
• Control Measures 2(Control Measures): Population reallocation = 100% 
• Loss of Control (susceptibility): Probability of heavy rain affects the Rio de 
Janeiro city =100% 
• Recovery Measures (coping capacity): Emergency response = 100% 
• Consequences: Deaths = at least 1 
 
The figure 8 below shows the Bow Tie model for the heavy storm in Rio de Janeiro. 
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Figure 8: Heavy storm Vulnerability. 
 
  
Vulnerability = ENHS x CM1 X CM2 X Co1x END 
 
Where: 
ENHS=expected number of heavy storms 
CM1 = Probability of control measure 1 (weather prediction and alert) failure 
CM2 = Probability of control measures 2 (Dislocation to safety area) failure 
Co1=Probability of Coping capacity (Fire Fighters emergency response) failure 
END=expected number of deaths 
 
Vulnerability = 1,0 x 1 (100%) x1 (100%) x 1 (100%) x1= 1 death in the next three 
years 
 
It´s important to understand why the control measures and the coping capacity has 
100% of failure for the last 10 years. Concerning the weather prediction and alert, it 
has not been effective because the limited weather prediction technology in Rio de 
Janeiro state as well as the ineffectiveness of the population alert.  
 
In case of heavy storm detection on time, it´s not possible to dislocate the population 
for a safe area because there´s not enough available area for the 1.5 million of people 
who live in vulnerable areas in Favelas in the Rio de Janeiro state. In addition, most 
of the population are afraid to leave their homes being no more permitted to return to 
their homes after the natural disaster. 
 
Regarding the coping capacity´s effectiveness, as we consider that only one death will 
bring the vulnerability level to an unacceptable level, despite the Rio de Janeiro fire 
fighters effectiveness during emergency response, they have not enough resource to 
avoid all deaths. 
 
The expected number of deaths is very conservative when we look to the table 2 
which shows the lowest number of deaths (six) occurred on 01-03-1982. In this case 
that was done to show how vulnerable the population is based on the final 
vulnerability number. In other words, even considering the lowest possible number of 
deaths, the vulnerability is still unacceptable. 
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6. Conclusion
The vulnerability of heavy storms in Rio de Janeiro analysis faces 2 natural disasters 
for the next three years.  In order to reduce such vulnerability and bring this number 
of acceptable level, which means Moderate class, it´s necessary that the population be 
dislocated to a safe area in Rio de Janeiro city as well as the emergency plan 
effectiveness improves to be able to set up the alarm in risk areas in case of heavy 
rains and dislocate as much as possible the remain population to a safe place. In this 
direction, it´s necessary in a short time frame to develop a National Disaster 
Emergency Plan, which enable to coordinate resources to the affected area as much as 
possible and involve government authorities and local companies which would supply 
resources during this natural disaster. In long time period, it's necessary to dislocate 
the whole population in a safe area. That is the most effective action to reduce the 
vulnerability. Nevertheless, that involves investment to build new popular houses in 
safe areas of Rio de Janeiro with all necessary infrastructure for the population. As 
much as such population is dislocate to safe areas lower will be the vulnerability of 
the population to heavy storms. 
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Abstract 
This paper introduces a methodological approach for identifying the resilience of 
interconnected EU critical infrastructures to climate change. The proposed approach 
tries to establish a consequence based modelling framework for assessing climate 
dependent causal relationships between CI operation and response to climate 
impacts with an aim to minimise disruptions to service flows under diverse 
conditions. The proposed approach also introduces a risk propagation element for 
capturing how heterogeneous CI are interconnected and interdependent and further 
expanded to introduce the element of resilience capabilities.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The main scope of the proposed approach is to propose a scientifically verified 
framework to estimate the resilience of critical infrastructures to climatic hazards. 
The proposed framework builds upon a comprehensive assessment of multiple cli-
mate risks and related natural hazards, such as floods, forest fires, droughts, etc.  Ac-
cording to the recently published IPCC AR5 report1, climate change-related risks to 
infrastructures are increasing (including rising sea levels and storm surges, heat 
stress, extreme precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, drought, …) 
with widespread negative impacts on people (and their health, livelihoods and assets) 
and on local and national economies and ecosystems (WGII AR5 - Chap8, summary).  
 
As CI are critical components to the normal functioning of modern EU societies, their 
resilience encompasses the operational component in addition to its structural integri-
ty and its capacity to maximize business output under climate stressors.  Critical in-
frastructures are commonly designed, built and maintained according to rigorous 
standards (CEN, 2014, 2007; Silvia Dimova et al., 2015) in order to withstand the 
climate and weather-related pressures, but shifts in climate characteristics may result 
in increases of the magnitude and frequency of potential risks, or expose specific CI 
to new risks not previously considered. A main objective of the proposed methodolo-
gy is to provide scientific evidence in better understanding how future climate re-
gimes might affect the interconnected CI during their lifespan accounting for the ele-
ment of ageing, and assess the cost-effectiveness of different adaptation measures.   
 
The increasingly dependent, interdependent and interconnected nature of European 
critical infrastructures exposes previously unseen risks, new vulnerabilities and op-
portunities for disruption across the CI networks. Current analysis of historical inci-
dents indicates that CI vulnerability tend to be focused on extreme weather events 
that can disrupt the normal operation of infrastructures, while on the other hand caus-
es impacts across infrastructures because of extensive interdependencies between 
them (DOE, 2012). Acknowledging that infrastructure’s vulnerabilities and impacts 
go far beyond physical damages (Angela Queste and Dr. Wolfram Geier, 2005; Hok-
stad et al., 2012) our approach will provide an assessment of the impacts to the ser-
vices provided by CI, addressing impacts associated with business continuity and also 
include the externalities of the infrastructures operation, societal costs, environmental 
effects, and economic costs due to suspended activities. 
 
2. Relevant policies 
 
Our proposed methodological framework is based on a synthesis of various policies 
for providing validated scientific support for national and European policies; 
 
• The EU Strategy on Climate adaptation, as identified in COM(2013) 216 (EC, 
2013a)- An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change, and detailed in SWD 
(2013) 137 (EC, 2013b)- Adapting infrastructure to climate change  
                                                          
1
  http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/ 
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• National Risk Assessment Plans (NRA) as identified in SWD (2014) 134, Brus-
sels, 8.4.2014 (EC, 2014), where CI have been identified as a national priority 
in several countries (DE, NL, IE,…) 
• Directive 2008/114/EC (EC, 2008), on the identification and designation of Eu-
ropean critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their 
protection, 8.12.2008  
• Reports by the IPCC2. 
 
A synthesis of the above policy documents introduces to our approach the following 
elements: 
 
1. The protection of CI is a collaborative process, where any change in its proper-
ties and operational characteristics to combat extreme weather phenomena shall 
by no means compromise other functions such as security levels, health and 
safety operations, and vice versa. 
2. According to the “all hazards” approach, risk assessment should include any 
type of risk whether is man-made, technological accident or stemming from 
natural causes including climate related events, in a way that will allow prioriti-
zation of risk. 
3. Risk Assessment should be comparable across sectors and diversified to capture 
the unique nature and characteristics of each CI type, whereas impacts should 
include as common best practices from NRA and Dir 114/2008. 
4. As CI are projects scheduled to last for decades, the ageing element should be 
an inherent part of the analysis. 
 
Additionally, a core component of our proposed methodological approach is to intro-
duce the interdependencies of heterogeneous types of CI into this analysis.  
 
3. State of the art review 
 
The number of available methodologies and funded projects in risk assessment for CI 
is large. The majority of funded projects is focused on assessing impacts specific to 
certain types of infrastructures and with different scope and time frame of the analy-
sis. Another complicated issue pertains to the complexity of the interconnected infra-
structures (Bollinger et al., 2013), relating to the time and computational expressive-
ness of a modeling system to effectively analyze risk and resilience across large net-
works.  
 
3.1 Past Research Projects  
 
A number of past and on-going research projects focus on the performance and re-
sponse of urban areas to natural disasters, even if they do not always make specific 
and direct reference to CI analysis. Research projects with impacts related to natural 
hazards & climate change in the same manner include ARMONIA (511208) 
MEDIGRID (FP6-2003-Global-2-004044) project, Na.RAs, EPSON, ENSURE 
(FP7/212045), FUME (FP7/243888), WEATHER project (233886), EWENT 
(233919), CLIM-RUN project (FP7-ENVIRONMENT 265192). Other ones are fo-
                                                          
2
  https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/ 
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cused on the impacts on the urban environment, and CI such as RESIN (653522), 
PLACCARD (653255),  
 
CIPRNET (312450), INFRARISK (603960), INTACT (606799), RAIN (608166), 
STREST (603389). 
 
On a national scale several approaches and guidance documents exist such as the 
German from BMI (Protecting Critical Infrastructures – Risk and Crisis Manage-
ment), the Dutch DHM (De Haagse Methodiek – The Hague Method) and  NRB 
(Nasjonalt risikobilde - Norwegian national risk chart), the CPNI/UK Civil Contigen-
cies Act, and the Norwegian Risk Vulnerability Analysis. Although all of them do 
focus on the analysis of a single infrastructure and most of them are fairly simplistic 
and guided by expert opinions & CI security officers, the general trend is to move 
towards a holistic protection framework rather than a basic risk analysis. 
 
3.2 Brief overview 
 
A set of quantitative probabilistic risk analysis of a single CI, such as the Risk and 
Vulnerability Analysis, the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Probabilistic Safety 
Analysis and Quantitative Risk Analysis has been proposed but require specialized 
knowledge  to be applied (Utne et al., 2011), while (Haimes et al., 2002) offer a 
methodological framework that identifies, prioritizes, assesses and manages risks to 
complex, large-scale systems. HAZUS-MH3 is the main risk assessment tool used by 
FEMA.  
 
(Rinaldi et al., 2001) first tried to model the interdependencies of CI as highly inter-
connected and mutually dependent systems, both physically and through a host of 
information and communications technologies. In recent years, some of the most 
prominent approaches are the following: 
 
• Event-driven simulation, which mimic the behavior of their real-life counter-
parts, and prioritizing a queue as a buffer mechanism used to store a representa-
tion of "events" that are about to happen. (IRRIIS (128735), DIESIS (212830)) 
• Input – Output: The supply and demand approach represented though “nodes 
and edges” producing, consuming and transferring resources of the CI. (I2SIm 
simulator)  
• Network based Markov-chain techniques are used in order to capture and model 
the change of state of interconnected infrastructures (Ouyang et al., 2009) 
• Object oriented models, with close adherence to the reality of the coupled pro-
cesses involved by integrating the spectrum of different stochastic phenomena 
which may occur (Casalicchio et al., 2010) 
• Quantitative approaches: This analysis is based on the extensive definition of 
risk scenarios followed by filter and ranking by expert opinions, as determined 
by their likelihood and consequence DECRIS model (Utne, I.B et al., 2010), 
(Utne et al., 2008)  
 
  
                                                          
3
 http://www.fema.gov/hazus 
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4. Development of the methodological framework 
 
The main idea of the proposed approach is that any asset within a CI can cause di-
verse impacts and affect other interconnected assets or networks. The applied model-
ling and simulation tools will estimate how the CI state (or its assets) are depended on 
its previous state and/or the states of its interconnected assets. The state of an inter-
connected asset is thus a result of the nature of the climatic pressure affecting the 
originating asset, the resilience of the asset / network under consideration (risk miti-
gation, means of immediate response, safety equipment) and the type of interconnec-
tion between the assets. A Consequence-based Risk Management approach will be 
followed as it is depicted in Figure 1, which incorporates uncertainty in all phases of 
climate risk modeling and quantifies the risk to societal systems and subsystems.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. EU-CIRCLE framework high level descrip-
tion 
 
 
The implementation of the methodological approach will be implemented on the 
CIRP platform4, an innovative modular and expandable software platform that will 
assess potential impacts due to climate hazards; provide monitoring through new re-
silience indicators, and support cost-efficient adaptation measures. It is defined as an 
end-to-end collaborative modeling environment where new analyses can be added 
anywhere along the analysis workflow and present findings in a unified manner 
providing an efficient solution that integrates existing modeling tools and data into a 
standardized fashion. 
 
A common point of the proposed methodology is to move towards a common repre-
sentation of CI infrastructures placing emphasis on their role, the flow of services to 
the customers and other CI. Different CI types are displayed into parallel layers repre-
sent individual sectors those of the road, electricity and drinking water network. Fig-
ure 2 introduces the reference simulated environment of the EU-CIRCLE project, 
introduced as a testing platform during the development stage.    
 
  
                                                          
4
 http://www.eu-circle.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/d5.1.pdf 
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Figure 2.  Infrastructure independencies for simulated 
environment 
 
 
Within our approach each infrastructure is represented as a set of interconnected as-
sets (e.g. power generation stations, power distribution stations, power lines, pumping 
stations, water pipelines, pipeline junctions, bridges, roadways, etc), and can be mod-
eled as a network that consists of nodes and links. Through this approach network 
flow algorithms can be applied to ascertain network behavior given any climate 
change scenario.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Generic methodological approach 
 
 
The process in summary is the following in Figure 3: 
 
1. Identify climate scenarios, and their probability of appearance (e.g. through ex-
treme value theory, return period) through any related statistical measure. 
2. Identify CI assets and their respective properties. 
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3. Define climate related impacts to the CI behavior and properties. These could 
influence the supply and demand of the CI, the bearing capacity of the CI assets 
and result in partial or total collapse of the capacity of the CI to serve. 
4. Define impacts that do not influence the network flow, but are mandatory for 
evaluating risk (e.g. loss of life, economy, societal, environment). 
5. Model the flow of the interconnected networks using network simulation mod-
els.  
6. Estimate cumulative impacts and subsequently the risk. 
 
Apply resilience options that could modify climate impacts to assets (step 3 & 4), 
operation of the CI (step 5) and their interconnections (step 5). These would result in 
effectively new simulations (step 1-6) using the modified properties of the CI net-
work.   
 
4.1 Climate Data & climate hazards analysis  
 
The initial condition of the analysis is the climate scenario. Different climate infor-
mation can be used as input to the risk assessment including: 
 
• Output from GCM (usually at low spatial resolution) reaching up to the year 
2100, and obtained from different RCP scenarios 
• Dynamically downscaled RCM models with higher resolution and very low 
temporal analysis 
• Statistically downscaled climate information (Benestad et al., 2008) 
• Historical information, either derived from in-situ observations, satellite moni-
toring and re-analysis data sets 
 
The output of the climate models include the likelihood of the event, and the related 
climate information (single value, spatial / temporal extend). Additionally it can pro-
vide input for secondary climate hazards models (forest fire spreading, flood model-
ling, drought, etc). 
  
4.2 Registry of CI assets  
 
An in-depth analysis of the elementary assets for the analysed critical infrastructure 
assets will be made applying a hierarchical classification. For each type of infrastruc-
ture, the following elements will be determined: direct assets, auxiliary assets, flow of 
people, goods and services, input / output, accessibility and capacity. Additionally the 
identification of interconnections, interdependencies and appointment of critical in-
frastructures assets will be identified depending on the type: physical, systems, geo-
graphical, logical (Rinaldi et al., 2001). Each asset has been attributed properties and 
values needed for the follow-on analysis. 
 
4.3 Induced Damages functions  
 
Under the proposed modelling framework, climate hazard conditions impact compo-
nents of CI systems, causing damages and mal-functions in their capacity and/or also  
possible disruptions in supply&demand and capacity on the networks nodes which 
performs changes on the network attributes.  These characteristics are generally de-
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scribed by impact models, fragility curves and damage-functionality relationships 
Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Generic damage curves according to HAZUS 
Methodology (FEMA, n.d.) and for Drinking Water plants 
 
 
Two different sets of impacts are identified i) either on asset or network level 
 
• Failure (total or partial) to the asset 
• Change in the supply / demand properties of the network (e.g. change in elec-
tricity demand due to heat wave or in the energy supply of wind parks) 
• Change in the bearing capacity of a network node (e.g. transmission line chang-
es due to temperature) 
 
ii) or on the impacts to CI and society in general and are critically used to identify and 
estimate in the impacts for the risk assessment. 
 
The main functional representation within this approach are Fragility curves / damage 
functions / impact assessment models that describe the probability of failure / and or 
capacity change, conditioned on climate hazard value, over the full range of values to 
which a system might be exposed and provide a richer and more comprehensive per-
spective on system capacity (Schultz et al., 2010).  
 
4.4 Network analysis  
 
The proposed approach introduces a network interdependency analysis between dif-
ferent types of networks of CI as a core modelling component. The complexity of 
each type of network makes it difficult to create a universal algorithm for simulating 
the network behavior under normal and stress conditions. We employ a more generic 
approach, describing the network as a graph (nodes and links) with a characteristic 
value of flow for its link. This approach permits to solve the network using graph 
theory solutions, independent of the network type. Moreover, an interdependency 
network analysis can be performed with additional information, about interconnec-
tions (types and properties) between the separate networks. The type of network is 
inserted as flow in the links and damage / fragility property of the node. 
 
The combined information produces a characteristic value that express the probability 
of a CI asset change of state during an extreme event. Moreover, in order to perform 
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resilience assessment during the Network Analysis, a resilience factor has been pro-
posed in Structural and Operational Analysis which can be used to examine resilience  
 
 
options and adaptation scenarios by modifying the damage/fragility curves of each 
network asset and the interconnections’ accordingly in Figure 5 and Figure 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Damage (in %) in water network assets due 
to 40year return period flood event.  
 
 
.  
Figure 6. Network flow disruptions [ranked from 0-5 
categories] 
 
 
The proposed approach is based on a probabilistic network models performed for 
each scenario. For solving the basic scenario, and every proposed resilience based 
modification, the network analysis solves each network flow independently and then 
captures its interconnections depending on the type resolving each network. The ex-
pected result is the Connectivity Loss (CL) between nodes, and Service Flow Reduc-
tion (SFR). Connectivity Loss is a measure of the ability of every distribution node to 
receive from a generation node where as Service Flow Reduction (SFR) determines 
the amount of flow that the system can provide compared to what it provided before 
the “event” (Steelman et al., 2007; Young-Suk Kim et al., 2008).  
 
A modification of the above Interconnected Network Analysis Model is proposed in 
order to automatically perform resilience assessment during the Network Analysis. A 
resilience factor can be introduced in the estimation of the damage function (step 3 
&4) and also in the process of solving network interconnections due to the implemen-
tation of different resilience capacities. As a result, parallel network analysis can be 
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performed in order to assess the most suitable CI adaptation scenario could be derived 
from the calculation of the necessary resilience indicator for the infrastructure. 
 
4.5  Assessment of consequences   
 
Climate change already has far-reaching impacts on infrastructure and can put the 
operation, capacity potential and reliability of various infrastructures at increased 
risk5 (SWD(2013) 137 final) (De Groeve et al., 2015; Keith Williges et al., 2015; 
UNISRD, 2013). Infrastructure system performance can be measured with either sim-
ple metrics that only depend on the topological characteristics of a network system, or 
more elaborate metrics that depend on flow patterns  (outcome of network simulation 
models - section 4.5) and supply/demand in addition to the topological characteristics. 
For utility systems, two system performance measures are adopted: Connectivity Loss 
(CL) and Service Flow Reduction (SFR). CL only requires network topology, while 
SFR considers flow capacity and the supply/demand of elements. With respect to the 
impacts on the CI and the society in general the following hierarchical structure is 
proposed: 
 
 
Table I. Consequences hierarchical structure 
 
 
 
4.6  Assessing Risk 
 
The RAF has been conceptualized in accordance to NRAs and guidance found in Dir 
114/2008, using an ordinal scale of 5 categories. The Risk Assessment Matrix applied 
here Table II, is a classic tool to conduct semi-quantitative risk assessment, widely 
applied in many different frameworks. Some basic principles that were adopted with-
in the present RAF that the output risk index is determined only by the mapping of 
the consequences and the likelihood to a single risk level, all of which can be divided 
into different levels, respectively, with qualitative descriptions and scales.  
 
  
                                                          
5
  http://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/partnership/Disaster-Loss-and-Damage-Working-Group 
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Table II. Risk matrix 
 CONSEQUENCES 
LIKELIHOOD NEGLIGIBLE SMALL HIGH SEVERE CRITICAL 
CERTAINTY LOW MEDIUM HIGH CRITICAL CRITICAL 
HIGH VERY LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH CRITICAL 
MEDIUM VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH 
LOW VERY LOW VERY LOW LOW LOW MEDIUM 
VERY LOW VERY LOW VERY LOW VERY LOW VERY LOW LOW 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This work introduces a methodological approach for assessing the resilience of Euro-
pean Critical Infrastructure to emerging challenges such as climate change. The work 
presents here the high level methodological aspects, as it is currently ongoing. 
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Lifetime degradation and interventions for systems under 
random shocks 
Dimos C. Charmpis 
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Cyprus, 
75 Kallipoleos Str., P.O. Box 20537, 1678 Nicosia, Cyprus 
Abstract 
This work is concerned with the time-dependent degradation and the intervention 
needs of engineering systems deteriorating over time due to the effects of series of 
shocks. A probabilistic framework is implemented to deal with the randomness in 
arrival times (Poisson process) and sizes of the shocks considered. Corrective and 
preventive intervention actions are applied to maintain a system in operational and 
safe condition despite the shock-based damage accumulated during its lifetime. The 
focus of the paper is on the effectiveness of early repairs to prevent loss of system 
functionality and/or failure. Various cases of such preventive repair actions are 
investigated using a Monte Carlo simulation procedure. The numerical results 
obtained demonstrate the trade-off relationship between the system’s improved 
performance and the corresponding numbers and extent of interventions required. 
Keywords: life-cycle; deterioration; Poisson process; repair; maintenance. 
1. Introduction
Engineering systems deteriorate over time due to the effects of natural and/or 
manmade hazards. During its lifetime, a system is expected to sustain actions causing 
practically continuous degradation (e.g. wear from normal use, fatigue due to 
repeated loading, corrosion due to aggressive environmental conditions, etc.), as well 
as sudden events due to shocks that result in discrete degradation (e.g. earthquakes, 
hurricanes, etc.). Despite its exposure to such degradation causes and the 
accumulation of damage with time, a system is required to be operational and safe for 
a certain period of time. In order to ensure that the system will meet these 
requirements, its condition needs to be monitored during its lifetime and appropriate 
interventions must be performed whenever needed, in order to restore its capacity and 
availability. Establishing an optimal maintenance strategy plays a crucial role in the 
cost-effective life-cycle management of the system. Therefore, intensive research 
efforts are internationally invested in this scientific area (e.g. Kleiner, 2001; Sanchez-
Silva et al., 2011; Orabi & El-Rayes, 2012; Frangopol & Bocchini, 2012; Junca & 
Sanchez-Silva, 2013; Salem et al., 2013; Alogdianakis et al., 2016; Sánchez-Silva et 
al., 2016; Charmpis et al., 2016; Ait Mokhtar et al., 2016). 
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The present work focuses on engineering systems subjected to series of shocks during 
their lifetime. The shocks acting on a system arrive at random times (according to a 
Poisson process), while the intensity of each shock is also random. Due to the damage 
accumulated on the system after a number of shocks, loss of functionality and/or 
failure of the system may occur. Thus, corrective intervention actions (repair or even 
complete reconstruction) are required to restore the damaged system’s capacity. In an 
effort to achieve a more cost-effective maintenance strategy for such a degrading 
system, the basic aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of preventive repair on 
the lifetime performance and intervention needs of the system. This type of repair is 
applied early on the system, before the occurrence of functionality loss and/or failure. 
The numerical investigation presented is performed using a Monte Carlo simulation 
procedure. At each simulation, shock arrival times and sizes are sampled from 
appropriate distributions. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
degradation process of a system subjected to random shocks. Section 3 explains how 
to identify loss of functionality and/or failure for a system under shock-based 
degradation. The implementation of corrective and preventive system intervention 
actions is discussed in section 4. Section 5 reports and discusses numerical results of 
an illustrative example. Finally, the overall conclusions of the paper are given in 
section 6. 
2. System degradation due to random shocks
Stochastic processes are widely used to study the lifetime performance of engineering 
systems under uncertainty (e.g. Sanchez-Silva et al., 2011; Iervolino et al., 2013; 
Junca & Sanchez-Silva, 2013; Rafiee et al., 2016). In particular, the Poisson process 
is commonly employed to model arrival times of random events occurring to a 
system. In the present work, we consider a system subjected to random shocks that 
occur according to a Poisson process with rate λ (events/year). If ti is the arrival time 
(time of occurrence) of the i-th shock (t0=0), then the i-th inter-arrival time is 
expressed as: xi=ti-ti-1. The inter-arrival times x1,x2,… is a sequence of independent, 
identically distributed exponential random variables with mean 1/λ. This 
distributional property of inter-arrival times results from the fact that the Poisson 
process has no memory. Hence, the process of shock arrivals has the same 
distribution throughout the lifetime of the system (stationarity assumption). 
Moreover, since the inter-arrival times of the process are independent, any shock 
occurrence time does not depend on the occurrence times of past shocks and does not 
affect the occurrence times of possible future shocks. 
When a shock arrives according to a Poisson process, the corresponding shock size is 
also controlled through a random variable, which is usually exponentially or 
lognormally distributed. In this paper, shock sizes follow an exponential distribution, 
which is assumed to remain unaltered throughout the lifetime of the system. Again, 
the memory-less property holds: any shock size does not depend on the past shock 
sizes and does not affect the possible future shock sizes. Moreover, the exponential 
distributions of shock sizes and inter-arrival times are independent. 
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Based on the above, a system subjected to random shocks deteriorates with time in a 
probabilistic manner, as it sustains shocks of various (random) sizes at various 
(random) arrival times throughout its lifetime. Shock-based system degradation is 
actually realized by removing from the system an amount of capacity units, when a 
shock occurs. Hence, we consider a system with initial capacity C0 that starts to 
operate at time t=0. The system is subjected to shocks that arrive at times t1,t2,… 
according to a Poisson process and cause degradation, which depends on the intensity 
of each shock. Thus, the shock occurring at time ti results in system damage of size Di 
(measured in capacity units), which is sampled from an exponential distribution. 
Shock after shock, damage accumulates on the system. By time t, the total damage 
accumulated can be expressed in terms of capacity units as: 



)(
1
)(
tn
i
iDtD , (1) 
where n(t) is the number of shocks that have occurred by time t. Then, the 
corresponding residual capacity of the system is obtained by subtracting from its 
initial capacity the total damage sustained: 
)()( 0 tDCtC  . (2) 
3. Failure and/or loss of functionality of degrading systems
The performance of an engineering system at any time t is typically assessed with 
respect to its safety and functionality by defining appropriate limit state conditions. In 
the present work, limit states are specified by choosing appropriate threshold values 
for the residual capacity C(t) of a degrading system, which is a standard approach 
followed also in other studies (e.g. Sanchez-Silva et al., 2011; Rafiee et al., 2016). 
Hence, when the residual capacity falls below such a threshold due to the damage 
accumulated from a series of shocks, the system underperforms, as it violates the 
respective limit state condition. Two threshold values are applied herein: 
 Functionality threshold Cfunc. A system is considered to be fully functional at any
time t as long as C(t)≥Cfunc. It is further assumed that a functional system operates
in an as good as new state despite the damage possibly accumulated on the system.
Loss of system functionality (but not necessarily system failure) is denoted by the
condition C(t)<Cfunc, which implies that the system cannot operate or it is not safe
to operate and is therefore put out of service.
 Failure threshold Cfail. Failure of a system is indicated by the condition C(t)≤Cfail,
which implies also loss of system functionality. Thus, when C(t)>Cfail and
C(t)<Cfunc, the system is not failed, but it cannot operate at all.
In general, threshold values have to be chosen in a way that C0≥Cfunc≥Cfail, although 
most commonly they are specified as C0>Cfunc>Cfail=0. 
In this paper, it is assumed that a failed system needs to be replaced, because it is not 
repairable (due to extensive damage sustained or even collapse) or it is uneconomical 
to be repaired. Therefore, the system has to be fully reconstructed, in order to operate 
again. Depending on the available budget, the system functionality needs, the 
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experience gained from the occurred failure, etc., the newly constructed system may 
be ‘identical’ with the failed one (i.e. with the same initial capacity C0) or it may be 
an  
upgraded or downgraded version of it (i.e. with an initial capacity that is larger or 
smaller than C0). It should be emphasized, however, that covering the direct cost 
associated mainly with the reconstruction of the system is not the most important 
consequence of the failure. Indirect consequences associated with injuries/fatalities, 
environmental issues, long loss of functionality, user inconvenience, delays, etc. are 
typically much more severe and costly. 
In the case of loss of functionality without failure, the system is considered to be 
repairable, i.e. the option of repairing instead of replacing it is technically, 
economically, environmentally, etc. viable. In general, the repair of the system may 
be perfect (the initial capacity C0 is fully restored and the system is in an as good as 
new condition) or imperfect (the initial capacity C0 is partly restored) (e.g. Sánchez-
Silva et al., 2016). In any case, the negative consequences sustained are basically due 
to the implications caused by the interruption of the availability of the system. 
Clearly, both direct and indirect consequences are much less severe when a system is 
non-operational and just needs some repairs compared to an overall failure inducing 
the need for system replacement. 
4. Corrective and preventive system interventions
A straightforward approach to make a decision regarding an intervention (repair or 
reconstruction) at any time t on a system damaged by a series of shocks is to compare 
the system’s residual capacity at time t with the functionality and failure thresholds 
defined in the previous section. Then, assuming that repairs are perfect and 
replacement installs a new system that is ‘identical’ to the failed one, two simple 
intervention criteria can be specified: 
 When a shock at time t causes system failure (C(t)≤Cfail), reconstruction is decided
and the failed system is immediately replaced with a new one having initial
capacity C0.
 When a shock at time t causes loss of system functionality without failure
(C(t)<Cfunc and C(t)>Cfail), repair is decided to immediately restore the initial
capacity C0 of the system.
These criteria allow only corrective intervention actions after undesired events have 
occurred: reconstruction is decided only after system failure; repair is decided only 
after loss of system functionality. Thus, we are forced to sustain (possibly 
devastating) consequences despite the intervention actions applied. 
In this work, an additional threshold value is introduced, in order to specify also a 
preventive intervention criterion that allows repair actions to be applied earlier. 
Hence, when a shock at time t causes the system’s residual capacity to fall below the 
‘repair threshold’ Crep (C(t)≤Crep), repair is decided to immediately restore the initial 
capacity C0 of the system. The threshold Crep takes a fixed pre-specified value chosen 
in a way that Crep≥Cfunc. This criterion allows system repair to be decided before 
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failure and/or loss of functionality occur, in order to prevent the negative 
consequences of these undesired events. This way, we gain control over the system’s 
probabilities of failure and loss of functionality. Preventive intervention based on a 
condition threshold has 
been used in other studies, mainly in an effort to mitigate the probability of system 
failure (e.g. Sanchez-Silva et al., 2011). The present paper, however, explicitly 
addresses also the highly important issue of system availability, as it investigates the 
effect of preventive repair on both probabilities of system functionality loss and 
failure. 
It is pointed out that the new preventive intervention criterion based on the repair 
threshold Crep is applied in addition to the two aforementioned corrective intervention 
criteria. Depending on the current capacity of a damaged system and the size of a new 
shock, any of the three criteria may be activated. More specifically, when the i-th 
shock arrives at time ti and causes damage of size Di on an already damaged system 
with residual capacity C(ti), then the new residual capacity of the system is C(ti)-Di 
and one of the following four cases applies: 
 C(ti)-Di>Crep: no system intervention required;
 C(ti)-Di≤Crep and C(ti)-Di≥Cfunc: system repair required (preventive action);
 C(ti)-Di<Cfunc and C(ti)-Di>Cfail: system repair required due to loss of functionality
(corrective action);
 C(ti)-Di≤Cfail: system reconstruction required due to failure (corrective action).
Note that, for Crep=Cfunc, the preventive repair criterion is actually deactivated and 
only corrective interventions can be applied. It should also be mentioned that damage, 
repair and reconstruction are all assumed to be ‘instantaneous’ events. 
5. Illustrative numerical example
Consider a structural system (e.g. highway bridge) with initial capacity C0=100 
(measured in capacity units) at time t=0. During its lifetime, the system is subjected 
to a series of earthquakes with occurrence times following a Poisson process with 
parameter λ=0.05 events/year (i.e. one earthquake is expected per 20 years). The 
damage caused on the system by each earthquake is an exponentially distributed 
variable with a mean of 15 capacity units. The functionality and failure thresholds for 
this system are Cfunc=20 and Cfail=0, while various repair thresholds Crep≥20 are 
examined. The required lifetime of the system is 100 years. 
A Monte Carlo simulation procedure is employed to study the probabilistic 
performance and intervention needs of the system for the period of 100 years. At each 
simulation, the system is subjected to a different series of shocks, whose inter-arrival 
times and sizes are sampled from exponential distributions with the properties given 
above; thus, damage accumulates on the system activating intervention actions as 
described in section 4. Six different test cases are specified by varying the Crep-value; 
for every case, 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations are performed. 
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Table I presents results for the test cases investigated. The probabilistic system 
performance can be assessed by the expected numbers of failures and losses of 
functionality per Monte Carlo simulation. When preventive repair is not allowed 
(Crep=20), there are unacceptably high probabilities for the system to be in a failed 
and/or non-operational condition within the period of study of 100 years. More 
specifically, failure at any simulation may occur with probability of about 10%, while 
loss of functionality should be expected more or less at every second simulation. This 
situation can be improved by performing earlier preventive repairs (Crep>20). A 
higher Crep-value results in lower expected numbers of failures and losses of 
functionality. For instance, the choice of Crep=40 reduces both numbers by more than 
50% compared to those obtained for Crep=20. For rather high Crep-values (i.e. Crep=70-
80), the expected numbers of system failures and losses of functionality are one order 
of magnitude lower than those for Crep=20. 
The improved system performance, however, is not achieved at no cost. Table I 
shows that a higher Crep-value generally induces the need for more interventions 
(repairs and reconstructions) within the lifetime of 100 years. Hence, for low Crep-
values (i.e. Crep=20-30), the need for an intervention should be expected to arise more 
or less at every second simulation. On the other hand, for high Crep-values (i.e. 
Crep≈80), two interventions per simulation should be expected. Moreover, higher 
expected numbers of interventions are associated with larger expected amounts of 
capacity units to be restored. Indeed, for Crep=20-30, a total amount of about 40 
capacity units should be expected to be restored at each simulation; for Crep=70-80, 
the corresponding amount is almost 70 capacity units. Thus, Table I demonstrates the 
trade-off relationship between the system performance metrics (expected numbers of 
system failures and losses of functionality) and the numbers and extent of 
interventions performed. 
Figures 1-4 illustrate the system’s capacity evolution with time due to damage 
accumulated from successive shocks for 4 characteristic Monte Carlo simulations. In 
the simulation of Fig. 1, preventive repair is not allowed (Crep=20), therefore any 
intervention could only be corrective. Indeed, a corrective repair is performed at time 
t≈65 years due to loss of functionality after 3 shocks sustained by the system. Two 
more shocks arrive after the repair, but the corresponding capacity drops do not cause 
another functionality loss or failure. The loss of functionality observed in this 
simulation would be prevented with a choice of Crep≥64. 
Table I. Probabilistic results for system performance and intervention needs (expected numbers per 
Monte Carlo simulation) 
Crep 20 30 40 56 71 80 
Expected number of 
Failures 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Losses of functionality 0.43 0.28 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.04 
Interventions 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.5 2.0 
Restored capacity units 39 45 50 58 65 69 
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Figure 1. System’s capacity evolution with time for Crep=20 (one corrective repair performed). 
In the simulation of Fig. 2 (Crep=40), after damage is accumulated due to 4 shocks 
sustained by the system, a preventive repair is carried out at t≈85 years. The single 
shock that arrives after the repair (at t≈90 years) does not cause any functionality loss 
or failure. Notice, however, that the additional damage accumulated due to the shock 
at t≈90 years would cause loss of system functionality without the early repair at t≈85 
years. Nevertheless, the use of a Crep-value that is greater than Cfunc does not 
guarantee that functionality loss or failure will never occur. In the simulation of Fig. 3 
(again with Crep=40), the system becomes non-operational after the 4-th shock 
sustained at t≈68 years, therefore corrective repair is needed. This happens because 
the size of the shock at t≈68 years is large enough to jump over the capacity range 
(20-40) activating the choice for preventive repair. A choice of Crep≥62 would prevent 
the loss of system functionality experienced in this simulation. 
Figure 2. System’s capacity evolution with time for Crep=40 (one preventive repair performed). 
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Figure 3. System’s capacity evolution with time for Crep=40 (one corrective repair performed). 
In the simulation of Fig. 4 (Crep=56), two system repairs are performed. At t≈47 
years, the 3rd shock sustained by the system results in loss of functionality and 
induces the need for corrective repair. At t≈90 years, after two more shocks, a 
preventive repair is also carried out. Thus, in general, a mix of intervention actions 
(preventive repairs/corrective repairs/reconstructions) could be activated at a single 
simulation depending in any case on the way damage accumulates with time. Note 
that, with a choice of Crep=65, the loss of system functionality at t≈47 years would be 
prevented, while another two preventive repairs would be performed until the end of 
the system’s lifetime, avoiding this way any occurrence of non-operational or failed 
condition. 
Figure 4. System’s capacity evolution with time for Crep=56 (one corrective and one preventive repair 
performed). 
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6. Concluding remarks
This paper presents an assessment of the effectiveness of preventive repairs on the 
lifetime performance and required interventions of an engineering system degrading 
over time due to random shocks. In an effort to prevent loss of system functionality 
and/or failure, a repair threshold is introduced to identify the need for early 
intervention on the system. This preventive repair approach improves the 
performance of the system in terms of its probabilities to be in a failed and/or non-
operational condition within its lifetime. However, the overall required numbers and 
extent of interventions are increased. The current work provides a quantitative 
demonstration of this trade-off relationship. Reliable quantitative data for system 
behaviour and intervention needs form the basis for the optimal allocation of 
available funding to cost-effectively maintain infrastructure networks or stocks 
comprising of various individual systems (e.g. Faddoul et al., 2013; Charmpis & 
Dimitriou, 2015; Sánchez-Silva et al., 2016). 
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Abstract 
An approach is developed to assess network connectivity using basic concepts 
borrowed and adapted from graph theory and reliability theory. The basic concepts 
are the “Network Diameter” and the “Critical Transitions”. The approach is called 
Topological Binary Modelling. 
Based on the network diameter concept, a connectivity metric is then introduced, 
called the “nominal connectivity order”.  
The critical transitions are those resulting in a degradation in the connectivity of the 
network. Critical transitions increase the connectivity order. Higher connectivity 
order denotes lower network connectivity. Subsequently, it denotes lower 
operability/performance quality. 
Having identified the critical transitions corresponding to a given connectivity order, 
the approach determines the likelihood of the occurrence of the critical transitions. 
One can then assess the network degradation probability with the time.  
Keywords: network, connectivity, binary, topological, critical transition 
1. Generalities and Basic Notions
An approach is developed to assess the connectivity of a network using classical 
concepts borrowed from reliability theory and graph theory. The first concept is the 
concept of “critical transitions”. A critical transition is the transition that leads to a 
degradation in the network overall connectivity state. The approach measures the 
network overall connectivity state using the “nominal connectivity state”. 
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The nominal connectivity state is defined as the state of connectivity of the network 
when all the nodes and the edges are available, as fixed by the designer and accepted 
by the operator.  
The approach uses the well-known Node-to-Node model to work out a global 
connectivity measure as the target of the approach to assess the network overall 
connectivity state using a systematic modelling process.  
A connectivity metric is then introduced, called the “nominal connectivity order-
NCO”. The NCO is the minimum order at which each node in the network is 
connected to all the others. The approach starts from the binary topological 
description using the “adjacency matrix” and proceeds to the determination of higher 
connectivity orders, using elementary tensor notations.  
The definition of the NCO allows determining the degradation in the network 
connectivity due to losses of nodes and edges. This allows in turn to determine the 
critical transitions as the transitions that increase the connectivity order. Connectivity 
orders higher than the NCO denotes a degradation in the network overall 
connectivity. The approach uses logical cut-sets (paths) to determine the critical 
transitions.  
Once, the NCO of the net is determined and the corresponding critical transitions are 
identified, the approach determines the likelihood of the critical transitions and 
permits assessing the network degradation probability with the time. 
The details of the approach as schematically presented above is detailed below in the 
same chronological order. 
1. Network Overall Connectivity
Following the notations of the graph theory, a graph ),( ENG  is composed of N
nodes (vertices) connected through a set of E  edges (links). The set of edges E  
contains all existing links in the network. Formally, the link ( )jil ,  denotes a direct link 
),( ji  while { }jil ,  denotes an indirect link ),( ji , between the two nodes i  and j .in the 
paper, we will denote links without brackets such as jil , . The distinction between 
direct and indirect link is signalled by the order of the corresponding tensor 
describing the link, as will be explain later.  
There are many useful metrics to measure graph connectivity. Among the well-known 
are degree distribution (Barabasi, 1999), characteristic path length (Watts, 1998), 
graph diameter [8] and clustering coefficient (Albert, 2002). These measures provide 
a useful set of statistics for comparing power grids with other graph structures. 
The “graph diameter” is amongst the basic notations of the graph theory. It does 
particularly interest us. For any pairs of nodes i  and j  N∈ , let ji,δ  denotes the path 
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between i  and j . The diameter D  of the graph G  is defined as the max of all ji,δ , { }NjiD ji ∈= ,/max ,δ . D  is the highest of the lowest paths.
In this paper, a concept derived from the diameter D  is used and measured using a 
metric called the “nominal connectivity order” and is explained in the following.  
2. Network Connectivity Order
The “connectivity order” of a network is a metric proposed to measure the global 
connectivity of a graph. 
In §2.1, the notion of the 1st order “binary connectivity tensor” is established based on 
the “adjacency matrix” from graph theory.  
In §2.2, the process of determining the higher order “binary connectivity tensors” is 
explained.  
In §2.3, the notion of the network nominal connectivity order, NCO, is introduced. 
2.1 Network Binary Topological Description 
Following the graph theory, we use the “adjacency matrix- A ” to describe the 
topology of a given network such as: 1
, jie = 1 if nodes i  and j  are directly connected, 
otherwise 1
, jie = 0 ( )Nji ∈, . The exponent 1 in 1, jie  denotes that it is a 1st order
connectivity element, i.e. it describes a direct link between the nodes i  and j . 
The topological mapping of the network, presented in Figure 1, is given in Table 1. 
The 1st order mapping represents the network as it should be in its nominal operability 
state. It is the nominal operability state after the design specifications, accepted by the 
operator and approved by other stakeholders. As one can see, not all the nodes are 
directly connected. However, all the nodes are still connected but at “higher 
connectivity orders”. The idea, now, is how to determine in systematic way these 
existing higher connectivity orders.  
2.2 Network Higher Connectivity Orders 
Many nodes are not connected at the 1st order level, i.e. not directly connected. They 
have 1
, jie =0. However, they are connected at higher orders, determined as following. 
Let 1+niju  ( )Nji ∈,  be the connectivity tensor describing the ( )thn 1+  connectivity
order between nodes and is determined following after (Eid, 2012) and (Eid, 2013), as 
following: 
n
ljil
n
ij eeu •=
+ 11 (1) 
Where, nljil ee •
1 n
mjim
n
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n
ji
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Once, 1+niju  is determined, one proceeds to the determination of 
1
,
+n
jie  as following: 
1+n
ije =




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>=
==
==
+
+
01
00
0
1
1
n
ij
n
ij
uif
uif
jiif
, and ,...3,2,1=n  (2) 
We, then, proceed to determining the minimum connectivity order of each couple of 
nodes, jin , , i.e. to determine the minimum value of n  at which the value of the binary 
tensor n jie ,  switches to one for each couple in the net. 
One can follow the evolution of the binary connectivity tensor in the tables from (1-a) 
to (1-e) related to the network described in Figure 1. As an example, for the couple of 
nodes 4 and 6, the minimum connectivity order is 3, i.e. 01 6,4 =e  and 0
2
6,4 =e  but 
16,4 =
ne
 for all 3≥n . Each couple of nodes has, then, its characteristic minimum 
connectivity order. 
Having designed a systematic process to determine higher connectivity order tensors 
and the characteristic minimum connectivity order of each of nodes, we are going to 
define a metric to measure the network overall connectivity in the following section, 
§2.3.
2.3 Network Nominal Connectivity Order 
Having determined the minimum connectivity order of each couple of nodes jin ,
Nji ∈, , one may be at that stage interested in establishing a measure of the network 
overall connectivity state.  
The approach proposes a metric for measuring the network overall connectivity  and 
denote it by the “Nominal Connectivity Order-NCO”. The NCO is the lowest 
connectivity order, { }Njin ji ∈,,min , , at which each node is connected to all the
others at which each node is connected to all others. Higher is the NCO, lower is the 
network connectivity quality.  
The network overall connectivity quality decreases with the increase of the 
connectivity order and inversely. The network overall connectivity state is, also, 
directly related to the “network operability/performance state” that can be defined as 
“the likelihood” of the network to be in nominal operation mode at instant “t”. 
Ultimately, the highest operability is attended when 11 =ije  for all the nodes. 
The NCO is the connectivity order at which the network’s operability complies with 
the design requirements & specifications and consented by the operator and other 
concerned stakeholders. The network given in Fig.1 has a NCO equal to five while 
the corresponding graph diameter is three. The network contains 10 nodes and 15 
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edges. If each node was directly connected with all the others, the network would 
have had 45 edges. At a connectivity order equal to five, each node is connected with 
all the others. At that level of connectivity, each node sees the 14 other nodes, in the 
network described in Figure 1.  
Once the NCO concept is well established and determined, one can proceed to the 
determination of the “critical transitions”.  
3. Critical Transitions
Critical transitions are those transitions (failures/reparations of elementary 
components such as nodes/links) that result in a change (a decrease/an increase) in the 
network NCO. According to reliability theory, all failures/reparations of an 
elementary component that does not impact on the network NCO are not critical 
transitions.  
It worth underlining that the approach is limited to the coherent networks in the sense 
of “reliability theory”. A network is coherent if no failure of any elementary 
component can improve (/decrease) the network connectivity order and no reparation 
of any elementary component can degrade (/increase) the network connectivity order.  
4. Determination of Critical Transition Sets
The sets of critical transition can then be determined simply by switching each 1st 
order tensor 11 =ije , and all possible combinatory of them, to zero, and examine the 
impact on the network nominal transition order. 
Accordingly, one can determine the logical cut-sets leading to critical transitions. As 
demonstrated in the application given below in §6, one can identify cut-sets according 
to their orders.  
5. Critical Transition Likelihood
Once the critical transition sets are identified, one can determine the probability of 
“losing the nominal connectivity” of a given network and its time profile. Given that 
the nominal connectivity is directly linked to the nominal operability/performance of 
the network. One needs certainly to know failure and repair rates of each link and 
node in the network. 
The case study will demonstrate these practical aspects. 
6. A Case Study
A network is described in Figure 1 and mapped in Table 1-a by its adjacency matrix. 
In the Tables 1-a to 1-e, one can follow the evolution of the connectivity order of the 
network.  
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The logical cut-sets leading to the critical transitions are then identified in the 
following sections and classified according to their orders: 1st order cut-sets, 2nd order 
cut-sets, etc. In our case study, one cannot expect a cut set equal to or higher than 5, 
Table 2.  
Generally, the determination of the logical cut-sets is not an easy task for large 
networks. Many valuable R&D research work is available in the literature regarding 
algorithms to determine logical cut-sets in large networks (Guangban Bai et al., 
2016). 
6.1 1st Order Cut-Sets
Three transitions have been identified in the 1st order minimal cut-set. Any loss of 
these identified links results in a loss in the NCO. The set of the 1st order critical 
transitions, 1S , is described by: 
8,66,12,1
1 lllS ++= (3) 
Where; jil ,  refers to the loss of the link between nodes ),( ji  while “• ” and “ + ” are 
the Boolean operators intersection “ ∩ ” and union “ ∪ ”, respectively. 
6.2 2nd Order Cut-Sets
Similarly, the set of the 2nd order logical cut-sets, 2S , is described by: 
2S ( ) ( ) ( )10,710,17,610,110,310,1 llllll •+•+•=
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )8,55,25,45,210,35,29,25,2 llllllll •+•+•+•+
( ) ( ) ( )9,89,29,49,210,39,2 llllll •+•+•+ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )9,44,35,44,310,34,37,34,3 llllllll •+•+•+•+
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )9,87,310,77,37,67,38,57,310,37,3 llllllllll •+•+•+•+•+ ( )10,710,3 ll •+( ) ( )8,55,49,45,4 llll •+•+ ( )9,89,4 ll •+ ( )9,88,5 ll •+ ( )10,77,6 ll •+
(4) 
6.3 3rd Order Cut-Sets
In the category of the 3rd order transitions, the set of triplet failure cut-set is empty. 
3S φ=  
6.4 4th Order Cut-Sets
In this category, one can identify four logical cut-sets. The set of 4th order transitions, 
4S , is defined as following: 
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4S ( )9,84,35,210,1 llll •••= ( )8,54,39,210,1 llll •••+ ( )9,87,64,35,2 llll •••+
( )7,68,54,39,2 llll •••+ . (5) 
10 
8 
6 
7 
5 
9 
1 
3 
2 
4 
Fig. (1) 
A schematic representation of a network 
1
ije 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
4 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
5 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
7 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
8 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
9 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
10 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Table (1-a) 
The binary topological connectivity tensor (1st order) 
2
ije 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
3 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
5 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
6 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
7 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
8 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
9 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
10 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Table (1-b) 
The binary topological connectivity tensor (2nd order) 
3
ije 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
3 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
4 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
5 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
6 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
8 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
9 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
10 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Table (1-c) 
The binary topological connectivity tensor (3rd order) 
4
ije 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
5 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
9 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Table (1-d) 
The binary topological connectivity tensor (4th order) 
5
ije 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Table (1-e) 
The binary topological connectivity tensor (5th order) 
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6.5 Loss of Nominal Operability Expression 
Having identified the totality of the critical transitions and determined the 
corresponding logical cut-sets, one can proceed to assess the probability of the event 
“Loss of Nominal Operability” of the network.  
The overall network set of critical transitions is: 
S 4321 SSSS +++= . (6) 
Where; ns  refers to the set of critical subsets of the thn  order and “ + ” is the 
Boolean operators and union “ ∪ ”.  
The loss of nominal operability, S , is logically described by 32 logical cut-sets, Table 
2.  
Table 2: Number of critical cut sets classified according to their order. 
1st Order 2nd Order 3rd Order 4th Order 
Cut-sets 3 25 0 4 
6.6 Loss of Nominal Operability Probability 
For simplicity sack, we assume that: nodes do not fail and links are identical. The 
application involves identical links whose failure rates are equal to 1410 −− h  and treats 
two situations: with repair rates equal to 110 10
−−
= hµ  and with stressed repair rates 
equal to 1310 −−= hstressedµ . This is expressing two operating situations, respectively: 
the normal operation situation and a crisis situation (the network is stressed by a 
threat). The likelihood of the loss of the NCO in both situations are compared in 
Figure 2-a. The time profiles are almost similar in both situations, for short time, but 
significantly diverse after 10 hrs. The asymptotic likelihood of losing the NCO 
increases by almost two decades under stress. 
We may take advantage of the assumption that links are identical, as well, and 
express the loss of nominal operability as a function of one-single link failure 
probability (S-L unavailability), Figure 2-b.  The resultant profile, Figure 2-b is a 
characteristic curve. It characterises this specific network.  
This academic case study demonstrates the applicability of the binary topological 
model and gives some indications about its originality and potentialities.  
We would still like to put the proposed model in comparison with some other well-
known and widely used approaches in network robustness/connectivity analysis. 
However, an exhaustive comparative assessment is out of scope for this introductory 
paper.  
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A more exhaustive comparative study should be the subject of a specific paper to 
prepare.  In the following section §7, we report on a brief comparative assessment 
with the “effective graph resistance” approach, widely used to assess network 
robustness.   
7. Comparison with the Effective Graph Resistance Approach
The effective graph resistance is selected to perform a brief comparative assessment 
with the topological binary model, for two reasons: both are proposing metrics to 
measure the network global connectivity and both use algebraic techniques. 
The use of the tensors of different orders by the topological binary model and the 
graph Laplacian by the effective graph resistance show an evident similarity between 
both models. That would most likely produce a meaningful comparative assessment.   
Ellens et al. (2011) proposed a metric, the effective graph resistance, as highly 
valuable in the analysis of various network problems, such as vulnerability, 
robustness and criticality of the network.  
The notion of effective graph resistance is driven from the field of electric circuit 
analysis where it is defined as the accumulated effective resistance between all pairs 
of some given vertices. The effective graph resistance is also called Kirchhoff index, 
named after Kirchhoff’s circuit laws.  
The fundamental notions of the effective graph resistance are briefly laid down in the 
following section before proceeding to the comparison between both approaches.  
7.1 Definition of Effective Graph Resistance 
The formal definition of the effective graph resistance is the sum of pairwise effective 
resistances, which measures, in some way, the connectivity between two vertices 
(Klein et al., 1993) . The pairwise effective resistance takes both the number of paths 
between any two vertices and their length into account. Subsequently, the number of 
back-up paths as well as their quality is considered (Ellens et al., 2011). 
For a simple undirected graph ),( EVG =  the Laplacian Q  is defined as the 
difference A−∆  of the vertices degree matrix ∆  and the adjacency matrix A , such 
as: 





∈−
=
=
otherwise   ,0
, j)(i, if     ,1
, if      ,
E
ji
Q
ii
ij
δ
 
(7) 
Where iiδ  is degree of vertex i. 
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Figure 2-a. Loss of the NCO time profile (λ = 10–4h–1). 
Figure 2-b. The loss of the network NCO vs the single link unavailability. 
For a graph with non-negative weights ijw of edges, the weighted Laplacian 
WSL −= , where W  is the weighted matrix ijw  and S  is the diagonal matrix of 
strengths ∑
=
=
N
j
ijii ws
1
. 
A good survey on the Laplacian is given in Mohar (1991) while more information 
about graph spectra are available in P. Van Mieghem (2011).  
For our purpose, we have applied the graph Laplacian, Eq.(7), rather than the 
weighted Laplacian.  
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The effective resistance Rij between nodes i and j is computed as: 
+++ +−= jjijiiij QQQR 2 , (8) 
where Q+ is the generalized inverse of Q obtained by the Penrose pseudo-inverse 
operator (Moore, 1920). Subsequently, the effective graph resistance RG of a network 
is computed by summing up all the effective resistances between all pairs in a 
network 
∑∑
= =
=
N
i
N
j
ijG RR
1 1
. (9) 
Ellens et al. (2011) suppose that the effective graph resistance is a good measure for 
network “robustness”.  
However, it is important to understand how Ellens et al. use the term “robustness”. 
Ellens (Ellens et al., 2011) states that “the effective graph resistance strictly decreases 
when edges are added or edge weights are increased.  
Algebraic connectivity for example does not show this strict monotonicity” and adds 
“complete graphs are most robust, unconnected graphs least, trees are the least robust 
connected graphs, star graphs are the most robust trees, and path graphs are the least 
robust.” 
Indeed, Ellens et al. use “robustness” to express the “connectivity”: “adding edges” or 
“increasing edges weight.”  
We will use the term “connectivity” rather than “robustness” because it is in fact the 
object of our measuring efforts. Still, we admit that higher is the connectivity of a 
network, higher is its robustness. But, network robustness is not just a connectivity.   
7.2 Critical Transitions Identification via Effective Graph Resistance 
The effective graph resistance can then be used to determine the criticality of 
components in a network as used by Koc et al. (2014). The criticality of a link l in a 
network G is determined by the relative increase in the effective graph resistance 
∆RG(l) that is caused by the failure of link l: 
,)(
G
GlG
G R
RRlR −=∆ −
 (10) 
where RG – l is the effective graph resistance of the network that is obtained from G by 
removing particular link l. The most critical links are associated to the highest 
increase in the effective graph resistance ∆R.  
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7.3 Verification of Critical Transitions Identification via Effective Graph 
Resistance (A Case Study) 
Connectivity order was calculated for network described and mapped in Figure 1 in 
each case, when one link (M – 1 analysis) or couple of links (all possible 
combinations; M – 2 analysis) are assumed to be failed; here M is the number of links 
/ edges in the network.  
Ranks were assigned to the links and the couples of links regarding the connectivity 
order, i.e., the loss of link l1,2 or l6,8 leads to a connectivity order equal to seven, thus, 
ranks of these links are equal to 1.5, rank of link l1,6 is equal to 3 (connectivity order 
is equal to 6), and so on. Ranks of all 15 links are presented in Figure 3, ranks of 
couples of links (associated to the increase in connectivity order, but excluding 
combinations containing links l1,2, l1,6 and l6,8) are presented in Figure 4.  
On the other hand, effective graph resistance was calculated in each case, when one 
link or couple of links (all possible combinations) are assumed to be failed, as well, 
and compared with the nominal RG of the initial network (Figure 1).  
All links and couples of links were ranked: link (and couple of links) associated to the 
highest increase in effective graph resistance has rank equal to 1, and so on. Ranks 
(up to the increase in the effective graph resistance ∆R) of all 15 links and couples of 
links which belong to the set of the 2nd order critical transitions ( 2S ) are presented in 
Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively. 
The correspondence of the results obtained by both approaches can be assessed by 
rank’s correlation. Aiming at this, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients were 
calculated (see Table 3).  
Figure 3. Ranks of all 15 links of the network. 
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Figure 4. Ranks of couples of links, which belong to the set of the 2nd order critical transitions. 
Table 3: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients (or Spearman’s rho). 
Case of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient p-value 
“M – 1” analysis 0.456 0.047 
“M – 2” analysis 0.521* 7.4·10–6 
* ranks of all combinations (66, in total) were used to calculate Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.
The results (in Table 3) reveal that the correlation can be flagged as significant, since 
p-value α≤ , if the level of significance 05.0=≤ α . It proves that the variation in the 
graph resistance aligns with the results obtained by the approach based on nominal 
connectivity order. 
8. Conclusions
A model is proposed and characterised by: the use of an algebraic metric to measure 
the network connectivity and the use of the critical transition notion. The model 
allows then to assess the network connectivity and determine the likelihood of the 
network nominal operability. We call it “the binary topological model”. 
An academic case study is used in order to illustrate the capability of the binary 
topological model. A comparison with the effective graph resistance approach is 
carried on, using the same case study. 
The effective graph resistance approach was selected because it seemed to be the 
closest to the binary topological model, in terms of the use of an algebraic metric in 
measuring the network connectivity. It is also one of the most cited approaches in 
assessing the connectivity of networks. 
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The comparison between the results of both approaches proved a significant 
correlation according to Spearman’s rank correlation analysis. However, it is worthy 
underlying the following differences between both models: 
• the binary topological model allows dynamic calculations of the network
operational nominal performance and connectivity,
• the binary topological model results seem more self-consistent.
Regarding the dynamic aspect, the effective graph resistance does not allow in its 
present state of progress the performance of a time-dependant connectivity modelling. 
Regarding the consistency of the results of each approach separately, the results of 
binary topological model seems self-consistent. For example, a clear clustering is 
observed, Figure 3, in three sets:  
• 2,1l  and 8,6l ; whose separate failures increase the connectivity order from 5 to 7,
expressing a degradation of 2 levels in the network connectivity;
• 6,1l ; whose failure increase the connectivity order from 5 to 6, expressing a
degradation of 1 level in the network connectivity;
• All the others (12 edges) whose failures don’t result in any critical transition.
The effective graph resistance model distinguishes significantly between the edges 
4,3l  and 10,7l  while the failure of both have the same consequences on the network 
connectivity as shown by the binary topological model, Figure 3. That seems 
inconsistent.  
The self-consistency of binary topological model is confirmed, as well, when 
assessing the ranking of cut-sets of 2nd order, Figure 4. 
The binary topological model approach seems promising. Still, more formal 
investigations are necessary in order to explore all its potentialities and limitations. 
These necessary additional investigations will be the subject of separate papers. 
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Abstract 
 For services supply continuity in critical system several works should be performed 
by one repair brigade in crossed time. And conditions for performing different repair 
works are characterized by uncertainties. There exists given term for each work and 
possible damages if the performance of works isn’t well-timed. Taking into account 
these factors the sequence of performing heterogeneous repair work essentially 
influences the security and/or efficiency of system. For systems the method of 
sequence rationale to perform heterogeneous repair works in time are proposed. The 
rational sequence of works is defined by criteria of timeliness on the base of the best 
choice from different dispatcher technologies and the used parameters (such as 
distribution work calls types on priorities, distribution of calls priorities on groups, 
appointment of technologies inside of groups). Effects are demonstrated by example.   
Keywords: criteria, efficiency, model, probability, repair,  system, technology, 
timeliness .
1. Introduction
For critical system  a necessity of performing in time a set of heterogeneous repair 
work to services supply continuity exists. In practice the sequence of calls performing 
is defined, as a rule, by the repair brigade (as it is conveniently) or under subjective 
chief instructions. In practice fop system preparedness there is no purposeful system 
coordination with background, frequency of occurrence of those or other 
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heterogeneous calls, time of performance of repair work, the possible missed benefit, 
losses or damages which can follow because of delays and exceeding of repair terms. 
In the present article a possibility of enhancing system preparedness is researched. 
Dozens years ago the queueing theory repair brigades were considered only as 
examples of serving systems for performing the flow of repair calls [1-4]. Here are 
researched the multiparameter dispatcher technology allowing to combine existing 
technologies, the formal requirements to timeliness of performing repair works, the 
criterion and the method to optimize sequence of performing heterogeneous repair 
work.  The method is based on comparison and rational use of essentially differing 
properties of usual dispatcher technologies with relative and absolute priorities, 
technology of batch performing and the proposed multiparameter technology with a 
combination of the listed technologies (the two last technologies have been 
researched earlier by authors of this article in another applications [3, 5-6,8-23]).  
2. About the criterion of timeliness
In practice an exceeding of repair terms may lead to problems with system security 
end efficiency, to  possible losses or damages which can follow because of delays.  In 
general cases the criteria of timeliness in conditions of uncertainties are defined 
formally as follows. 
Definition of criterion 1. Works of i-th type are considered to be well-timed if average 
full performing time of calls of i-th type taking into account delays does not exceed 
set Тgiven.i ,  i.e. if Тfull.i1Тgiven.i.. 
Definition of criterion 2. Works of i-th type are considered to be well-timed, if 
probability of well-timed performing works by calls of i-th type during the required 
term Tgiven i is not below against admissible probability Рtim.i=Р (tfull.iТgiven.i) Рadm.i 
where the random variable tfull.i characterizes full time of performing works of i-th 
type taking into account delays.  
An example of formal probability interpretation of criterion 1 and 2 in application to 
different types of works (types from 1 to I) is illustrated by Figure 1. The timeliness 
for repair works of i-th type is estimated by probability values: for criterion 1 - Тfull.i
the 1st moment (average) of full performing time of calls of i-th type taking into 
account delays; for criterion 2 - Ptimi(Tgiven i) – probability of well-timed performing 
works by calls of i-th type during the required term Tgiven i. If Ri(Тgiven.i) is probability 
of exceeding requirements to timeliness of performing calls of i-th type, than 
Ri(Тgiven.i)=1-Рtim.i(Тgiven.i), A risk of exceeding requirements to timeliness is estimated 
considering damages. 
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Figure 1. An example of formal illustration of criterion 1 and 2 
The criterion 2 sets more hard terms (as a rule Рadm.i 0.8) and is used when 
completion of calls works should be finished strictly before required time. 
3. About ideas for improving repair works in time and enhancing
system preparedness in conditions of uncertainty 
3.1 Analysis of typical and proposed dispatcher technologies 
The typical mode of repair for systems is the following. The repair brigade performs 
gathered calls for operating repair during a shift (or several shifts). A shift can 
proceed day, half-day, 8 hours or other established period of time. In a context of this 
approach brigades are considered as one continuously working brigade for serial 
performing calls for repair works.  I.e. the brigade operates as one-linear system of 
serial service of calls flow. For large systems calls queue can be accumulated. The 
formal order of a choice from queue a following repair call is called dispatcher 
technology.  
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Leaving behind brackets subjective reasons and momentary preferences, we will 
consider 4 typical dispatcher technologies and their special properties and propose the 
5-th multiparameter dispatcher technology. 
According to the technology 1 (Techn.1) all calls are performed by the consecutive 
order “first in - first out” (FIFO) without priorities. Its main property is the average 
delays for all calls are identical. According to the technology 2 (Techn.2) calls are 
performed with relative priorities. Calls of higher priority have advantage against calls 
of the lowest priority, namely: among the calls waiting the beginning of performing, calls 
of higher priority are performed ahead of calls of the lower priority. The calls with the 
similar priority are performed in the order FIFO. The call of higher priority can’t 
interrupt the call performing with lower priority. It means, that the brigade always leads 
up the begun repair to the end, despite of new call with higher priority. The main 
valuable property of technology 2 that average delays of repair by calls of the lowest 
priority are in 3-5 times above (at high loading can be 10 times more), than delays of 
calls of the higher priority. According to the technology 3 (Techn.3) calls are 
performed with absolute priorities. In difference from technology 2 new calls of 
higher priority absolutely interrupt performing of call with a lower priority. The calls 
with the similar priority are performed in the order FIFO. The interrupted call will be 
completed from the interrupted point. It means after receiving new call with higher 
priority the brigade interrupts the begun repair for call with lower priority. And the 
brigade carries out the completion of the begun repair after the completion of all arrived 
calls with the higher priorities. The main valuable property of technology 3 that average 
delays of repair by calls of the lowest priority are in 10-20 times above (at high loading 
can be more), than delays of calls of the higher priority. 
According to the batch technology 4 (Techn.4) calls are performed with natural 
formation of batches and relative priorities in a batch. The first arrived call forms the 
first batch. The next batch is formed of the calls which have arrived during total 
performing time of the previous batch. The next batch of calls starts to be served at once 
after complete performing all calls of the previous batch. In the batch which has arrived 
on service, the first call of the highest priority begin to perform. After finishing the 
complete performance this call another batch calls are performed in serial order  FIFO. 
Repair by all calls which have entered into the served batch, is carried out without 
interruptions irrespective of new arriving calls. The main valuable property of 
technology 4 consists in the following. If for technologies 2 and 3 calls of the higher 
priority have overwhelming advantage for technology 4 this advantage is sharply 
reduced. As a result average delays of calls of the lowest priority considerably decrease 
and exceed delays of calls of the higher priority no more, than in 3 times. This valuable 
property can be effectively used in the technology 5 allowing to combine  technologies 2, 
3 and 4. 
The proposed Technology 5 (Techn.5) is a combination of technologies 2, 3, 4. For 
Technology 5 all calls are divided on n groups. Calls of the g-th group have higher 
priority than calls of the e-th group if g<e (e, g = 1,…, n).  In each group priorities of 
calls are relative. For performing calls of g-й groups one technology (2 or 4) is 
established. Between calls e-й and g-й groups are appointed relative (by technology 
2) or absolute priorities (by technology 3) – see Figure 2.
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Figure 2. The structure of the proposed combined Technology 5 
As a result, by optimization of parameters (such as distribution calls types on 
priorities, distribution of calls priorities on groups, appointment of technologies inside 
of groups) the combined Technology 5 is capable to possess in various degree 
valuable properties of technologies 2, 3, 4 to meet the given requirements for 
timeliness (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. The properties of technologies 1-5 which affect time delays 
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As a result of comparison by using formal criteria for each shift the most rational 
technology and optimizing parameters (i.e. sequence of calls performing), on which 
the minimum of negative consequences is reached at limitations on admissible time 
for performing heterogeneous repair works, can be revealed – see Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Illustration of a role and a place of dispatcher technologies in performance of repair work 
For systems for which delays in performing repair works are insignificant, there may 
not be high practical effect from use of the proposed ideas (it should be estimated 
additionally). 
4. Formalization for estimation of possible delays
From the point of engineering view the processes of performing  repair works by one 
brigade are formalized as serving processes of Poisson flows of heterogeneous calls 
in one-linear system (М/G/1/) [1-6] with dispatcher technologies 1-5. Heterogeneity 
of repair work is shown in various average time of calls processing and-or in various 
admissible terms for calls completion considering delays. 
Calls flows of the same type as a rule constitute a compound flow from different 
sources.  In practice, each flow intensity is very low in comparison with the 
compound flow. In such a situation theorem of Hinchin-Grigolionis [7] is applicable, 
according to which the compound flow is a Poisson flow. 
For investigated typical Technologies 1-5 the full delays  in performing calls of i-th 
type are estimated by  probability Ptimi(Tgiven i) of well-timed performing during the 
required term Tgiven i, approximated by means of incomplete gamma function: 
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 (1) 
Where 
Here Тfull.i and Тfull.i2 are according to the 1st and 2nd moments of full performing 
time of calls of i-th type taking into account delays. For estimations of these metrics 
(Тfull.i and Тfull.i2) with reference to technologies 1, 2 and 3 it is purposed to use 
classical models of the queueing theory [1-2, 4]. For technology 4 and 5 the formulas 
received earlier in the works of this paper [3, 5-6, 8-23] are applicable. Thus as input 
let know enough frequencies of arriving calls (λi) and average time of performing 
calls of i-th type (βi1). Evaluations can be carried out with use of software tools 
complexes, for example, the software tools Complex for Evaluation of Information 
Systems Operation Quality (CEISOQ) - “know how” (registered by Rospatent 
N2000610272), “Mathematical modelling of system life cycle processes” – “know 
how” (registered by Rospatent N2004610858), “Complex for evaluating quality of 
production processes” (registered by Rospatent N2010614145) [8-23]. 
5. Formalization of a problem of optimization
The following statement of a problem to optimize a sequence of performing 
heterogeneous repair work is proposed.A sequence of performing heterogeneous 
repair work is the most rational for a repair brigade according to the technology (from 
technologies 1-5) and with those parameters on which the minimum of the missed 
benefit, losses or damages (further - a total expected damage) is reached. The next 
formalization is proposed: to find minimum of a total expected damage at limitations 
on admissible time for performing heterogeneous repair works set by criterion 1 or 2 
and define the best technology and its parameters minimizing 
Where λi – frequency of arriving calls of i-th type, λ = ∑ λi I𝑖=1 ;
Ri(Тgiven.i) – probability of exceeding requirements to timeliness of performing calls 
of i-th type, Ri(Тgiven.i) =1-Рtim.i(Тgiven.i), Ptimi(Tgiven i) – probability of well-timed 
performing works by calls of i-th type during the required term Tgiven i ; 
Ui – the expected value of the missed benefit, losses or damages as a result of 
exceeding requirements to timeliness of performing calls of i-th type; 
Ind(α1)=1 if the criterion of timeliness 1 is used, else Ind(α1)=0; Ind(α2)=1 if the 
criterion of timeliness 2 is used, else Ind(α2)=0.  
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The decision of the problem is carried out by modelling and estimation of values 
Ri(Тgiven.i) =1 - Рtim.i(Тgiven.i) with use of the formula (1) by search of all possible 
dispatcher technologies and variants of parameters (such as distribution calls types on 
priorities, distribution of calls priorities on groups, appointment of technologies inside 
of groups). The most rational sequence of performing heterogeneous repair work is 
the sequence that corresponds to dispatcher technology with the parameters for which 
the total expected damage is minimal. 
At formation of input data for evaluation the frequency of arriving calls of i-th type is 
defined for the last period of time (for example, for a week or month with proper 
quantity of calls about repair) as the relation of quantity of calls to duration of the 
taken period. The decision of an optimization problem is carried out before the 
beginning of each shift and is valid during the shift.  
6. Example of enhancing system preparedness
Researches and development of deposits of hydrocarbons on various depths of Arctic 
Ocean and in hard uncertainties for security and efficiency is expected. Presence of 
various threats generates diverse natural and techno-genic risks. Let's put, the large 
enterprise of oil & gas developments and searches the ways of increasing system 
efficiency and security at the expense of decreasing costs of operating repair. For the 
enterprise 8 types of repair work are peculiar. Let’s the exceeding of given terms 
conducts to the missed benefit equally on each type of repair, i.e. Ui = U. The repair 
brigade performs works consequently by Technologies 1-3 or by batch Technology 4 
(forming batches of arrived calls and performing works without interruptions). It is 
required to do optimization of sequence of performing heterogeneous repair work and 
to estimate effects reached. Input for calculation Тfull.i and Рtim.i(Тgiven.i) is reflected by 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Input for calculation 
i Type of repair work Frequency 
of calls 
λi 
Average 
time of 
performing 
calls 
Admissible 
time 
Тgiven.i 
Admissible 
probability 
for timeliness 
Рadm.i (Тgiven.i) 
1 To repair and adapt  equipment for 
occurrence of the extreme dangerous 
and catastrophic phenomena at Arctic 
ocean and their influences on sea 
activity and economic objects of a 
coastal zone  
1 day
-1
 1 hour 8 hours 0.95 
2 To repair and adapt  equipment for 
complex control sea and coastal 
ecological systems 
10 week
-1
 2 hours 8 hours 0.90 
3 To repair and adapt  equipment for 
geological-geophysical investigations 
and exploitation of hydrocarbonic 
resources of Arctic ocean 
3 week
-1
 3 hours 12 hours 0.90 
4 To repair and adapt  equipment for 12 week
-1
 3 hours 16 hours 0.80 
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hydrometeorological and a 
geoinformational support of the sea 
activity 
5 To repair and adapt  equipment for 
hydrometeorological and navigating-
hydrographic support of sea activity 
9 week
-1
 4 hours 30 hours 0.80 
6 To repair and adapt  equipment for 
researches of influence of 
hydrometeorological factors on 
efficiency of resources development 
taking into account climate changes 
4 month
-1
 8 hours 33 hours - 
7 To repair equipment for protection of 
the sea environment against 
anthropogenous pollution  
10 year
-1
 10 hours 40 hours - 
8 To repair equipment for researches of 
efficiency of various technologies of 
development of hydrocarbons deposits 
and other minerals on the Arctic shelf 
6 year
-1
 12 hours 44 hours - 
Considering, that the expected value of the missed benefit in the conditions of an 
example is identical (is equal U), the total expected damage can be transformed to a 
form 
(∑ λi Ri(Тgiven. i)Ui I𝑖=1 (Ind(α1)+Ind(α2)))/λ  = U (1-С), 
where C is a relative portion of well-timed performed calls 
For modelling and estimations  software tools complexes CEISOQ [8-23] is used – 
see results on Figure 5. 
Results of the analysis have shown, that at the expense of a choice of rational 
dispatcher Technology 5 and its optimizing parameters relative portion of well-timed 
performed calls in 2-4 times above in comparison with today applied Technologies 1 
and 4. It may be interpret as benefit value in hard conditions of Arctic region. And all 
repair works will be performed in time, system preparedness is enhanced.  
Certainly, in practice different interruptions in works are not always possible (i.e. real 
effect will be a little bit low), nevertheless this effect taking into account real 
limitations can be estimated and it will be essential. So, use of Technology 2 with 
relative priorities, i.e. without interruptions, can’t raise portion of well-timed 
performed calls. 
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Figure 5. Relative portion of well-timed performed calls, 
Technology 5 with optimizing parameters is the best 
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Abstract 
More than 350,000 railway bridges are present on the European railway network, 
making them a key infrastructure of the whole railway network. Railway bridges are 
continuously exposed to changing environmental threats, such as wind, floods and 
traffic load, which can affect safety and reliability of the bridge. Furthermore, a 
problem on a bridge can affect the whole railway network by increasing the 
vulnerability of the geographic area, served by the railway network. In this paper a 
Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) method is presented in order to move from visual 
inspection towards a real time Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) of the bridge. It 
is proposed that the health state of a steel truss bridge is continuously monitored by 
taking account of the health state of each bridge element. In this way, levels of bridge 
deterioration can be identified before they become critical, the risk of direct and 
indirect economic losses can be reduced by defining optimal bridge maintenance 
works, and the reliability of the bridge can be improved by identifying possible 
hidden vulnerabilities among different bridge elements. 
Keywords: Real-time monitoring; Structural Health Monitoring; Bayesian Belief 
Networks; Steel truss bridge.  
1. Introduction
A continuous improvement of the reliability and robustness of the railway system is 
desirable in order to support the continuous expansion of the railway infrastructure 
within the transportation network. Indeed, the daily life of millions of people, and the 
economy of many industrialized countries, strongly depends on the quality of the 
services provided by the railway system, due to the fact that the railway has high load 
capacity and speed, and consequently, new passengers and freight companies are 
using the railways. Railway bridges are a vital element of the railway network as, on 
average, there is one bridge for every 700 meters of the track in the European railway 
network (European Commission, 2012). For these reasons, the railway system and, 
particularly, railway bridges are generally considered as the key system of the 
transportation Critical Infrastructures (CI) (Murray et al., 2007, Johansson et al., 
2013). 
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Railway bridges are designed to operate for a long period of time, for example more 
than 35% of the bridges of the European railway network are over 100 years old, and 
as a consequence, they are exposed to continuously changing environmental threats, 
such as wind and floods, that can affect safety and reliability of the whole railway 
network (Le et al., 2013). Moreover, in order to improve railway capacity, railway 
bridges, especially, old bridges, are being pushed to their physical limit, due to the 
increased transfer speed, train frequency and length (Reyer et al., 2011; Pipinato et 
al., 2016).  
Generally, the health state of the railway bridge is evaluated by visual inspections, 
which are carried out at intervals of one to six years. However, during a visual 
inspection the structure can be examined superficially based on expert knowledge, 
which can be subjective, and thus the outcomes can be significantly variable in terms 
of structural condition assessment (Chase, 2004). Hence, real-time Structural Health 
Monitoring (SHM) methods for railway bridges can significantly improve the 
reliability of the railway network by providing rapid and reliable information to 
decision makers regarding the health state of the bridge, and its elements, by 
considering environmental threats, such as wind, ice, flood, and deterioration 
mechanisms, as part of the analysis (Brownjohn et al., 2013).  
Several SHM studies on railway bridges have been developed in the last years 
(Doebling et al., 1998) (Kim et al., 2015) (Sanayei et al., 2015) by adopting either: i) 
a model-based approach, which relies on the development of a mathematical model of 
the bridge (such as a Finite Element (FE) model), in order to assess the health state of 
the bridge by evaluating the difference between measured and simulated structural 
parameters; ii) a non-model-based method, which relies on the analysis of 
experimental measurements of the bridge in order to assess its health condition. 
Furthermore, ensemble methods, which merge together a FE model updating strategy 
and non-model-based method, have been recently proposed (Zhong et al., 2014; 
Shabbir et al., 2016). Although, computational time and influence of noisy data can 
be of concern in these SHM methods, followed by the main limitation that the bridge 
is not usually studied as a whole system, but the analysis focus is placed on the health 
state of a bridge element (such as abutments, slabs, joints, girder, bearings, etc.). 
However, railway bridges can impact the reliability of the whole transportation 
network, for example a bridge failure can result in the interruption of economic 
activities, by increasing the vulnerability of the geographic area served by the railway 
network (FHWA, 2011). Therefore, it is beneficial to analyse it as a system. Hence, in 
order to ensure safety and reliability of the bridge, and consequently of the whole 
transportation CI, the analysis of the bridge health state should consider the bridge as 
a whole system, by evaluating each bridge element and its interactions with other 
elements, in order to identify possible hidden vulnerabilities and to provide reliable, 
robust and rapid information to the decision maker (Zio, 2016).  
In this paper, an SHM methodology based on a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) 
(Rafiq et al., 2015) method for a truss steel railway bridge is proposed, with the aim 
of assessing the health state of the whole bridge continuously, by taking account of 
the health state of each bridge element. Indeed, an assessment of how a degradation 
mechanism affects the health state of the bridge over time is needed in order to 
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prevent bridge failure. In this way, the risk of direct economic losses, such as bridge 
repair works, and indirect economic losses, such as network unavailability and service 
delays, that can affect the transportation CI after a bridge failure, can be significantly 
reduced by defining an optimal maintenance schedule (Lokuge et al., 2013) 
(Venkittaraman et al., 2014). Furthermore, variations of the bridge behaviour can be 
pointed out by the proposed BBN monitoring method, as soon as they occur. In this 
way, bridge managers can take robust and rapid decisions on whether the bridge 
needs to be take repaired and brought to a new safe condition, or, even if the bridge is 
exposed to some continuous degradation mechanism and environmental threats, the 
safety and reliability are still guaranteed. In the proposed method, a Finite Element 
(FE) model of a truss railway bridge is developed using the SAP2000 software, with 
the aim of calculating the displacements of the bridge elements due to a static load. 
The displacements are used as the evidence of the bridge behaviour and, thus, as the 
input of the BBN. In order to account for the environment effects on the bridge, a 
deterioration mechanism is introduced by modelling the formation and growth of 
micro-cracks at the joints, which are difficult to spot during visual inspections 
(Mehrjoo et al., 2008).  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the proposed methodology and 
describes the FE model, the degradation mechanism and the BBN method; Section 3 
shows the results of a case study; the conclusions and future work are discussed in 
Section 4. 
2. The proposed BBN methodology
A first step towards a real-time monitoring SHM is proposed by developing a BBN, 
in order to provide information to bridge managers about the health state of the 
bridge. In this way, bridge managers are able to take rapid condition-based decisions 
by evaluating whether the bridge needs to be maintained, or its safety and reliability 
are still guaranteed. The proposed method is illustrated by developing an FE model of 
a steel truss railway bridge. The FE model simulates the behaviour of the bridge due 
to external loads, such as the train load, and furthermore, the effect of the micro-
cracks at the joints is analysed as degradation mechanism. A BBN of the bridge is 
then developed by defining one node in the BBN framework for each major element 
of the bridge. The behaviour of the bridge, which is obtained by using the FE model, 
and the information retrieved from interviews with bridge managers and structural 
engineers is used to define the Conditional Probabilities Tables (CPTs) of the BBN. 
The proposed method aims to update the health state of the bridge and of its elements 
automatically, as soon as sensors provide a new measurement of the bridge 
behaviour. As a result, using the BBN the undesired health state of the bridge can be 
pointed out by identifying its most degraded element(s). 
2.1 The steel truss bridge model 
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can be of great importance to bridge owners, for reducing the risk of failure and the 
whole-life cycle cost of the bridge (Katipamula et al., 2005). 
The bridge model, which is developed by using the SAP2000 software, is 30m long, 
7m wide and 8m high, as shown in Figure 1. The components of the bridge have been 
realized considering the S355 steel, as this is the steel commonly used in Europe to 
build steel railway bridges (Pipinato et al., 2016). The bridge is modelled to allow the 
transit of trains in two directions, and consequently two railway tracks have been 
modelled by following the most commonly used dimensions (Country Regional 
Network, 2012). The reference system, used in this paper, is as follows: the side of 
the bridge at y = 0m, is defined the right side of the bridge, whereas at y = 7m is 
defined the left side of the bridge.  
Figure 1. FE model of the steel truss railway bridge 
2.2 The micro-cracks degradation mechanism 
(Mehrjoo et al., 2008) claims that more than 40% of the steel truss bridges are 
affected by the formation of micro-cracks at the joint location, which typically can 
develop around the holes of the bolts or rivets during the assembling phase of the 
bridge. Furthermore, these micro-cracks are difficult to identify during visual 
inspections due to their size, and the limitations of visual inspections, which can 
examine the bridge structure superficially (Chase, 2004). The environmental 
conditions, which continuously affect the bridge elements through the cycle of 
loading and unloading, e.g. trains are continuously passing over the bridge, can lead 
to a continuously increasing size of the micro-cracks. Therefore, the bridge can suffer 
with fatigue unexpectedly.  
The formation and growth of micro-cracks leads to a reduction of the cross sectional 
area at the joints, and consequently, in order to simulate this degradation mechanism, 
in this study, the cross sectional area of the degraded bridge elements has been 
reduced by as much as 30% of its initial value. 
Displacements of the bridge joints are considered as the monitored parameter of the 
bridge behaviour due to the fact that the natural frequency and mode shape analysis 
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have shown to be prone to measurement contamination, and besides displacements 
could be an interesting variable to be monitored in the near future, due to the 
technology improvements of sensors (Doebling et al., 1998) (Zhao et al., 2015). A 
static uniform  
load of 40 kN/m has been applied to the bridge in order to simulate a train, which has 
been stopped on the track, and the displacements at the joints are consequently 
retrieved using the FE model.  
The displacements of the top chord on the right hand side of the bridge that have been 
retrieved using the FE model are depicted in Figure 2. The bridge healthy state is 
shown by the solid line in Figure 2, whereas, the degraded states, due to the reduction 
of the cross sectional area of the truss components by the 10% and the 30% of its 
initial value, are represented by the dotted and dashed lines in Figure 2, respectively. 
The displacements of the degraded top chord are larger than those of the healthy case, 
and, moreover, as the bridge degradation grows, the displacements of the top chord 
on the right hand side of the bridge increase consequently. 
Figure 2. Displacements of the top chord on the right hand side of the bridge model 
2.3 Real-time SHM method based on Bayesian Belief Network 
In order to develop a SHM method for monitoring the health state of the railway 
bridge, a BBN is developed. The BBN can monitor the evolution of the bridge health 
state by considering the health state of its elements, and updating the health state of 
the whole system, as soon as the virtual sensor system of the FE model provides a 
new measurement. Hence, the health state of the bridge and its components is updated 
automatically every time when a new evidence of the bridge behaviour, i.e. a new 
displacement of each joint location (6 joints on the bottom chords and 5 joints on the 
top chords, in this case study), is provided by the FE model. The steel truss bridge is 
analysed within the BBN framework by defining a node for each major element of the 
bridge, and finally, with the aim of assessing the influence of each bridge element on 
the health state of the whole bridge, a node representing the health state of the whole 
bridge is introduced in the BBN.  
Figure 3 shows the above mentioned idea, which can be explained following a top-
down reasoning process: the FE model is perturbed by introducing the effect of 
environmental threats, which lead to the deterioration of the bridge materials, such as 
the growth of the micro-cracks at the joints. A monitoring measurement system of the 
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displacements of the four chords is simulated by using the FE model, which mimics 
the sensor system on each chord. Therefore, every time that a new measurement of 
displacements is available, it is used in the BBN framework, where it is processed by 
a virtual sensors node, in order to assess the health state of the correspondent bridge 
element. The health state of each bridge element is then evaluated at the following 
level of the BBN, due to the fact the health state of each bridge element is influenced 
also by the health state of other bridge elements. Indeed, if a bridge element degrades, 
other elements are subject to an increasing load. For example, the node called Top 
chord left, which represents the health state of the top chord on the left hand side of 
the bridge, is influenced by the health state of the other chords, and consequently each 
virtual sensors node is connected to the Top chord left node, as shown in Figure 3. 
Finally, the health state of the whole bridge, which is depicted by the Bridge health 
state node, is affected by the health state of each bridge element.  
Figure 3. Bayesian Belief Network of the steel truss bridge with influence of the degradation of 
materials 
These dependencies among different elements of the bridge are expressed by using 
CPTs. The CPTs are completed by merging the information from the simulation of 
the bridge behaviour by using the FE model and the expert elicitation process (Rafiq 
et al., 2015) (Andrews et al., 2017). The virtual sensors nodes have 6 possible states, 
depending on the difference between the displacement of the healthy bridge element 
and those of the degraded element: the healthy state is defined if the difference is less 
than 1%; then, the 5 degraded states are defined by arbitrarily considering a constant 
5% step of the above mentioned difference (e.g. the first degraded state requires a 
difference between the displacement of the healthy bridge element and those of the 
degraded element higher than 1% and lower than 5%; the second degraded state 
requires a difference between 5% and 10%, etc.). Particularly, as soon as the 
displacements of the bridge element increase, the virtual sensors nodes assess the 
amount of the increment, and define the adequate health state. On the other hand, 
three mutually exclusive health states are defined for each bridge element and the 
whole bridge (i.e., for the nodes on the bottom two levels of the BBN) (Rafiq et al., 
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2015): i) a healthy state, if no corrective or repair action are required; ii) a partially 
degraded state, if some repair or prevention activities are needed, such as methods for 
restoring the corroded steel to shiny metal; iii) a severely degraded state, if 
strengthening or replacement of bridge elements is required, such as welding of a 
chord or beam, replacement of elements etc. (Ryall et al., 2000).  
3. Modelling results
The proposed SHM method for railway bridges assesses the health state of the bridge 
element, and the health state of the whole bridge, by updating the health state of each 
bridge element, using the displacements provided by the FE model. In this way, the 
reliability of the railway network can be improved by providing rapid and reliable 
information to bridge managers, regarding the health state of the bridge, by 
considering environmental threats, such as the deterioration mechanisms. 
Furthermore, possible hidden vulnerabilities can be pointed out by analysing the 
bridge as a whole system, i.e. considering the possible influence among different 
bridge elements.  
In this section, an example of the steel truss bridge, which is subject to the 
degradation of the bottom chord on the left hand side, is presented. In Section 2.2, the 
degradation mechanism has been presented, by explaining how the micro-cracks at 
the joints grow due to the effects of external factors, such as passing trains and wind, 
which constantly apply a load to the bridge structure. Figure 4 shows the evolution of 
the displacement of the bottom chord on the left hand side of the bridge: the solid 
dark line shows the displacement of the healthy chord, however, as soon as the 
material of the bridge degrades due to the environmental effect, and consequently the 
micro-cracks grow, the displacements become larger, as shown by the dark dotted 
line in Figure 4. Therefore, as the bridge structure is continuously influenced by the 
load-unload cycle, the micro-cracks become larger, and consequently, the cross 
sectional area of the bottom chord on the left hand side decreases. As a consequence, 
the displacement of the bottom chord on the left hand side increases as the micro-
cracks growth, as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Displacements of the healthy and degraded bottom chord on the left hand side of the bridge 
model 
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The seven displacement patterns depicted in Figure 4, which represent the time 
evolution of the degradation process of the steel truss bridge, are used as the input to 
the BBN in order to update the health state of the whole bridge, and of its elements. 
Indeed, it is worth mentioning that the simulated degradation mechanism of the 
materials of the bridge, which is shown in Figure 4, is a gradual process that 
continues over time after its initiation. Therefore, seven types of evidence of the 
bridge behaviour would be available over time, and as soon as a new measurement is 
available from the sensor system, the BBN could compute the probability of the 
health states of each bridge element and, thus, of the whole bridge. Figure 5 shows 
the real-time evolution of the posterior probability distributions of the health state of 
the steel truss bridge (node 5) and its components (node from 1 to 4, for the top and 
bottom chords on the right and left hand side, respectively): the real-time monitoring 
starts with the steel bridge in the healthy state, as shown by the displacement pattern 
depicted by the solid dark line in Figure 4 that is the first evidence (Evidence 1 in 
Figure 5) of the bridge behaviour provided by the measurement system of the FE 
model. Therefore, the probability of each health state for each bridge element, and for 
the whole bridge, is consequently computed, and as no degradation is present in all 
the components of the bridge, the probability of the healthy state is the largest (green 
bar in Figure 5). Then, the degradation mechanism is initiated, and therefore, the 
displacements of the bottom chord on the left hand side increase, as shown by the 
dark dotted line in Figure 4. The new measurement is immediately taken by the BBN 
(Evidence 2 in Figure 5), which updates the probability of each health state of each 
bridge element. Figure 5 shows that when Evidence 2 is used by the BBN, the 
probability of the partially degraded state of the bottom chord on the left hand side 
(yellow bar of node 4 in Figure 5) increases accordingly. It should be noted that also 
the probability of the degraded health states of other elements of the bridge (node 
from 1 to 3), and of the whole bridge health state (node 5), increases due to the 
influence among different bridge elements. In this way, possible hidden 
vulnerabilities of other bridge elements can be pointed out consequently.  
Figure 5. Evolution of the health state of the bridge using displacements as evidence of bridge 
behaviour 
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The process of monitoring continues in the same way, by providing the new available 
measurement of the displacement of the bridge elements to the BBN, which assesses 
the health state of the element of the bridge, and then of the whole bridge. Generally, 
Figure 5 shows that the probability of the partially degraded state of each bridge 
element (node from 1 to 4) increases and, consequently, the probability of the healthy 
state of the whole bridge (node 5) decreases. Particularly, the probabilities of the 
degraded states of the bottom chord on the left hand side (node 4) show the highest 
increment, as the degradation mechanism directly affects this bridge element. In this 
way, the health state of the bridge, and of its elements, can be monitored, by 
identifying the most degraded elements of the bridge. Hence, optimal maintenance 
programme can be adequately scheduled, based on the degradation level of the bridge 
elements. 
4. Conclusion
Railway bridges are pushed to their physical limits due to continuously changing 
environmental conditions, such as increasing traffic and climate change that produces 
extreme events in terms of strong winds and storms. Even though, recently the 
technology of sensors and data analysis has enhanced significantly, the railway 
bridges are mainly evaluated by visual inspections. However, in order to improve the 
reliability of the railway network by providing rapid and reliable information 
regarding to bridge managers the health state of the bridge, real-time SHM methods 
are needed. In this way, bridge manager can achieve an optimal management of the 
bridge, by reducing the risk of economic losses and disruption of the service.  
In this paper, a truss steel bridge has been modelled by using the Finite Element 
software SAP2000. The effects of environmental factors on the health state of the 
bridge have been assessed by simulating the initiation and growth of micro-cracks of 
the joints, by gradually reducing the cross sectional area of the truss elements of the 
bridge. A BBN has been developed in order to monitor the health state of the steel 
truss bridge, by considering the health state of its elements. The monitoring method 
has demonstrated to efficiently monitor and assess the evolution of the health state of 
the bridge elements over time, by updating the health state of the each bridge element 
as soon as a new evidence of the bridge behaviour is provided by the sensor system. 
Therefore, bridge managers can be informed with the health condition of the bridge, 
and optimal maintenance schedule of the bridge can be achieved by identifying the 
most degraded bridge element. In this way, the reliability of the whole railway 
network can be consequently improved.  
Real-time condition monitoring SHM methods for bridges are needed, in order to 
reduce the risk of possible losses, the whole life cost of the bridge and the 
vulnerability of the whole railway network. The proposed method is a first attempt to 
achieve this aim. Although, a good illustration of monitoring the evolution of the 
health state of the bridge has been given by the developed method, some further 
development are needed. For example, the relationship between joints and beams 
within the same chord need to be considered in the structure of the BBN, and a more 
robust definition of the CPTs is needed. In addition, the method needs to be tested 
using sensor measurements on a real bridge.  
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Tuesday 30th May: 09.40 – 10.20 
Crisis management and Critical infrastructure protection in Lithuania 
Dalius Labanauskas 
Head of National Security and Crisis Management Unit, Office of the Government, 
Republic of Lithuania 
National security is the basis for the prosperity of the State. Only a secure 
environment can ensure the functioning of a mature democratic constitutional 
order, sustainable economic growth, the protection of human rights and 
freedoms, and the viability of civil society. Instability in the world, natural and 
manmade disasters, large scale migration, humanitarian crises, terrorism, and the 
disruption of the vital societal functions and of the supply of strategically important 
resources may have negative consequences for the country. Situations which have occurred because of 
natural, technical, ecological or social events, the outbreaks of contagious diseases threatening to cause a 
major danger and threat to the health and life of the majority of the population, the environment, and to 
disturb public administration or the functioning of critical infrastructure. Such situations may increase in number 
due to negative consequences caused by the climate change. The prevention of potential threats, dangers 
and risks, and where it proves impossible to avoid them – the readiness to appropriately counter them using all 
measures and methods available to the State – steps necessary to strengthen the security of the country and 
its population. The priority of the Lithuanian government is to make sure that Lithuanian citizens feel safe in their 
homeland from all possible threats. An overview of the Lithuanian crisis management structures, responsibilities, 
coordination and information exchange mechanism, and the cooperation between the state and private 
institutions will be presented. 
Dalius Labanauskas joined the Office of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania in 2009. Prior to the 
current position he was the Head of the Analytical Division in the Crisis Management Centre under the Ministry 
of National Defence. Since 2010, he has been a member of the Lithuanian Government Emergency 
Commission. 
On an everyday basis, he is involved in risk and threat assessment, information exchange activities among 
national institutions and international partners, preparation and participation of national as well as 
international exercises such as NATO CMX. He is also involved in the European Programme for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection as a Lithuanian representative. In 2013, he was a chair of and is still actively involved in 
the Council of the European Union Friends of Presidency group, which is in charge of dealing with the EU 
Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements and Solidarity Clause implementation. 
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Tuesday 30th May: 10.20 – 11.00 
Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection and building resilience in NATO ENSEC COE 
Agenda 
Dr. Artūras Petkus 
Head of Strategic Analysis Division, NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, 
Republic of Lithuania 
Critical Energy Infrastructure has become a convenient target (especially in terms 
of Hybrid Threats) due to its complexity (fragility of security) and vital significance 
for the existence of states, effective governance and welfare of the society. Hybrid 
Threats    meanwhile    blend    elements    of    diplomacy,    clandestine    action, 
disinformation, sabotage and irregular troops to achieve strategic objectives. In other words these are a wide 
spectrum of hostile acts, where the role of the military component is limited. However these methods are being 
succesfuly employed to impact proper function of Critical Energy Infrastructure. While hybrid war can take 
place over several dimensions, it appears clear that Critical Energy Infrastructure and energy industry could be 
and will be targeted as part of a wider campaign in order to reduce the county’s ability and willingness to 
resist. 
Since protection of Critical Energy Infrastructure is primary responsibility of nations, NATO seeks to "continue to 
develop NATO’s capacity to support national authorities in protecting critical infrastructure, as well as 
enhancing their resilience against energy supply disruptions that could affect national and collective defence, 
including hybrid and cyber threats" (NATO Warsaw Summit Communique). Working in line with NATO’s 
commitments, NATO ENSEC COE provides expertise in Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection. Main outcomes 
of Center’s activities in this regard will be presented. 
Dr. Artūras Petkus joined the Strategic Analysis Division of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence in 2015 
as a Head of division. His main areas of responsibility are: performance of energy security related analysis on 
strategic level; development of methodology and theoretical approach for assessment of energy security risks 
and threats, contribution to development of NATO ACT Strategic Foresight Analysis Report as well as 
Framework for Future Alliance Operations Report; contribution to research in field of Energy Security (Overview 
of energy security in Baltic States, study “Hybrid Conflict and Critical Energy Infrastructure: the Case of Ukraine” 
etc.). 
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Wednesday 31st May: 09.00 – 09.40 
Investigation of seismicity in the Lithuanian territory 
Dr. Jurga Lazauskienė 
Head of Division of Bedrock Geology, Lithuanian Geological Survey, under the 
Ministry of Environmental, Republic of Lithuania 
The territory of Lithuania and whole region of Eastern Baltic feature a low seismic 
activity. Earth's crust of early Precambrian consolidation and significant distances 
to active tectonic zones causes situation of this kind. Nevertheless, according to 
historical and instrumental data a few dozens of local earthquakes with intensities 
reaching VII points (MSK scale) took place in the Baltic countries and adjacent Belarus since 1616 to our days. 
Two Kaliningrad earthquakes with magnitudes 4.5 and 5.0 stroke Baltic region in 2004 which indicated 
seismogenic potential of this region. These seismic events indicate that earthquakes may occur in Lithuania as 
well. Besides manifestation of some local seismic activity in Eastern Baltic, large regional earthquakes generate 
earth trembling up to intensities IV or V (MSK scale) in this area. For instance, inhabitants of Lithuania have felt 
trembling from Oslo 1905 earthquake and from earthquakes of Vrancea area in Romania in years 1940, 1977, 
1986 and 1990. 
The first  instrumental seismological observations  in Lithuania  started  in 1970 as Vilnius  seismic station  was 
founded. Three analog long period (T=25 s) and three short period (T=1.5 s) seismometers were installed in the 
territory of Institute of Physics at outskirts of Vilnius. Seismological records were processed in Obninks (Russia) 
until 1992. Later on, maintenance of station and routine data processing was undertaken by stuff of Institute of 
Physics. 450 distant and regional seismic events were reported in the seismic bulletin of Vilnius seismic station 
since 1991 to 1995. No local events were registered in Vilnius seismic station. Operation of Vilnius seismic station 
was suspended in the beginning of 1999. 
The first comprehensive study of seismic activity of Lithuania was carried out in 1988 as a part of re-examination 
of safety of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP). The top twenty-two experts of the Soviet Union concluded that 
seismic hazard was not assessed properly when INPP has been designed despite local and international 
regulations. In order to improve the situation the experts proposed to install seismic network and monitor local 
seismicity. Seismic Alarm System (SAS) and complementary Seismic Monitoring System (SMS) were installed in 
the INPP in 1999. At the same time Geological Survey of Lithuania took responsibility to process, analyse and 
store seismological data of the SMS and project of seismological monitoring was initiated there. In 2012, 
Lithuanian Geological Survey established Seismological Data Center (LGS-SDC) with two broad band seismic 
stations PBUR (Paburgė, western Lithuania) and PABE (Paberžė, central Lithuania). In addition, data from the 
SMS are also received regularly. The Lithuanian Geological Survey continued seismic monitoring of Lithuania 
and adjacent territories. Seismic data were continuously collected from seismic stations in Lithuania and 
adjacent countries. Four seismic stations are located around the INPP at distances of 30 km. These INPP and 
Lithuanian Geological Survey two broadband stations together form the current Seismic Monitoring Network of 
Lithuania. 
Lithuania has several important industrial facilities including the decommissioned INPP, Nemunas dam, nitrogen 
fertilizer factory “Achema” in Jonava, mineral fertilizer factory “Lifosa” in Kėdainiai, oil refinery “Orlen” in 
Mažeikiai, and liquefied natural gas floating storage and regasification unit terminal in Klaipėda. Therefore, 
even moderate earthquakes can cause significant damage in such objects. This shows that seismic assessment 
is important even in such low seismicity regions like Lithuania. Until present, assessments of seismic hazards were 
performed using various approaches. These assessments were, however, sporadic or they involved partly 
deterministic seismic hazard assessment – an approach that is no longer considered up-to-date. Until now, 
seismic hazard maps for entire European continent and Mediterranean region published by Jiménez et al., 
2003 and later Woessneret. al., 2015, were considered the most reliable in terms of seismic hazard assessment. 
Yet continent- scale maps are not always appropriate for small areas like Lithuania. Naturally, it was necessary 
to perform a new seismic hazard assessment of the Lithuanian territory using, modern probabilistic seismic 
hazard assessment (PSHA). This assessment had to include all available information from historical and 
instrumental seismic observation sources. A new map was compiled based on revision of an existing map of 
seismic hazard over Lithuania. It presented Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) that can be exceeded within 50 
years with probability of 10 %. 
Dr. Jurga Lazauskienė is Head of the Department of Bedrock Geology at LGT and an Associate Professor at 
Vilnius University where she teaches Geodynamics, Geotectonics and Petroleum Geology. She is actively 
involved in fields of Seismology, Petroleum and Bedrock geology, Geodynamics and sustainable development 
of natural resources. She is an author of more than 90 oral and poster presentations (75% internationally) and 
more than 15 publications in the international journals. Since year 2009 dr. Jurga Lazauskienė acts a member of 
Delegations of Republic of Lithuania for geological and seismo-tectonic issues related to Astravets NPP (Belarus 
Republic) and Kaliningrad NPP (Russian Federation) sites. 
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Round table discussion 
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Tuesday 30th May: 15.40 – 16.10 
The cybersecurity dimension of critical infrastructure 
Vytautas Butrimas 
Subject Matter Expert, Research and Lessons Learned Department, NATO Energy 
Security Center of Excellence, Republic of Lithuania 
Member, National Communications Regulatory Authority Council, Republic of 
Lithuania 
As someone occupied with government information technology (IT) and national security policy for the past 27 
years, I have worked in a changing cybersecurity environment that started from dealing with the first hackers 
invading our IT systems with viruses such as the “Michelangelo” virus of 1991 to worrying about cyber criminals, 
socially motivated hacktivists and possible activities of cyber “terrorists” to state sponsored cyber-attacks not 
limited to just IT systems. The appearance of STUXNET, the “denial of computers” attack perpetrated against 
energy company Saudi Aramco and cyber intrusions that took place in one of Ukraine’s regional power grids in 
the winter of 2015 strongly indicated that critical infrastructures that support national economies and well- 
being of modern society were now increasingly attractive targets for cyber-attacks. Additionally, the extensive 
expansion of the capabilities of modern industrial control systems (ICS) made possible by the advances in 
information and communication technologies (ICT) and their application to the management of complex 
systems running critical infrastructure has introduced, together with increased efficiencies and cost savings, 
serious dependencies and vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities that, due to a lack of understanding of the 
interrelatedness of increasingly complex systems, have given rise to unintentional incidents.  Vulnerabilities, that 
if known by “the bad guys”, may be exploited to execute intentional cyber-related attacks, attacks which are 
now possible due to the entry of IT in the formerly isolated and proprietary world of industrial control systems 
(SCADA). The new threats emanating from cyberspace have provided new and broad challenges that range 
beyond the national level to the international level. Critical infrastructure today has a cross-border or 
international dimension. Failure at a national level can affect a connected neighboring country. While some 
worthy and effective efforts are being made by national governments and industry in terms of laws, regulations 
and standards, they fall short in meeting the international dimension of today’s cyber threats. SCADA and ICS 
environments can no longer be considered safe from today’s dynamic threats emanating from cyberspace. 
This presentation will address implications of any changes to cyberspace environments that have taken place 
within the last few years that now require responses in the form of shared understanding, restraint, acceptance 
of responsibility, transparency and  cooperation. Proposals  for addressing  these new threats will also be 
discussed. 
Vytautas Butrimas has been working in information technology and security policy for over 27 years starting 
from his work as a computer specialist for Prince William County Government in Virginia, to his work on 
information society development as Vice Minister at the Ministry of Communications and Informatics, Republic 
of Lithuania.  In 1998 he moved on to the Ministry of Defense as Policy and Planning Director where he chaired 
a task force which prepared Lithuania’s first National Military Defense Strategy (approved in 2000). From 2001 to 
2011 Mr. Butrimas worked as Deputy Director responsible for IT security at the Communications and Information 
System Service (CISS) under the MoND. In 2009 he chaired taskforces which prepared the first MoND Cyber 
Defense Strategy and Implementation Plan. In 2007 (and again in 2012) the President of the Republic of 
Lithuania appointed him to the National Communications Regulatory Authority Council (RRT-Council) for a 5 
year term. He served as Chief Adviser for the Ministry of National Defense with a focus on cyber security policy 
from 2011-2016 and served on a national task force which wrote The Law on Cybersecurity passed in 2014. In 
November of 2016 he was posted by the Minister of National Defence to work as Cybersecurity Subject Matter 
Expert for the NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence in Vilnius. Mr. Butrimas has participated in NATO and 
National exercises that have included cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure in the scenarios. He has also 
contributed to various reports, written published articles and been an invited speaker at various conferences 
on Cyber Security and Defense policy issues. 
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Tuesday 30th May: 16.10 – 16.40 
Cybersecurity of electrical grid 
Marius Celskis 
Information Security Manager, the Lithuania Electricity Transmission System 
Operator: LITGRID AB, Republic of Lithuania 
Electricity management system. Main grid components - generation, transmission 
and distribution of electricity. Cybersecurity of informational and operational 
technology. Rise of attacks on critical infrastructure. Prevalent security threats and 
countermeasures. Protecting operations at Lithuania's electricity transmission 
system operator - Litgrid AB. 
Marius Celskis is Information Security Manager at the Lithuania Electricity Transmission System Operator: LITGRID 
AB. Specializing in cybersecurity of industrial control systems (incl. SCADA). Mr. Celskis has a Bachelor’s Degree 
in Electronics Engineering and Business Management from Kaunas University of Technology  and  holds  a 
number of professional certificates in Industrial Control Systems Security, Information Systems Auditing and 
Security Incident Handling. 
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ESReDA events 
ESReDA Project Groups Meetings 
Monday, 29th May, 10.00-12.00 
Lithuanian Energy Institute 
Breslaujos g. 3 (Small Hall, 2nd floor, room 202) 
PG CI‐PR/MS&A‐Data meeting will be held on May 29th, 10.00-12.00. The agenda will be circulated by the 
leader of PG CI‐PR/MS&A‐Data. The meeting is open to all the 52nd ESReDA Seminar participants. For those 
interested in participating, please contact PG leader Mohamed Eid (mohamed.eid@cea.fr) in advance. 
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ESReDA Board of Directors meeting 
Monday, 29th May, 15.00-18.00 
Lithuanian Energy Institute 
Breslaujos g. 3 (Small Hall, 2nd floor, room 202) 
The biannual meeting of the ESReDA Board of Directors will be held this afternoon. The agenda will be 
circulated by the ESReDA General Secretary to ESReDA Directors. 
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ESReDA General Assembly 
Tuesday, 30th May, 17:30-19:00 
The 52nd ESReDA seminar auditorium 
The annual meeting of the ESReDA General Assembly will be held this evening. The agenda will be circulated 
by the ESReDA General Secretary to Members. A Gala dinner for Members and participants of the seminar will 
be followed the main meeting. 
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Social events 
Gala dinner 
Tuesday, 30th May, 20:00 
Restaurant “Senieji rūsiai” (“Old cellars”) / Napoleon’s Hall 
Vilniaus g. 34, Kaunas 
Gala dinner will be held in a European standard restaurant established in the17th century cellars in the heart of 
Kaunas old town. The restaurant with the interior in the style of middle ages attracts visitors with their Napoleon’s 
Hall, Noblemen’s Hall, and the Hall of Guns. In one of the halls, there is a fresco depicting the Middle French 
Army crossing the river Nemunas on 24 June 1812 according to the lithography of De C. Montte. 
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General information 
Changes to technical and social programme 
The 52nd ESReDA seminar organizers reserve the right to adjust or change the Technical and/or Social 
Programmes as, if and when necessary. 
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Seminar venue 
Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas (Vytautas Magnus University) 
S. Daukanto g. 28 (Small Hall, 2nd floor), goo.gl/IUk03p 
Kaunas, Lithuania 
 
Kaunas is the second-largest city in Lithuania and has historically been a leading centre of Lithuanian 
economic, academic, and cultural life. Kaunas was the biggest city and the centre of a county in Trakai 
Municipality of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania since 1413. 
Kaunas is unique place since it has the oldest funiculars in the world; it is surrounded by old fortification system 
(now the castle are used for cultural activities, as museums); has the best example of high Baroque in Northern 
and Eastern Europe – “Pažaislis” Church and Monastery Ensemble; has the longest pedestrian street in Eastern 
Europe – “Laisvės alėja”. 
 
An old legend claims that Kaunas was established by the Romans in ancient times. These Romans were 
supposedly led by a patrician named Palemon, who had three sons: Barcus, Kunas and Sperus. Palemon fled 
from Rome because he feared the mad Emperor Nero. Palemon, his sons and other relatives travelled all the 
way to Lithuania. After Palemon's death, his sons divided his land. Kaunas got the land where Kaunas now 
stands. He built a fortress near the confluence of the Nemunas and Neris rivers, and the city that grew up there 
was named after him. There is also a suburban region in the vicinity named "Palemonas". 
 
Kaunas is first mentioned in written sources in 1361 when brick Kaunas Castle was constructed. In 1362, the 
castle was captured and destroyed by the Teutonic Order. The Kaunas castle was rebuilt at the beginning of 
the 15th century. 
 
In 1408, the town was granted Magdeburg Rights by Vytautas the Great and became a centre of Kaunas 
Powiat in Trakai Voivodeship in 1413. Vytautas ceded Kaunas the right to own the scales used for weighing the 
goods brought to the city or packed on site, wax processing, and woollen cloth trimming facilities. The power 
of the self-governing Kaunas was shared by three interrelated major institutions: vaitas (the Mayor), the 
Magistrate (12 lay judges and 4 burgomasters) and the so-called Benchers' Court (12 persons). Kaunas then 
began to gain prominence, since it was at an intersection of trade routes and a river port. In 1441 Kaunas 
joined the Hanseatic League, and Hansa merchant office Kontor was opened — the only one in the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania. By the 16th century, Kaunas also had a public school and a hospital and was one of the 
best-formed towns in the whole country. 
 
After the final partition of the Polish–Lithuanian state in 1795, the city was taken over by the Russian Empire and 
became a part of Vilna Governorate. During the French invasion of Russia in 1812,  the Grand Army of 
Napoleon passed through Kaunas twice, devastating the city both times. 
It is also the seat of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Kaunas. 
 
Modern Kaunas has close links with critical infrastructures. It is an important railway hub in Lithuania and city of 
the crossroads of international air transport (Kaunas airport) and road transport (Via Baltic, Rail Baltic). The 
Kaunas Hydroelectric Power Plant, located on the Nemunas River, is producing electricity for Kaunas city. 
 
Kaunas is often referred to as a city of students and basketball, often called as the second religion of Lithuania. 
http://visit.kaunas.lt/en/ 
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GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the 
address of the centre nearest you at: http://europea.eu/contact 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this 
service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: http://europa.eu 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe 
Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact). 
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